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Abstract  
This thesis offers a novel theoretical framework for analysing how political and 
media elites invoke political myths following terror attacks. It does not define 
political myths as necessarily false claim or untrue stories, but instead draws on the 
existentialist approaches of Hans Blumenberg and Chiara Bottici to argue that they 
are form of dramatic narrative that answers human needs for significance 
(Bedeutsamkeit).  Human beings require significance to live in a world that is 
otherwise indifferent to them or, as Martin Heidegger put it, they are “thrown” into. 
The thesis thereby connects modern literature on political myth to concept of 
Angst, most prominently discussed by Søren Kierkegaard and expanded upon by 
later existentialist philosophers. The thesis elaborates on this with the novel insight 
that the process of finding significance is also an act of constructing ontological 
security, and that this is particularly apparent in times of crisis. Following the 
works of Anthony Giddens and Stuart Croft, the thesis defines ontological security 
as a condition in which people have constructed a sense of biographical continuity, 
have a strong web of trust-relations, and are able to avoid Angst. The thesis argues 
that terror attacks are moments where ontological security (not just physical 
security) is under threat, and that the process of finding significance 
(Bedeutsamkeit) through the work on myth simultaneously (re)establishes 
ontological security.  It focuses on two empirical examples: the 7
th
 July 2005 
bombings in London and the 2013 Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby. Following these 
terror attacks, senior political figures and media commentators invoked a political 
myth which portrayed the United Kingdom as embroiled in an existential conflict 
with violent radical Muslims inspired by a warped interpretation of Islam. The 
thesis concludes that its novel theoretical framework can enable an understanding 
of discursive responses to other terror attacks across the globe. 
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Thesis Introduction  
This thesis intends to demonstrate the importance of political myth 
and ontological security following terror attacks. While recent literature on 
political myth has substantially enriched the study of politics, it is currently 
missing a golden opportunity to engage with the burgeoning literature on 
ontological security. This is somewhat surprising since both are concerned 
with fundamental questions about our individual and social existence and 
how we relate to the world around us. The thesis therefore seeks to enhance 
the existentialist theories of political myth in particular
1
 by incorporating 
ontological security literature while simultaneously strengthening the 
philosophical underpinnings of the latter.
2
 But why is this oversight 
important and why should it be addressed? More specifically, what is the 
original contribution of this thesis and what will it enable us to do? The 
main contribution is that it provides a novel theoretical toolkit through 
which to analyse the rhetoric following terror attacks that concentrates 
specifically on how political language is deployed in order to answer 
existential concerns (of “being” as discussed in existentialist philosophy) in 
these crucial moments. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, these 
crises tend to dominate media and political discourses in their immediate 
aftermath and may form the backdrop for legitimising radical policy 
changes, normally in the form of new counter-terrorism legislation. 
Secondly, these crises can often have substantial social impacts and, in 
recent years, this has taken the form of empowering the far-right. Finally, in 
terms of the contribution to the political myth literature more specifically, it 
is the first piece of work to my knowledge that links existentialist theories of 
political myth to political crises, specifically terror attacks. This is important 
both can coalesce and provide a currently absent framework for 
                                                          
1
 Chiara Bottici, A Philosophy of Political Myth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand, "Rethinking Political 
Myth : The Clash of Civilizations as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy," European Journal 
of Social Theory 3, no. 9 (2006); The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2010).  
2
 Stuart Croft, "Constructing Ontological Insecurity: The Insecuritization of 
Britain's Muslims," Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 2 (2012); Anthony 
Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).  
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understanding the relation between political rhetoric and answering the 
human problems discussed by existentialist philosophy. 
In part I of the thesis, I develop an existentialist approach to political 
myth that incorporates vital insights from the ontological security literature.   
In part II, I utilise two examples of how politicians and media elites 
responded to two terrorist attacks: the 2005 London bombings and the 
murder of Lee Rigby in 2013. I argue that both politicians and media elites 
attempted to evoke a sense significance and ontological security for their 
audiences by invoking political myth following these attacks – regardless of 
whether they would use this terminology or not. To be more specific, I make 
the novel argument that the process of finding significance via political 
myth is simultaneously a process of constructing ontological security. 
However, it must be said from the outset that I am not referring to myth in 
the mainstream pejorative sense as a necessarily false narrative or claim. 
Indeed the vast majority of academic studies do not assess myth in terms of 
its claims to truth, but in the nature of its content and its function in society.
3
 
I shall first proceed with a literature review before outlining the structure of 
the thesis. 
Literature Review  
 
There is no universally agreed-upon definition of myth. However, 
scholars are nonetheless united in the conviction that myth is at least a 
“socially significant product of humanity’s irrepressible urge to construct 
meaning”.4 This is especially reflected in the literature on political myth, 
which has taken many different forms throughout the twentieth century in 
particular. The revolutionary syndicalist Georges Sorel saw the creation of 
myths as necessary for any successful revolutionary movement, not least 
because human beings require more than just reason but also passion and 
imagination in order to incite great social changes.
5
 Ernst Cassirer similarly 
                                                          
3
 To stress this point further, I am not arguing that there is no physical threat posed 
by people conducting acts of violence in the name of particular interpretations of 
Islam.  
4
 Andrew Von Hendy, The Modern Construction of Myth (Bloomington, IL: 
Indiana University Press, 2002), 333. 
5
 Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 28. 
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noted the power of myth in politics. However, where Sorel glorified 
violence and had a generally favourable view of myth, Cassirer saw it as a 
regression with potentially horrific consequences. In his classic work The 
Myth of the State, Ernst Cassirer was horrified by what he saw as the power 
of mythic thought to lead to barbaric and repressive politics.
6
 Having lived 
through the rise of the Nazis, he had witnessed the rise of myth in its most 
pernicious and volatile form. 
These two classic studies were influential in informing other 
theoretical approaches to myth throughout the twentieth century. Most other 
studies emphasised the cognitive and emotional aspects of political myth. 
Regarding the former, Lance Bennett aptly describes myths as being 
“lenses” through which we view the world.7 Christopher Flood borrows 
from the discipline of social psychology to describe myths as functioning 
effectively as invokes the concept of “cognitive schema” or, a socially 
acquired cognitive framework which functions as an “organizing and 
filtering procedure for the reception of new information, be it the 
combination of sights and sounds into images of physical objects or the 
complex perception of social situations”.8 For Flood, and many other 
modern-day scholars of political myth, part of this important filtering 
feature in politics is found in ideology.
9
 Bruce Lincoln for instance refers to 
political myths as ideologies in narrative form.
10
 While Flood, Lincoln, and 
others who have approached myth in conjunction with ideology make 
valuable contributions to the literature, the overly-close association of myth 
and ideology is problematic (I discuss this further in Chapter 2). However, 
political myths are not simply a means through which we process 
                                                          
6
 Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1974). 
7
 Lance Bennett, "Myth, Ritual and Political Control," Journal of Communication 
30, no. 4 (1980). 
8
 Christopher G. Flood, Political Myth: A Theoretical Introduction (New York: 
Garland, 1996), 81. 
9
 Bruce Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies 
of Myth, Ritual and Classification (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); 
Alexander Wöll and Harald Wydra, Democracy and Myth in Russia and Eastern 
Europe (London/New York: Routledge, 2007); M.A. Ashraf, Al Qaeda's Ideology 
Through Political Myth and Rhetoric, in A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD 
at the University of St Andrews (University of St Andrews, 2012); Flood, Political 
Myth: A Theoretical Introduction. 
10
 Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of 
Myth, Ritual and Classification. 
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information. They also have a strong emotive element that engenders 
feelings of belonging and attachment. Indeed, Carl J. Friedrich argued that 
any form of political community is inconceivable without myth. For him, 
myths function as emotional glue that unites communities while softening 
“the cold rationality of reason of state.”11 National myths in particular rely 
on this kind of emotional power, as well-elaborated upon by Anthony 
Smith.
12
  
The most promising recent developments in the study of political 
myth – and the ones I make the most extensive use of - are those that have 
been described by Christoffer Kølvraa and Jan Ifervsen as “existential” 
approaches to political myth.
13
 These are found primarily in the works of 
Chiara Bottici.
14
 Bottici argues that myth is a process of work on a basic 
narrative pattern that responds to a need for significance (Bedeutsamkeit). 
While human beings require a sense of meaning in order to master the world 
they live in, they also require significance to live in a world that is less 
“indifferent” to them. In this sense, political myths are narratives that allow 
us to orient ourselves, feel about, and act within, our political world.
15
 The 
two core features of Bottici’s conceptualisation of political myth - that they 
are a process and respond to a need for significance - are heavily influenced 
by German philosopher Hans Blumenberg.  In his Work on Myth, (Arbeit 
am Mythos), Blumenberg argues that myth answers a human problem: how 
to function in the “absolutism of reality.”16 Put simply, this is a condition in 
which human beings are unable to ground a position of significance in a 
world full of unaccountable simultaneous events that are indifferent to them. 
Failure to do this threats the rise of extreme Angst, which is a condition I 
reflect upon on more generally in Chapter 1. For now, we can understand it 
as a state of a negative feeling that results from a uniquely human condition 
                                                          
11
  Carl Joachim Friedrich, Man and his Government: An Empirical Theory of 
Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963).97 
12
 Anthony Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
13
 Christoffer Kølvraa and Jan Ifversen, Myth and History Politics in European 
integration: The Myth of the Fathers, in Paper presented at the European Union 
Studies Association conference (Boston, Massachusetts2011), 5. 
14
 Bottici refers to her approach as a “philosophical” approach to political myth, 
and outlines this extensively in: Bottici, A Philosophy of Political Myth. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Hans Blumenberg, Work on Myth (MIT Press, 1985). 
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of freedom and responsibility. There is no objective sense of meaning for 
human beings that is not created by them. The problem with Angst is that it 
does not provide us with a “direct object”, unlike fear.  While unpleasant, 
fear can be understood and addressed more easily since it has a definite, 
tangible source.  
It is because of these problems that human beings need 
“significance” (Bedeutsamkeit). Significance accordingly provides “closure” 
by reducing the innumerable possibilities of “being” within the multitude of 
possibilities within the absolutism of reality.
17
 Myths must therefore be 
more than mere narratives; they must, as Bottici argues borrowing from 
Karoly Kerényi, “ground” (begründen) significance.18 Myths ground 
significance and a sense of certainty in a world that would otherwise be 
indifferent to us. However, they do not do this permanently; they need to be 
constantly re-articulated to suit present circumstances. This means that 
myths are constantly in a process of being invoked in different contexts with 
different variations depending upon people’s needs. This is what 
Blumenberg called the “work on myth”. The work on myth refers to the fact 
that myths are told, retold, and invoked in different contexts all the time, 
albeit with the same general features. As Blumenberg puts it, “[M]yths are 
stories that are distinguished by a high degree of constancy in their narrative 
core and by an equally pronounced capacity for marginal variation.”19  
Blumenberg was referring to literary myths in particular, but his theory can 
also apply to politics. The changeability and immediate needs of politics 
practices necessitates myths being adapted to suit present circumstances. 
Indeed, as Bottici points out, political myths are always told from the 
standpoint of the present and: 
…it is in light of the continual change in their present 
conditions that human beings are impelled to go back to 
their political narratives, revise them in light of their new 
needs and exigencies through their reception, or, when 
this is not possible, dismiss them.
20
 
In co-authored publications with Benoît Challand, Bottici has 
applied this theory of myth into two empirical case studies. The first is the 
                                                          
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Bottici, A Philosophy of Political Myth, 123; Karoly Kerényi, "Prolegomena," in 
Essays on a Science of Mythology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 7. 
19
 Blumenberg, Work on Myth, 34. 
20
 Bottici, A Philosophy of Political Myth, 187. 
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“Clash of Civilizations”, which they argue is more than an academic theory, 
but a political myth that permeates multiple aspects of society.
21
 The second 
study investigates the role of political myth and memory in forming 
European identity.
22
  Joanne Esch has also discussed the role of political 
myth in legitimising the US-led “War on Terror” following 9/11.23 Drawing 
from Piotr Cap, she argues that political myth was invoked as part of a 
strategy of “legitimisation via proximisation”, wherein threats of the “other” 
were portrayed in speeches by the speaker as literally closing in on the 
addressee.
24
 This ultimately, she argues, contributed to “legitimising” the 
2001 invasion of Afghanistan. 
While existential approaches to political myth have enriched the 
study of politics, I believe there is an important gap within them that needs 
to be addressed. Namely, that the literature on political myth has barely 
engaged with the literature ontological security.
25
 To my knowledge the 
only exception to this is Vincent Della Sala’s recent work on political myth 
and the European Union. He argues that the EU’s political myths become 
normative and cognitive maps which provide the EU with ontological 
security. However, he does not explore the concept of ontological security 
in great detail and is less concerned with the existential philosophical 
underpinnings of either ontological security or political myth, which I 
explore in Chapter 1. My thesis explores the relations between these 
concepts at a more fundamental level. It also provides a methodological 
toolkit to analyse how these phenomena appear in political and media 
rhetoric. The lack of engagement between the two literatures is an important 
oversight for the existential approaches to political myth in particular owing 
                                                          
21
 Bottici and Challand, "Rethinking Political Myth : The Clash of Civilizations as 
a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy."; The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations. 
22
 Imagining Europe: Myth, Memory and Identity (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013 ). 
23
 Joanne Esch, "Legitimizing the "War on Terror": Political Myth in Official-
Level Rhetoric," Political Psychology 31, no. 3 (2010). 
24
 Ibid.; Piotr Cap, "Language and Legitimization: Developments in the 
Proximization Model of Political Discourse Analysis," Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 
1 (2005); Proximization in the Discourse of Politics: Legitimizing the War on 
Terror, in Paper Presented at the Conference on Culture, Language and Social 
Practice (Boulder, Colorado 2007); "Towards the Proximization Model of the 
Analysis of Legitimization in Political Discourse," Journal of Pragmatics 35 
(2008). 
25
  Vincent Della Sala, "Europe's Odyssey?: Political Myth and the European 
Union," Nations and Nationalism 22, no. 3 (2016)..  
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to the concern of ontological security research with the core existential 
concept of Angst, as discussed initially by Søren Kierkegaard, and which is 
indirectly invoked by Hans Blumenberg in his theory of myth. 
 Ontological security goes beyond traditional physical/somatic 
notions of security and is instead concerned with the security of being.  R.D. 
Laing first coined the term “ontological security” to refer to a “continuous 
person” that enjoys a stable and whole existence in reality.26 Despite 
Laing’s importance, the most prominent modern-day scholar of ontological 
security is Anthony Giddens. He argues that it concerns a “person’s 
fundamental sense of safety in the world and includes a basic trust of other 
people” and obtaining this trust is “necessary in order for a person to 
maintain a sense of psychological well-being and avoid existential 
anxiety”.27 Giddens emphasises the importance of a continuous narrative, or 
“sense of self” which can be found in the self’s ability to “keep the narrative 
going”. When we are ontologically secure, we feel whole and can act in 
comfort since we bracket out “questions about ourselves, others, and the 
object-world which have to be taken for granted in order to keep on with 
everyday activity”.28  
Ontological security has been applied to an array of studies across 
the Humanities and Social Sciences. Jayde Cahir has conducted research  on 
the ontological security of people who were subjected to a policy of mass 
surveillance of individuals in Australia following the Cronulla riots.
29
 
Stephen F. Ostertag has investigated how people mentally intercept, 
negotiate and use news media in ways to maintain ontological security. He 
finds that this normally results in “lay theorising” and “ignorant othering” in 
an attempt to simplify the complexities of social environments.
30
  Karie 
Marie Norgaard has revealed how a desire to avoid unpleasant emotions that 
threaten people’s ontological security could prevent social movement 
                                                          
26
 R.D. Laing, The Divided Self (London: Penguin, 1990). 
27
 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 37. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Jayde Cahir, "Balancing Trust and Anxiety in a Culture of Fear: Text Messaging 
and Riots," SAGE Open 3, no. 2 (2013). 
30
 Stephen F. Ostertag, "Processing Culture: Cognition, Ontology, and the News 
Media," Sociological Forum 25, no. 4 (2010). 
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participation on crucial issues such as climate change.
31
 Ontological security 
was first introduced to the discipline of International Relations (IR) by Jef 
Huysmans.
32
  Jennifer Mitzen and Brent Steele have both comprehensively 
theorised on how ontological security could be applied to IR,
33
 with the 
latter focusing particularly on how European states stabilise their self-
identity as “civilising” actors.34 Dmitry Chernobrov has analysed the role of 
ontological security in satisfying identity-needs during perceived 
international crises.
35
 Karl Gustafsson has argued that the deterioration of 
Sino-Japanese relations is partly due to challenges to ontological security, 
with this resulting from disruptions to their reciprocally performed and 
routinesed processes of recognition.
36
   However, Stuart Croft’s work on 
ontological security is the most directly relevant to this thesis. Croft has 
sought to bring the existentialist roots of ontological security (as elaborated 
on in section 1.3) back to the forefront. He argues for ontological security to 
be understood in terms of a need to construct biographical continuity, a web 
of trust relations, self-integrity, and a continual struggle against insecurity.
37
  
However, what is often missed by these studies is the manner in which 
conflict itself can help (re)establish ontological security, despite any 
physical or somatic threats. This has recently been addressed by Bahar 
Rumelili et al, who make precisely this argument and supports it with a 
series of case-studies.
38
 Rumelili points out that although conflicts “threaten 
                                                          
31
 Kari Marie  Norgaard, ""People Want to Protect Themselves a Little Bit”: 
Emotions, Denial, and Social Movement Nonparticipation," Sociological Inquiry 
76, no. 3 (2006). 
32
 Jef Huysmans, "Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier 
" European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 2 (1998). 
33
 Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the 
Security Dilemma," ibid.12, no. 3 (2006); Brent Steele, Ontological Security in 
International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
34
 Jennifer Mitzen, "Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities 
and Ontological Security," Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006). 
35
 Dmitry Chernobrov, "Ontological Security and Public (Mis)Recognition of 
International Crises: Uncertainty, Political Imagining, and the Self," Political 
Psychology 37, no. 5 (2016). 
36
 Karl Gustaffson, "Routinised Recognition and Anxiety: Understanding the 
Deterioration in Sino-Japanese Relations," Review of International Studies 42, no. 
4 (2016). 
37
 Croft, "Constructing Ontological Insecurity: The Insecuritization of Britain's 
Muslims." Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
38
 Bahar Rumelili, "Introduction," in Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security: 
Peace Anxieties, ed. Bahar Rumelili (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2015), 2. 
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the physical security of the parties involved” they also “help settle certain 
existential questions about basic parameters of life, about being, self in 
relation to external world and others, and identity.
39
 This is largely because 
they augment the social production of definite objects of fear (as 
distinguished from Angst), construct unambiguous moral standards, and 
create systems of meaning that clearly differentiate friends from enemies.
40
 
The core argument by the authors of this edited volume is that the prospect 
of peace processes can in fact induce ontological insecurity, and they 
demonstrate this with a series of case studies discussing protracted conflicts 
including Israel/Palestine, Turkey’s Kurdish conflicts, the Cyprus conflicts, 
and the “troubles” in Northern Ireland.41  
Both political myth and ontologically security deal with the same 
fundamental existential concerns regarding Angst as discussed above. 
Furthermore, conflicts are often supported by and legitimised by political 
myths. This is particularly true in the case of legitimising the US-led “war 
on terror” and also the legitimisation of violent jihad.42 Political myths are 
fundamentally dramatic and contain themes of good and evil, tragedy and 
joy, and victory and defeat among other things. They simplify phenomena 
into dramatic absolutes, and provide people with the sense of certainty and 
security that we would need to avoid the conditions of Angst. They 
additionally add a sense of significance (as discussed in Blumenberg and 
Bottici)
43
 which not only provides the consistency of ontological security, 
but grounds a stronger sense of meaning that makes the world less 
indifferent to us. Furthermore and crucially to this thesis, my argument is 
that political myth is often invoked as part of an attempt to re-establish a 
sense of ontological security in response to perceived crises. More 
                                                          
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Ibid., 3. 
41
 All of these are relevant, but interesting engagements with ontological security 
can be found in: Ayşe Betül  Çelik, "The Kurdish Issue and Levels of Ontological 
Security," ibid. Amir Lupovici, "Ontological security and the Israeli-Palestinian 
Peace Process," in Conflict  Resolution and Ontological Security: Peace Anxieties, 
ed. Bahar Rumelili (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2015); ibid. 
42
 Esch, "Legitimizing the "War on Terror": Political Myth in Official-Level 
Rhetoric."; Xander Kirke, "Violence and Political Myth: Radicalizing Believers in 
the Pages of Inspire Magazine," International Political Sociology 9, no. 4 (2015). 
43
 Blumenberg, Work on Myth; Bottici, A Philosophy of Political Myth. 
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specifically, significance-making (Bedeutsamkeit) in the work on political 
myth has the effect of providing ontological security.  
The examples throughout this thesis show myth being invoked by 
political and media elites in response to terror attacks, bringing all the 
themes of good/evil, tragedy/joy, heroism/villainy to the fore. It simplifies 
phenomena to at least make the self/other relation seem constant. Even if the 
threat posed by the “other” generates fear (and sometimes it does not), this 
is a preferable situation to the absolutism of Angst. What my thesis 
demonstrates is that there are important links between ontological security – 
particularly relating to the need for biographical continuity as discussed by 
Anthony Giddens and Stuart Croft - with the existential political myth 
literature that need to be further explored. While the empirical example 
discussed in this thesis is the political myth of a perceived conflict with a 
violent, radical form of Islam and Muslims, I believe the theoretical 
framework to be compatible with multiple studies of conflict or perceived 
conflict. 
Structure of the thesis  
 
Chapter 1 discusses the concept of political myth. While there is no 
universally agreed definition of political myth, the vast majority of 
academic studies do not use the term in the mainstream pejorative sense as 
necessarily false or implausible stories. Drawing from the existentialist 
approach in myth, I argue that myths provide us with a way of making sense 
of the world. They do not necessarily answer the ultimate meanings of 
existence, however, which would be the domain of religion. What matters is 
that they enable people to act in the “here and now;” to make sense of social 
processes within the world. As Henry Tudor once claimed, a political myth 
is a story told for a specific purpose and is not just a source of amusement.
44
 
In this section I also stress a vital point: by referring to Britain’s conflict 
with a violent, radical form of Islam as a political myth, I am not claiming 
that it is not true. I am not saying that there are no objective threats to life 
and limb posed by people who claim to represent Islam.
45
 Rather, I am using 
                                                          
44
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the concept of myth in the existentialist philosophical sense as a narrative 
that responds to a need for significance and ontological security. The most 
important thing to consider is what a particular political myth does rather 
than whether is it objectively true or false. Foundation myths for instance, 
like those of the USA and the European Union, all have a particular function 
for people within those political orders which may be irrelevant for those 
who are not associated with them. Spaniards would be unlikely to be 
enthused by the tails of the heroism of the founding fathers of the USA, for 
example, whereas a very different reaction may be expected from an 
American citizen. It is likely that neither would deny that all (or most) of the 
events actually occurred, and neither of their views about the same event are 
necessarily true or false. They are just viewed differently and have vast 
discrepancies in their importance for these respective countries. 
In this section I also discuss the three core aspects of myth: the 
cognitive, the integrative, and the mobilising.  Myths are dramatic and often 
highly emotive narratives. They can (and often do) incite people towards 
political action for a whole variety of different causes. The scholar who 
perhaps best elaborated on the mobilising potential of political myth was 
Georges Sorel, who saw the creation of myths as necessary for any 
successful revolutionary movement. According to him, myths are not simply 
“descriptions of things”, but are “expressions of a determination to act.”46 
For Sorel, the human mind is “so constituted that it cannot remain content 
with the mere observation of facts” and therefore cannot function on reason 
alone.
47
 Indeed, if we relied on just reason, then we would have not had any 
of the major historical changes which, Sorel argues, were always created 
through imaginative means. Myth allows us to capture “the activity, 
sentiments and the ideas of the masses as they prepare themselves to enter 
on a decisive struggle.”48 Sorel felt that this kind of motivating force could 
be used to unite people under a myth of the General Strike more than any 
deep intellectual inquiry could. I then assess two further critical features of 
the work on myth: the “cognitive” and the “integrative aspect”. The 
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cognitive aspect of myth is fundamentally simplifying. Myth provides 
people with mental maps to interpret events and also gives guidelines for 
behaviour. The integrative aspect of myth allows people to associate 
themselves within social and political collectives. Many scholars have 
pointed out that myths have a certain unifying capacity. My approach draws 
from social psychology and specifically the research into the concept of 
“entitativity.”  Entitativity was first introduced to social psychology by D.T. 
Campbell to refer to “the degree of having nature of an entity, of having real 
existence.”49 This refers to the perception of groups as possessing unity and 
coherence which is abstract from the individuals which constitute it. 
Ultimately, political myths provide cognitive lenses through which people 
can interpret and make sense of political events.
50
 They also allow 
individuals to associate themselves more firmly within social and political 
collectives.
51
 The relational and process nature of societies means that 
myths are always circulating, being altered, and adapted to, different parts 
of society. The narratives of a clash between goodness and evil, respective 
heroic and villainous figures of these categories, and the idea of a constant 
threat posed by the other (some Muslims), are all repeated but applied 
contextually.  
While this gives us a definition of myth, it would not sufficiently 
answer why we need myths. Section 1.3 attempts this. I argue that myths 
answer fundamental human existential needs for significance and 
ontological security. I draw from the existentialist philosophies of Søren 
Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger and, to a lesser extent, 
Jean-Paul Sartre to argue that human beings are faced with the problem of 
finding answers to our “being” in the world. We struggle to construct a 
coherent sense of self which mediates between the totality of the world and 
our own comparatively small, subjective position within it. In this vein, I 
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argue that political myths exist in order to respond to the fundamental 
existential problems that have been discussed by such philosophers for 
generations: the problems of Angst and estrangement. To explain this, I 
draw from Kierkegaard’s idea of the tension between the infinite and the 
finite. The “infinite” corresponds to “possibility”, or the capacity to 
envisage new ideas, bring new creations into existence, choose from 
innumerable potentialities and, ultimately, change oneself. The “finite” 
corresponds to “actuality” or “necessity”, understood as the concrete “here 
and now” and our reality as a definite “something” in the world.52 This 
tension between the finite infinite is a chief cause of what Kierkegaard 
refers to as Angst (anxiety). For Kierkegaard, Angst had to be differentiated 
from fear, since fear refers to “something definite” whereas “anxiety is 
freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility”.53 Political myths are 
one way that the tensions between the absolutism of the infinite and the 
particularity of the finite are addressed.  Although Kierkegaard is not 
generally discussed by modern day theorists of political myth, the same 
problems that Kierkegaard emphasised seem to resonate with their theories.  
I argue that his philosophy synthesises well with Hans Blumenberg’s 
existentialist take on myth, that asks how we function within the 
“absolutism of reality” as discussed above.54  
In section 1.4 I point out that much of this theory the observations 
made by existential approaches to political myth are also closely reflected in 
current sociological research into ontological security. This research is most 
fundamentally concerned with security of being, and not just the physical, 
somatic, or raw-survival that dominates traditional security studies.
55
 I argue 
that the existentialist approach to political myth in particular is substantially 
enhanced when the concept of significance (Bedeutsamkeit) engages 
directly with ontological security. This is primarily because what 
Blumenberg and Bottici both discuss is reflected in decades of ontological 
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security research, and it reveals just how important political myths are to our 
understanding of politics.  I see the main point of interaction between 
political myth and ontological security as follows: the process of 
significance (Bedeutsamkeit) making through the work on myth is also a 
process of ontologically securitising.
56
 The work on myth ensures that even 
when one’s physical security is threatened, one’s security of being can be 
re-assured. This is because myth does not answer questions of existence in 
the sense of survival, but also wider questions about who we are and what 
we might become. Although there are numerous approaches to ontological 
security, I will adopt Stuart Croft’s approach which understands ontological 
security as the need to construct biographical continuity, to construct a web 
of trust relations, and to act according to self-integrity and, crucially, to 
struggle against ontological insecurity.
57
  
Chapter 2 assesses the relationship between political myth and other 
related phenomena: ideology, religion, and science. After introducing the 
discussion in section 2.1, I use section 2.2 to distinguish the phenomenon of 
myth from that of ideology Although political myths and political ideologies 
appear together in practice, they are qualitatively different insofar as 
ideologies are concerned with ideas, whereas myths are fundamentally 
narratives. They are not the same thing, but they do sometimes appear 
together in practice, as American ideals of freedom and liberty are often 
heavily interwoven with myths about the exploits of the founding fathers. I 
begin this section by tracing the concept of ideology from its original 
iteration by Destutt du Tracy as the “science of ideas” to subsequent 
“pejorative” definitions of the concept. I assess a variety of pejorative 
approaches to ideology particularly as it was influenced by Karl Marx and 
adopted in much of 20
th
 Century political philosophy. Bottici argues that 
pejorative ideological views lend themselves to ironically becoming 
ideological and, furthermore, they risk falling into the trap of distinguishing 
between “myth” versus “reality.”58 This latter point is important in 
particular since adopting a pejorative take on ideology and linking it closely 
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to political myth leaves researchers in a position of adopting a pejorative 
understanding of myth. In section 2.3 I move on to distinguish between 
myth and political religion. I argue that political religions answer many of 
the fundamental existential concerns that political myths do, but in a far 
more absolutist and totalising manner. My understanding of political 
religions draws heavily from the writings of Eric Voegelin.  Voegelin 
distinguished between two overarching forms of religion: Überweltiche 
Religionen (transworldly religions) and Innerweltliche Religionen (inner-
worldly religions).
59
 The former can be described in the traditional sense 
and the latter could be understood as a form of religion that is less 
concerned with eschatological salvation “beyond the world”, but a form of 
salvation  “within the world”.60 For Voegelin, the latter is problematic 
primarily because it does not allow itself to be subject to scientific critique. 
Instead, these inner-worldly religions will attempt only to shift the concept 
of truth. I argue that political religions were most vividly seen in the 
communism and Nazism of the 20
th
 century. 
Finally, in section 2.4 I argue that myth is not necessarily in 
opposition to reason and scientific inquiry. Instead, I posit that myths can 
answer the fundamental existential needs discussed in chapter 1 that reason 
and science do not necessarily fulfil. I point out that myths are less likely to 
answer “ontic” questions that science is concerned with. Put more simply, 
what matters is not whether a myth is able to accurately reflect truth or 
falseness, but whether it can answer the existential issues discussed in 
section 1.3. Nonetheless, scholarship in the 19
th
 and early-mid 20
th
 centuries 
remained wedded to the idea that myths were in tension with reason and 
science, and I discuss this with reference to Bruce Malinowski and James 
George Frazer in particular.
61
 Furthermore, I consider Ernst Cassirer’s view 
of myth as a form of social and cognitive regression that he outlines in Myth 
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of the State.
62
  I argue, however, that this is not inevitable, and that myth can 
in fact be used to aid scientific enquiry and some scientific achievements 
have been mythologised. This is aptly demonstrated by Vincent Mosco’s 
discussion of the “myth of cyberspace”.63  
Chapter 3 is my methodology chapter. After introducing the 
discussion in section 3.1, it discusses the linguistic cues that will be 
analysed as evidence for the presence of the work on myth. I search for 
instances of deixis and specific linguistic tropes.  Deixis refers to the act of 
“pointing” via language, and any such linguistic form which accomplishes 
this “pointing” is called a deictic expression. There are three important types 
of deixis: person, place, and time. Person deixis refers to “human 
participants” who will typically be the speaker their supporters and allies, 
enemies and opponents, or other members of the intended audience. Place 
deixis encodes spatial relations relative to the location of the speaker, but 
can also be words or expressions that point to a specific location. Some 
linguistic tropes are important for the work on myth. I identify two 
important types of trope: metaphor, metonymy, and the subtype of the latter: 
synecdoche. One of the observations I make throughout the thesis is that 
deixis is exceptionally important to the work on myth. This is because deixis 
is about positioning, and this is particularly important when we are 
concerned with our places within the world, and even more so when we are 
concerned with the potential rise of Angst.  
In section 3.3 I discuss the sources I select for analysis in chapters 5 
and 6, I devote substantial time to justifying this selection.  I explain that I 
selected political speeches, parliamentary debates, and newspaper columns. 
Speeches are carefully orchestrated to appeal to public sentiments and, 
where possible, to persuade them towards a particular view.  My analysis of 
political speeches and parliamentary debates draws heavily from the works 
of Jonathan Charteris-Black, who has written extensively on political 
rhetoric, and especially on the usage of metaphor and myth by speakers. I 
synthesise this with my analysis of deixis to explain how I will approach the 
political speeches I select in Part II. I also outline how and why I analyse 
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Newspaper columns. I explain my attempts to find some balance in the 
political affiliation of the newspapers in question, and why I select a tabloid 
and a broadsheet newspaper from left and right-leaning publications. My 
analysis of right-leaning publications comes mostly from the Daily Mail and 
the Telegraph, and my left-wing analysis is from the Guardian and the 
Daily Mirror. I used the same search terms as I did for section 3.3 and 
conducted it within the same time period. This meant that some columnists 
appeared more than others. One example would be Melanie Phillips of the 
Daily Mail who features particularly heavily in this regard, owing largely to 
her deep concern with the perceived threat of radical Islam.  
  This section also discusses the limitations of my methodology and 
offers a defence of how I select and interpret my material. I do not claim to 
comprehensively resolve these issues, but offer a defence of my approach. I 
emphasise that my reading of these materials is somewhat subjective, and 
that others may read the same material differently. This largely reflects the 
hermeneutic claim that there is no independently objective reading of such 
texts.
64
 My examples should not be read as a comprehensive, empirical 
“case-study” in the sense that much of traditional social science would 
expect. Rather, it should be read as a discussion about a particular empirical 
example, with a much closer scrutiny of the work on myth in individual 
sources. While all actors contribute to the work on myth, some are more 
influential in being able to “direct” it than others. This is why I focus 
primarily on prominent media and political discourses in the aftermath of 
major crises. The section also discusses the general limitations that come 
with qualitative research grounded in interpretivism. The biggest drawback 
is the temptation that researchers have to “cherry-pick” their data. I attempt 
to justify my approach to these issues despite these valid concerns. I 
conclude in section 3.4 with a reflection on my discussion, and outline 
briefly what will be discussed in part II of the thesis. 
Part II begins to apply the theoretical framework into an empirical 
example. In chapter 4 I outline the core aspects of the political myth, after 
introducing the topic in section 4.1, I use section 4.2 to argue that narratives 
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about Britain facing an existential conflict with a pernicious violent radical 
form of Islam have become a political myth. It must be once again stressed 
that I do not refer to these narratives as a political myth because I believe 
they are false, but because they have taken on a dramatic and figurative 
form that serves to provide people with a sense of significance and 
ontological security. The myth posits that Britain is facing an existential 
threat from this radical other and that it must ultimately triumph and 
resolutely destroy this threat. I point out two key themes of this myth: the 
notions of “British resilience” and “British values”. The former draws from 
memories of British resilience in the Second World War, while the latter 
refers to values of Britishness that are often associated with liberalism. The 
myth posits that Britain will overcome its nemesis, as the enemy is so 
barbaric that it cannot be  reconciled with Britain and Britishness. The 
distinction is made more complex by the fact that there are “good” Muslims 
who can be distinguished from “bad” Muslims. The former, it is often 
claimed, must do more to convert the latter.   
In section 4.3 I point out that there are two variants on the work on 
myth. As Blumenberg explained, myths are “distinguished by a high degree 
of constancy in their narrative core and by an equally pronounced capacity 
for marginal variation”.65 I note that the work on myth in this case has high 
levels of constancy, but all key parts of variation that seem to be associated 
by political leanings.  While both left and right-leaning politicians and 
newspaper columnists accept the fundamental premise that there is an 
existential threat posed by a radical, violent, Islamic other, the way they 
express this view differs. The right-wing is more likely to blame tolerance 
of multiculturalism and an abject failure to defend British values for such 
attacks. They are also likely to blame Muslims or Islam itself for their 
failure to prevent such attacks. By contrast, left wing analysis also tends to 
defend multi-culturalism and will often refer to the mental deficiencies of 
the bombers. Section 4.4 concludes by reflecting on these issues before 
introducing the empirical examples to be discussed in chapter 5 and 6. 
Chapter 5 concerns the first two of my empirical examples: the 
London Bombings of 7
th
 July 2005.  As indicated in chapter 3, my empirical 
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analysis consists of political speeches, parliamentary debates, and 
Newspaper articles following the attack. I explain what happened on the day 
of the event in the introductory section (5.1). I subsequently use section 5.2 
to analyse the response of senior politicians in their speeches and in 
parliamentary debates. I comment particularly on Tony Blair’s reaction to 
the event in the two months following the attack, analysing key speeches 
and parliamentary debate. The section demonstrates how politicians deploy 
the work on myth in order to evoke this sense of significance and re-
establish ontological security. I point out that the “British resilience” 
narrative theme first discussed in section 4.2 was strongly present in this 
period. In particular, many comparison were made between the resilience of 
Britons and Londoners especially and those who resisted the Nazis during 
the Blitz. The events represented a shattering of ontological security and a 
potential return to a state of Angst. Blair’s rhetoric was deployed 
(consciously or not) to prevent this, find significance (Bedeutsamkeit) and 
re-establish ontological security. The section reveals that Blair’s rhetoric 
frequently evoked the integrative and mobilising aspects of myth in order to 
achieve this and, furthermore, that he sought to provide people with the 
grounding through which the then-present situation could be addressed.  
In section 5.3 I conduct a similar analysis of the reaction of 
newspaper columns following the attacks.  Many of the themes present in 
the political rhetoric of section 5.2 also appeared in these sources. They 
frequently  make references to the Blitz, with accompanying promises (and 
prophecies) that Britain would endure against the enemy other and would 
ultimately be victorious. While both the left-leaning and right-leaning 
publications evoke the core themes of the work on myth (i.e., that there was 
a conflict with a radical and violent Muslim other), I note that there are 
occasional differences in how they respond to the events.  Right-leaning 
publications often express outrage at the failure to confront the enemy 
sooner, which they attribute to weak governance as a consequence of being 
in thrall to political correctness. Left-leaning publications tend to cite the 
failure of British foreign policy (especially the 2003 invasion of Iraq) and 
warn against the dangers of Islamophobia and the rise of the far-right. The 
section nonetheless finds that key themes of British resilience, British values 
were expressed by both sides. British resilience was more prevalent in this 
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example than the example in chapter 6. There were reactions with stories of 
Londoners overcoming the odds in a fashion comparable to the Blitz 
featuring heavily. I conclude the chapter in section 5.4 with a reflection on 
the points discussed. 
In chapter 6 I discuss the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby on  23
rd
 May 
2013. In the introductory section 6.1, I elaborate on the main differences 
between this and the events of 2005. While these differences between the 7
th
 
July London Bombings and the Murder of Lee Rigby were quite clear at 
first glance (notable because of the scale of the attack), the work on myth 
was still adapted into this context by political figures and newspaper 
columnists. In section 6.2 I analyse the responses of senior politicians, most 
notably the Prime Minister David Cameron and debates with MPs in 
parliament. This search was conducted with the same search terms and time 
period that I explained in chapter 3. The section demonstrates that David 
Cameron (much like Tony Blair in chapter 5) sought to find significance 
(Bedeutsamkeit) in the events and encourage the (re)establishment of 
ontological security. While the notion of “British resilience” was still 
important in the rhetoric, my research reveals that greater attention was paid 
to the second core theme of the collective self-narrative in the work on 
myth: the importance of “British values”.  Many also cited the heroism of 
Ingrid Loyau-Kennett, a member of the public who confronted the attackers 
while they still wielded blood-stained weapons. Loyau-Kennett and the 
“Angels of Woolwich” were often depicted by political figures as heroes at 
a time of grave tragedy, and an embodiment of values we should aspire to 
hold. 
Section 6.3 analyses the responses from newspaper columnists to 
these events. It indicates that many of the key themes of the work on myth 
remained common to both left-leaning and right-leaning commentary (e.g., 
the conflict between Britain and a radical form of Islam and Muslims), but 
with other key differences. Left-leaning publications were once again more 
likely to attribute the blame of the attacks to British foreign policy. They 
would also cite the deficient mental faculties of the killers, claiming that this 
was perhaps the most significance factor causing the attacks.  They would 
subsequently warn about the threat of Islamophobia, particularly in the 
context of the rise of the English Defence League (EDL). The right-leaning 
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publications continued to attribute the attacks to a weakness of governance, 
surrendering to political correctness, and for failing to understand the “true” 
nature of the enemy. There are examples of both sides emphasising the 
heroism of Loyau-Kennett and the “Angels of Woolwich” as well as 
condemning the attackers themselves. Both sides also emphasise the 
fundamental aspects of the work on myth: the irreconcilable conflict 
between the Britain and violent/radical form of Islam and Muslims who 
must ultimately be defeated. In section 6.4, I reflect on the issues discussed 
throughout chapter 6. 
In the thesis conclusion I reflect on the issues discussed throughout 
the thesis. In particular, I pay close attention to the novel contribution that 
my thesis makes and the normative implications of some of my findings. 
Regarding the former, I point out that my thesis is the first to conduct an 
analysis of political myth and ontological security in rhetoric following 
terror attacks. I also argue that my thesis provides a theoretical toolkit that 
we can use to analyse other invocations of the work on myth in different 
contexts, and that this is particularly important given the incidences of terror 
attacks in Europe and North America between 2014 and 2016. With regards 
to the normative reflections in the conclusion, I point out that the 
phenomenon of political myths causes a dilemma for us. On the one hand, 
many of us need political myths in order to anchor a sense of stability in 
such moments of crisis. On the other, political myths tend to produce highly 
simplified accounts of social and political phenomena. While simplicity 
may be a necessary feature of finding ontological security, it could 
potentially run contrary to an open, pluralistic and “shades of grey” view of 
society, particularly in regards to identity. If a political myth encourages 
pre-conceptions about collective self/other identities, then this could 
encourage a simplistic view of other that could, at worst, encourage 
prejudices. While this is not inevitable, I argue that it is something to 
consider when conducting an analysis of a political myth which is 
concerned with conflict between peoples. 
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Chapter 1:  An Existential Approach to Political Myth  
1.1 Introduction 
  
This chapter elaborates on my theory of political myth. There is no 
universally agreed-upon definition of myth, and this presents immediate 
challenges for the analysis. While my own definition will not satisfy 
everyone, I offer a defence of it with reference to a wide-array of literature. 
While this is drawn predominately from philosophy, some of it also comes 
from social psychology and sociology. The main objective is to establish the 
theoretical framework which will form the bedrock that enables my reading 
of the empirical material, making it a crucial aspect of the thesis. I 
demonstrate how myths are needed by pointing out the connections to the 
observations of a variety of existential philosophers, but particularly Søren 
Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. In the conclusion 
to this chapter, I reflect on the observations discussed throughout the 
chapter and propose that further research needs to be conducted (elsewhere) 
into how the work on myth can sustain ontological security in times of 
conflict and violence. While it will not be possible to cover the entire 
existentialist canon in this section (questions about who exactly falls within 
this tradition notwithstanding), this section covers core thinkers who 
elaborate on the question of Angst in most profoundly.  
1.2 Defining Political Myth 
 
I adopt what Christoffer Kølvraa and Jan Ifervsen have referred to as 
an existential approach to political myth.
66
 This is heavily influenced by the 
works of Hans Blumenberg and Chiara Bottici. I posit the following 
definition of myth for this thesis: 
Myths are dramatic and figurative narrative processes 
which construct bonds for social groups by collectively 
interpreting their shared conditions of existence, 
providing adherents with maps for behavior and certainty 
for action. Myths may incorporate (but are not limited to) 
themes such as founding moments of a social order, 
figures of heroism and villainy, and moments of tragedy 
                                                          
66
 Kølvraa and Ifversen, "Myth and History Politics in European integration: The 
Myth of the Fathers," 5. 
24 
 
and joy. They can be invoked verbally by the literal 
discussion of their subject matter and in more 
extraordinary moments such as parades and 
ceremonies… In order for myths to remain important for 
a social group, they must always be interpreted to suit 
present circumstances and provide a sense of certainty in 
an otherwise uncertain world.
67
 
 
They make the intangible tangible, the distant near, and the 
complicated simple. They are also able to evoke powerful emotions within 
many of us and mobilise into political action. They can serve a variety of 
causes and can potentially be a cause of either emancipation or suppression.  
By the “work on myth”, I am referring to the fact that myths are told, retold, 
and invoked in different contexts all the time, albeit with the same general 
features. As Blumenberg puts it, “[M]yths are stories that are distinguished 
by a high degree of constancy in their narrative core and by an equally 
pronounced capacity for marginal variation.”68 The two paradoxical features 
of myth, constancy and variation, also make them “transmissible by 
tradition”. This is because their “constancy produces the attraction of 
recognising them in artistic or ritual representation” and “their variability 
produces the attraction of trying out new and personal means of presenting 
them”. Put differently, the constancy of the subject matter of a myth, 
alongside the variable ways one can represent them, makes myths extremely 
attractive for people to invoke in a variety of contexts. This, Blumenberg 
argues, is particularly attractive for composers and listeners of music.
69
 As I 
argue later in this section and throughout Part II, it can also be extremely 
attractive for politicians and media commentators. What this provides us 
with is an image of myths being told, retold, and continually adapted by 
different “composers”. This is, in essence, the “work on myth”. That is, 
myths have a constancy in their basic subject matter that is continually told, 
retold, and adapted depending upon the situation. Political myths are 
continuously “worked on” to address political needs. For this reason, as 
Bottici points out, political myths are always told from the standpoint of the 
present and: 
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…it is in light of the continual change in their present 
conditions that human beings are impelled to go back to 
their political narratives, revise them in light of their new 
needs and exigencies through their reception, or, when 
this is not possible, dismiss them.
70
 
 
There are three main features of political myth: the cognitive, the 
integrative, and the mobilising. The cognitive aspect of myths provides a 
way of condensing the complexity of reality into manageable pieces. Myths 
eschew complexity and contingency and replace both with simplicity and 
permanence.  As Lance Bennett puts it: 
Political myths are difficult to analyze because they are 
such basic components of everyday perception. They are 
likely the lenses in a pair of glasses in the sense that they 
are not the things people see when they look at the world, 
they are the things they see with. Myths are the truths 
about society that are taken for granted. These basic 
cultural principles are woven throughout everyday social 
discourse from dinner table conversation, to the morals of 
television programs, to the lofty policy debates of 
congress.
71
 
Myths are collectively formed through “associative mechanisms that 
link private experience, ongoing reality, and public history into powerful 
frameworks of understanding.”72 As they become “lenses” through which 
we make sense of contemporary political events and experiences,
73
 they are 
not only difficult to analyse, but also to critique.  Indeed, we are reluctant to 
begin such critiques as Murray Edelman has argued. Edelman argued that 
publics tend to be reluctant to engage with the intricacies of politics.
74
 This 
necessitates myths and other linguistic devices which provide the illusion of 
simplicity and coherence. Stories involving heroic leadership, struggle, and 
sacrifice are often embodied within particular metaphors which are 
continually repeated within political discourse, serving to “intensify some 
perceptions and screen others out of attention,” as well as providing mental 
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maps for individuals to make sense of the world around them.
75
 Hence, 
there is a demand for myths and linguistic devices that reassure by 
portraying things as simple and coherent. Stories of heroic leadership, self-
less struggle and sacrifice, etc, then become established in political 
discourse, where they “intensify some perceptions and screen others out of 
attention.”76 All of this simplicity explains why they are so useful for 
explaining political events. As Edelman puts it:  
“If a few classic themes are surefire vehicles for engaging 
the emotions of large numbers of people, leaders will 
predictably interpret events in these forms, and their 
audiences will eagerly cooperate in creating the world in 
the same configurations.”77 
It also means that myths do not have to be recounted in their entirety 
in order to function as elements of political discourse: 
“Myths can be evoked by labels (“The Aryan myth”), 
watchwords and slogans (“Workers of the world, 
unite!”), metonymic allusions (“the Vietnam syndrome”), 
echoes or quotations (“I cannot tell a lie”), and other 
verbal forms as well as by nonverbal forms, including 
iconic and ritual representations.”78 
 
All of this is close to describing the notion of “cognitive schemata” 
which, as Christopher Flood explains, are “widely used to explain how 
discursive and other symbolic practices influence the ways in which 
members of social groups organize their perceptions on the basis of acquired 
cognitive frameworks.” Once established, they constitute an “organizing 
and filtering procedure for the reception of new information, be it the 
combination of sights and sounds into images of physical objects or the 
complex perception of social situations.”79 Flood’s approach to schemas is 
borrowed from the discipline of social psychology. In this discipline, it is 
understood as a “cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a 
concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among 
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those attributes.”80 Schemas are a set of interrelated cognitions, such as 
thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, which allow people to quickly make sense of 
other people, situations, events, or places on the basis of limited 
information. When schemas are invoked, they often facilitate top-down, 
concept and theory-driven processing as opposed to “bottom-up” or “data-
driven” processing.81 In other-words, gaps are filled with prior knowledge 
and preconceptions rather than by seeking information directly from 
immediate contexts. Certain cues, (such as the appearance of another 
person) are likely to activate particular schema which then “fills in” the 
missing details in this manner. 
There are close links between the cognitive and integrative aspect of 
myth. By referring to this aspect as “integrative”, I mean that political myths 
almost always place individuals into groups. The work on myth cannot 
occur in isolation, but is rather a collective endeavour. They often also 
enable people to position themselves in the world in relation to others. For 
instance, national foundation myths tell stories of the origins of the people 
we are supposedly associated with and often provide indications as to how 
we should act in the world today. Indeed, nationalist myths in particular 
allow people(s) to “construct their identities as individuals and 
simultaneously as members of a community.”82 The fact that they do not 
directly encounter everyone within this community means that they are, as 
Benedict Anderson famously described, fundamentally 
“imagined.”83Whether they are myths of origins, futures, or new ages, 
myths only arise, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, “from a community and for it: 
they engender one another, infinitely and immediately.”84 Myths are, as 
Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nany put it, “identificatory 
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machines” which remind people of their affiliation with a particular 
community.
85
  
The formation of collective “WE-identities” is therefore central to 
the work on myth
86, and indeed one can say the same about “THEY-
identities”.87  When we create or impose these identities we are in effect 
creating “groupings” for people which supersede their own individuality. 
This reflects another important phenomenon discussed in the social 
psychology literature: entitativity. Entitativity was first introduced to social 
psychology by D.T. Campbell to refer to “the degree of having nature of an 
entity, of having real existence.”88 This refers to the perception of groups as 
possessing unity and coherence which is abstract from the individuals which 
constitute it. The concept was made to explain why certain groups were 
considered “real” while others were simply aggregates of individuals. 
Entitativity is substantially influenced by the (perceived) sharing of 
common fate, similarity, and proximity.
89
 For example, spectators at a 
football game may seem to be a disorganised mass of individuals  who 
happen to be in the same place at the same time, but the fact that they 
express similarly emotions, shout, and sing together, gives them 
entitativity.
90
 People behave differently when they are members of a group 
that they feel is high in entitativity. Research has indicated that group 
members are more likely to identify with such groups
91
, and this tendency is 
even stronger when are uncertain about themselves and whether their beliefs 
are correct.
92
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The mobilising aspect of myth is crucial to their effectiveness in 
political discourse. The theorist who elaborated on this most effectively was 
Georges Sorel. Sorel saw the creation of myths as necessary for any 
successful revolutionary movement. According to him, myths are not simply 
“descriptions of things”, but are “expressions of a determination to act.”93 
The human mind, for Sorel, cannot be content with merely observing facts 
and thereby cannot function simply with reason alone.
94
 Indeed, Sorel 
argued that if we relied solely on reason, then we would have not be able to 
undertake great social changes, because such changes were always created 
through imaginative means. Myths operate against reason, and they enable 
us to capture the sentiments and passions of the masses who enter into 
decisive struggles against opposing forces.
95
 Sorel’s interest in myth was 
politically motivated; he felt that the power of myth could be used to bring 
about a general strike far more effectively than any deep intellectual 
analysis would be able to. Indeed, Sorel was often scathingly critical of 
intellectuals like Ernst Renan whose usage of “syllogisms”, he contended, 
could never account for the passion of movements with religious or mythic 
qualities.
96
 He was also critical of socialists and Marxists who were “afraid 
of revolution” and who, he claimed, sought to “shake the confidence felt by 
the workers in the preparations they are making for the revolution… they 
cast ridicule on the idea of the general strike – the only idea that could have 
value as a motivating force”.97 Indeed so powerful is myth that Sorel 
believes those “living in the world of myths” that they become “secure from 
all refutation.”98 Holding on to this promise of victory is core to this 
mobilising force.  
Whereas Sorel saw myths and violence as being necessary and even 
desireable for social change, Ernst Cassirer would later be implacably 
opposed to this view – despite not mentioning Sorel directly. In his classic 
work The Myth of the State, Ernst Cassirer was horrified by what he saw as 
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the power of mythic thought to lead to barbaric and repressive politics.
99
 
Cassirer wrote during the rise of the Nazis and therefore witnessed myth in 
its most pernicious, insidious and highly volatile form – particularly with 
regards to the myth of the Aryan race which was a key part of Nazi politics. 
Myths turn the “passive state” of deep internal emotions into an “active 
process” which is openly displayed by many people simultaneously. It 
encouraged people into making radical political changes which were 
informed by this fundamentally regressive mode of thought. Such myths 
often surface when people are presented with a situation of insecurity, most 
notably when there is a challenge to the established political order. In a 
passage which is somewhat reminiscent of Giddens’ modern work on 
ontological security (more on this below), Cassirer referred to these 
situations as “critical moments” in which:  
…the rational forces that resist the rise of the old 
mythical conceptions are no longer sure of themselves. In 
these moments the time for myth has come again. For 
myth has not really been banished or subjugated. It is 
always there, lurking in the dark, waiting for its hour and 
opportunity.
100
  
Myth is only suppressed by science and reason (see section 2.4 for 
more on this) but not eradicated by it and, therefore, we must always “be 
prepared for violent concussions that may shake our cultural world and our 
social order to its very foundations”.101 Cassirer provides us an image of 
myth as a caged beast within ourselves that breaks free when we let our 
guard down. Cassirer’s conclusions are understandable, since he had 
witnessed the rise of the Nazis and the consequences of the myth of the 
Aryan race. Indeed his entire theory of myth seems to be constructed around 
this particular example.  
The mobilising aspect of myth has been visible in modern day 
Western liberal-democracies with violent consequences, as much social 
science research suggests. Joanne Esch’s study on political myth in the 
legitimisation of the War on Terror in 2001 is one example that is highly 
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relevant to this thesis.
102
 Following the attacks of 9/11, the Bush 
administration employed myth as a way of establishing a new sense of 
significance and order where it had been shattered. Myths, such as 
“American exceptionalism” and “Civilization v barbarism”, were re-
articulated in order to provide people with a new sense of significance by 
demonstrating that everyone was in conflict with a clearly defined, evil 
enemy.
103
 Many of the speeches that Esch cites came in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11 and, in such a moment of crisis, anxiety, and shock, they 
served to provide a concrete position from which Americans could identify 
themselves and their enemies. The openness of anxiety was replaced by the 
direct object of fear (al-Qaeda) which, while unpleasant and frightening, is 
able to provide a sense of security in being where it might otherwise not be.  
I also explored the role of myth in “legitimising” violent political 
action in my recent paper in International Political Sociology. I drew 
particularly from Sorel to analyse how the mobilising aspect of myth is used 
in online violent jihadist magazine in order to inspire young Muslims into 
acts of violence. The case study of Inspire magazine represented one site for 
the work on a broader political myth that posits that all Muslims are in an 
epic, violent conflict with “crusaders” and treacherous false Muslims. It 
uses this broader political myth (which is generally central to most violent 
jihadist myths) for young Muslims in the West by utilizing a visual format 
which mimics mainstream Western magazines. The magazine contains 
familiar popular-cultural and political references throughout. Many articles 
are superimposed onto an image of a Macbook and some are presented in 
the style of rap music lyrics. Colloquial online terminologies such as “LOL” 
(laughing out loud) and “ROFL” (rolling on the floor laughing) appear 
regularly, and propaganda images often resemble film adverts.
104
 
The authors legitimise their claims by effectively bringing the 
conflict to the reader by showing how it is has in impact in their daily lives; 
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the “here and now.”105 Many articles construct Western military invasions, 
particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, as an attack on all Muslims, including 
(and especially) the reader.
106
 Nothing is seen as historically contingent; it is 
as if each injustice is part of the process of violence with the equivalent 
actors and motives. As one contributor to the magazine puts it, the West has 
a “deeply rooted historic hatred for Islam and Muslims” which was 
previously led “in the name of Christianity” but is today “in the name of 
democracy.
107
 The magazine does this by making numerous references to 
Western foreign policies as the continuation of the eleventh to thirteenth 
century Crusades.
108
 The only option it provides for the readers to mobilise, 
take up arms, and conduct terror attacks.  
What the variety of examples I have outlined reveal is that myths 
can mobilise people for multitude of causes. All of them have their heroes 
and villains, themes of tragedy and joy, memories of glory, etc.  They can 
be part of enforcing norms and rules but also part of dismantling them. They 
can be a means of overcoming oppression or enforcing it. They can breed 
chaos and order depending upon the social and material contexts in which 
they are worked on 
1.3 The Existential Need for Political Myth 
 
Myths transform ordinary political narratives into dramas that seek 
to answer fundamental existential questions. By existential questions, I am 
referring to those that give our lives a sense of meaning and purpose in the 
“here and now”. This means those questions that do not limit themselves to 
asking “do I exist”? or “will I exist”? but “how do I exist” or “what are the 
qualities or meanings of my existence”?  More specifically, myths address 
questions about our existence in relation to others. The question may 
therefore best be asked as “how do I exist in relation to others in the social 
and political world”? Indeed this sense my theory of myth is not just 
existential, but also phenomenological. In this section, I elaborate on core 
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observations of our conditions of being made by existential and 
phenomenological philosophers, and connect this to the established 
literature on political myth. I argue that these insights provide us with an 
understanding of why political myths are so needed and so durable.  
While there are numerous approaches to existential philosophy, there 
is at least one unifying feature. That is, existentialists tend to assert the 
“uniqueness” of the human situation in the world. This situation is one of 
ambiguity and estrangement, but also a sense of freedom and responsibility 
for finding and attributing meaning to our lives.
109
 Existentialism is thereby 
not concerned with existence in the literal sense of the word, but how we 
conceive of ourselves, behave towards others, and live within a world in 
which we are paradoxically both embedded and estranged. Indeed, 
“estrangement” is a crucial feature of our existence which we experience in 
a sense as ambiguity. On the one hand, we are embodied creatures within 
the world, subject to the same laws and processes of everything else in the 
world, but we are also constituted by features that distinguish us from other 
beings.  Chief among these features is our capacity to reflect on the very 
conditions of our being.  As David E. Cooper puts it, our feeling of 
estrangement is rooted in the fact that, while we are “embodied occupants of 
the world” our “powers of reflection, self-interpretation, evaluation, and 
choice distinguishes us from all other occupants of the world.”110 However, 
this does not mean that there is no intimate relationship between human 
beings and the world. Any philosophical reflection about human  beings in 
the world “reveals that neither is thinkable without the other” because “the 
world of things cannot be understood except by reference to the significance 
that these things have in relation to human purposes and practices.”111 In 
other words, it is simply not possible to divorce ourselves from the world 
since our being is so intimately tied to it. Moreover, all “things” within the 
world are only understood by us with reference to our own purposes and 
practices. With this intimacy appreciated and estrangement understood, it 
becomes clearer that: 
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… each human being is possessed of a radical freedom 
and responsibility, not only to choose and to act, but to 
interpret and evaluate the world. Honest recognition by 
people of the disturbing degree of freedom that they 
possess requires cultivating moral comportment or stance 
towards themselves and others that honours the reciprocal 
interdependence of individual lives.
112 
Cooper stresses that is merely a sketch and notes that it omits many 
of the core terminologies of existentialism. However, we can see a common 
philosophical thread that characterises human beings as being embedded 
within yet paradoxically estranged from the world. What unites many of 
these perspectives is the question of how we exist, and “be/become” in a 
world not of our choosing, but in which we have to make choices.  Human 
beings are unique in their capacity to reflect on the questions of their 
existence, but these questions can lead them into existential quagmires. This 
is because of a very simple yet troubling problem: the relative freedom we 
have to define ourselves and provide meaning to the world is also 
accompanied by the responsibility to do so. In times when our assumptions 
are challenged, and when grave existential (in many sense of the word) 
threats appear before us, this burden can increase substantially.  
Søren Kierkegaard is often considered to be the founding father of 
existentialism. His reflection on the above issues remains one of the most 
profound in the existential canon. For Kierkegaard, the human being is 
“infinitely interested in existing”. This does not mean human beings are 
solely concerned with survival, but also the kind of lives they live and the 
kind of people they wish to be/become.
113
 He developed the now well-
known notion that human beings are afflicted by the fundamental condition 
of Angst. However, before expanding on this, it is important to understand 
another key concept in Kierkegaard’s philosophy: the notion that the human 
“self” is a synthesis of the “finite” and the “infinite”,114  The “infinite” 
corresponds to “possibility”, or the capacity to envisage new ideas, bring 
new creations into existence, choose from innumerable potentialities and, 
ultimately, change oneself. The “finite” corresponds to “actuality” or 
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“necessity”, understood as the concrete “here and now” and our reality as a 
definite “something” in the world. Many are tempted oneself in either the 
finite or infinite and so forsake the responsibility of being a self. To do this 
in the finite, one is trapped within an inescapable environment in the 
concrete “here and now”, believing that no alternatives exist. These 
individuals become depressed, and find safety and security by assimilating 
themselves into social and institutional networks. As Kierkegaard puts it, 
the individual finds it “too venturesome a thing to be himself, far easier and 
safer to be like the other, to become an imitation, a number, a cipher in the 
crowd”115. Losing oneself in the infinite, however, is to live as though life is 
a series of perpetual experiments, with different personalities and paths 
tried, but with no lasting commitment ever made. People who are lost in the 
infinite become obsessed about who they can potentially become but never 
actually become anything – and definitely not a “self”. As Kierkegaard 
warns, if “possibility [the infinite] outruns necessity [the finite], the self runs 
away from itself”.116 We must balance these tensions, and that means 
recognising that innumerable possibilities lie before us, but that we must 
nonetheless choose a definite course of action, appropriate to our “true” 
selves. This is an arduous task, but is central to the human condition. 
  This tension between the finite and infinite is a chief cause of what 
Kierkegaard refers to as Angst (anxiety).117 For Kierkegaard, anxiety has to 
be differentiated from fear, since fear refers to “something definite” whereas 
“anxiety [Angst] is freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility”.118 
Kierkegaard provides an example of a man standing on the edge of a cliff. 
When he moves closer to the edge, he experiences a focused fear of falling, 
but, paradoxically, he feels a terrifying impulse to throw himself off the 
edge. For Kierkegaard, this experience is Angst because he has the 
possibility and complete freedom to decide whether to throw himself off the 
cliff or stay put, and it is this freedom and possibility to act that places such 
an immense burden on human beings. He refers to this as the “dizziness of 
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freedom”.119 For Kierkegaard, this is a purely human experience as 
(according to him) other animals do not have the capacity to reflect upon 
these issues, and are instead driven solely by their instincts.
 120
 Yet despite 
the burden of Angst, Kierkegaard is keen to stress that anxiety is not just a 
destructive force, but also a creative one. Indeed rather than being an 
emotion to be overcome and suppressed, Kierkegaard actively encourages 
us to embrace anxiety. As he put it: 
“I will say that this is an adventure that every human 
being must go through – to learn to be anxious… 
whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has 
learned the ultimate”121.  
In anxiety, we feel the immense possibilities of being free and, if we 
can master that, we can use it for creative purposes. Nonetheless, few were 
more afflicted by anxiety than Kierkegaard himself. It is apparent 
throughout his work that he was compelled to believe that human beings 
themselves have an “eternal consciousness” that would transcend them after 
death. As he most revealingly puts it in Fear and Trembling: 
If a human being did not have an eternal consciousness, if 
underlying everything there were only a wild, fermenting 
power that writhing in dark passions produced 
everything, be it significant or insignificant, if a vast, 
never appeased emptiness hid beneath everything, what 
would life be then but despair?
122
 
The opposite of this despair is faith, and it is faith that we must have. 
For Kierkegaard, there are always gaps and paradoxes within systems that 
one may never be able to truly resolve. What is required is a “qualitative 
leap” to overcome these gaps without necessarily having the empirical 
evidence to support your decision. This was, for him, especially so for 
Christianity, which he elaborates on in more depth in Philosophical 
Fragments.
123
  He calls on Christians to make a “leap of faith” (or leap to 
faith) to overcome these paradoxes which is irreversible and, for him, the 
ultimate demonstration of freedom.
124
 The alternative to this would be to 
remain in despair. 
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Friedrich Nietzsche shared many of Kierkegaard’s observations 
about the existential problems faced by human beings, but came to very 
different conclusions as to how to deal with them. Rather than submit to a 
leap of faith in God, Nietzsche declared in an infamous passage of The Gay 
Science that “God is dead”: 
God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. 
How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderer of all 
murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the 
world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: 
who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for 
us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what 
sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatest 
of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not 
become gods to simply appear worthy of it?
125
 
What Nietzsche means by this is that God only exists because we 
believe him to exist. As God had become less important to people’s lives, 
we had effectively “murdered” Him. He is also referring to the belief in 
true-world theories altogether, and the subsequent void that this would 
leave. With a series of metaphors, Nietzsche asks what is left for us and 
what we would have to invent to fill in this void, where we shall find 
salvation, forgiveness, and atonement. For, the answer is effectively 
nowhere but within the world with a continuous process of self-overcoming. 
It occurs in the place that Kierkegaard would have understood as the finite 
(see above). Nietzsche explicitly rejects those who seek salvation in other-
worldliness, as those who followed the Abrahamic religions had done. 
People turn towards creating other-worldliness when they are dissatisfied 
with life within this world. Nietzsche seeks to create an alternative inner-
worldliness that would not only anchor them to the world but overcome 
many of the weaknesses of humanity. He referred to this in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra as the Übermensch (Overman or Superman).
126
 The 
Übermensch is a goal for humanity in which we would substitute our need 
for divine figures in other-worldliness and for a love of what is within this 
world. Individuals would be overcoming the “herd mentality” and creating 
their own perspectives detached from any perceived objective system. In 
this sense, Nietzsche’s philosophy is a radical embrace of subjective 
freedom and the anxiety that accompanies it. We can embrace the gaps and 
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paradoxes that Kierkegaard desperately sought to avoid, live solely within 
our concrete inner-worldly experiences, and maximise our chances of 
reaching the status of Übermensch. 
While Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are considered key founding 
figures of the existentialist philosophical tradition, related themes have been 
developed by other scholars. Angst and the way we live and exercise 
freedom in the vastness of reality have been important in particular. Martin 
Heidegger warned that anxiety “can hold open the utter and constant threat 
to itself airing from Dasein’s ownmost individualized Being…”127 For 
Heidegger, Anxiety represents the breakdown of our assumptions about 
reality, and reminds us of these fundamental features of “being-in-the-
world” that we may have stopped questioning. It reminds us that we are 
responsible for choosing who we are and how we behave in the world. Like 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger sees the productive potential of Angst; while it 
fundamentally undermines its basic assumptions of the world and its place 
within it, Angst can also allow Dasein to re-assess its existence and see new 
possibilities.
128
 We are ultimately free to do this, while of course being 
constrained by our “thrownness” into the world. That is, we are thrown 
(geworfen) into existence by the random forces of chance, and the place we 
end up in the world, and who we are, are limited by this chance. This 
“thrownness” means that there is a past and present that Dasein carries with 
it that is already given. This leaves us with a “burden” that he understands 
as our “facticity”.129 At most, however, this represents some limitations on 
Dasein, who retains the potential to transform and become what it chooses. 
Jean-Paul Sartre similarly focused on the problems of Angst and recognised 
some limitations placed by facticity, but he far more optimistic about our 
capacity for freedom. An authentic existence required that people realise 
that they have radical freedom in terms of how they behave, with few 
constraints other than what we choose to impose upon ourselves.
130
    
                                                          
127
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1962), 69. 
128
 Ibid., 310-15. 
129
 Ibid., 173-74. 
130
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 65-67, 69-70. 
39 
 
With all this said, one may consider existential thought to be 
concerned solely with the subjective and entirely introspective conditions of 
an individual’s being. At worst, it seems like an exceptionally 
individualistic mode of thought and this begs a question: what of other 
people? Surely subjectivity requires intersubjectivity at some stage? 
Fortunately, many in the existential tradition accept this and have argued 
that our relations with others are fundamental to our existence. We can only 
“be” in any genuine sense by participation within a community of beings 
who mutually recognize one another’s existence.131 Heidegger makes clear 
in Being and Time that the world of Dasein is a “with-world”, in which 
being means “being-with others”. Consequently the condition of being 
within-the-world is Dasein-with, or, more simply, “being-with” (Mitsein).132 
Heidegger suggests that we should investigate who we were before we 
began to reflect, when we were absorbed within our daily lives in the world. 
For him, this reflection leads us to conclude that in our “being-in-the-world” 
we always, necessarily, experience things in relation to other people.
133
 
Existing requires that we are involved in some way with others, as it would 
be near-enough impossible to “be-in-the-world” as Dasein without being 
reliant on shared communal norms at least to some degree. For Karl Jaspers, 
our freedom depends on others being free and this requires a reciprocal 
relationship in which others recognise our respective freedom.
134
 Gabriel 
Marcel takes this one step further by arguing that it is not sufficient merely 
to “apprehend” the other as free, but also to “collaborate with his freedom 
[emphasis: mine]”.135 What seems to be widely accepted in the existentialist 
canon is that our experience of the world is intimately tied to our experience 
of and with others. Angst in particular (as discussed above) is not necessarily 
something that is experienced alone or, at least, it cannot be conceived of 
without at least some involvement other people, even if not always directly.   
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How do many of these existentialist themes that have been 
elaborated on affect us in regards to our politics? Moreover, how do we 
overcome our feelings of estrangement and Angst in a political context? I 
argue that one way these tensions are addressed is through “political myth”, 
and the best articulation of this can be found in the works of Chiara 
Bottici.
136
 Bottici has been heavily influenced by Hans Blumenberg, who  
saw myth (not political myth) as an important means through which we 
address many of the concerns outlined above. For Blumenberg, a sense of 
reality without significance (in the sense of Bedeutsamkeit) is a reality that 
is vast, total, and “naked”. In other words, it would consist of innumerable 
events occurring simultaneously, all of which are indifferent to us. This has 
the unfortunate potential to ultimately overwhelm us into believing that we 
have no control over our conditions of existence.
137
 Such a situation must 
always be resolved in order to prevent extreme Angst which - as similarly 
conceived of above - is a state of “indefinite anticipation” or the paradoxical 
“intentionality of consciousness without an object” resulting in the “whole 
horizon” becoming the “totality of the directions from which “it can all 
come at once”. To avoid this, humans are constantly in a process of 
formulating a mental picture of this anxiety-inducing and “naked” world. 
This is exemplified by philosophy, science, and art, among other things.
138
 
Myth is one part of these processes; it reduces the uncertainty and 
absolutism of Angst into the something more definite and concrete (even 
fearful) which, while unpleasant, can be understood and addressed more 
easily.  
As Chiara Bottici points out, it is likely that Blumenberg was 
influenced heavily by German philosophical anthropologists such as Arnold 
Gehlen who claimed that human beings, unlike other animals, are versatile 
due to being able to adapt to multiple environments, and are therefore 
Weltoffen or “open to the world.”139 The fact that human beings are so 
Weltoffen means they are exposed to a great number of stimuli from the 
world and this, being so burdensome, is something that humans must seek 
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relief (Entlastung) from.
140
 For Gehlen (who borrows this expression from 
Nietzsche), human beings are “always not-yet determined animals” (noch 
nicht festgestelles Tier).
141
 For Blumenberg, it is because of these problems 
that human beings need “significance” (Bedeutsamkeit). Significance is 
necessary to aid humanity with its constant struggle against the 
aforementioned “absolutism of reality.” Significance (Bedeutsamkeit) 
accordingly provides “closure” by reducing the innumerable possibilities of 
being and existence within the labyrinth of the “absolutism of reality.” 
Significance grounds what is fundamentally a sense of certainty in the 
otherwise uncertain conditions of reality. Or, as Blumenberg puts it, it 
“makes possible a ‘density’ that excludes empty spaces and empty time, but 
it also makes possible an indefiniteness of dating and localization that is the 
equivalent of ubiquitousness.”142 It thus opposes the dearth of confidence 
which is caused for people by the general “unfathomabiltiy of time.”143 
Ultimately, the work on myth “converts numinous indefiniteness into 
nominal definiteness and… make[s] what is uncanny familiar and 
addressable”144 Myths must therefore be more than mere narratives; they 
must, as Bottici argues borrowing from Karoly Kerényi, “ground” 
(begründen) significance.
145
 This said, it is important to stress that myths do 
not attempt to describe the totality of the universe unless they are 
appropriated into wider narratives of creation. They are instead concerned 
with our sense of being within the world; or our reality as a definite thing 
within the vastness of the world that we inhabit.  But they do not seek to 
provide answers for the ultimate meanings of being and existence within the 
world. As Bottici puts it, “significance answers the question of “why?” by 
raising the issue of “whence” and therefore: 
“...it can limit itself to telling a story about some of the 
conditions of existence without necessarily aspiring to 
answer the question of the sense of life in general. 
Significance (Bedeutsamkeit) situates itself precisely 
between two extremes: meaning on the one hand (the 
Sinnfrage: “What is this?”) and the sense of “Being” on 
the other (the Seinsfrage: “What is the sense of being?”). 
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Significance is not (just) meaning, because there is 
meaning every time that there is language. But 
significance is not necessarily the question about the 
sense of the being either, because some myths do not aim 
to provide explanations of the ultimate meaning of 
being.”146 
 
In other words, “something that is significant is something that 
situates itself between the two extremes of a simple meaning and the 
meaning of life and death.”147 Significance (Bedeutsamkeit) is required in 
order to “be-in-the-world” the world and mitigate the problems of existence 
within the world such as estrangement and Angst. While significance does 
not answer the totality of our needs, the fact that it gives our sense of being-
with (Mitsein) greater purpose, and concretises otherwise disparate 
phenomena, highlights that it is of central importance addressing the 
inherent concerns we gain through our being. Myth is one way in which we 
may find significance (Bedeutsamkeit) but this does not necessarily mean 
that this is universally the case for everybody at all times. 
Nonetheless, others scholars have suggested that myths are crucial to 
addressing fundamental existential concerns in politics. Murray Edelman 
argued that the public were reluctant or incapable of engaging with the 
intricacies of politics, which creates a sense of ambiguity and anxiety. This 
necessitates myths and other linguistic devices which provide the illusion of 
simplicity and coherence. Stories involving heroic leadership, struggle, and 
sacrifice are often embodied within particular metaphors which are 
continually repeated within political discourse, serving to “intensify some 
perceptions and screen others out of attention,” as well as providing mental 
maps for individuals to make sense of the world around them
148
 Carl J. 
Friedrich argued that any form of political community is inconceivable 
without myth. While he was mainly interested of foundational myths that 
provided communities with a sense of meaning, he also viewed myth in 
general as an emotional glue that keeps a community together and softens 
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“the cold rationality of reason of state.”149 Indeed it is this softening and 
simplifying part of myth that can assuage the anxieties we have in the 
world, Anamaria Dutceac Segesten sees myth as a way of creating a 
“concentrated simplified and standardized view of reality” and an 
“instrument of chaos control, of introducing some regularity into the 
seeming randomness of the visible universe.”150  
It should be clear that what I am investigating in this thesis is not 
whether myths are true or false, but the role they have in our being-in-the-
world and, in particular, how they address our existential needs in the face 
of anxiety. To borrow Heideggerian terminology, my research is less 
concerned with the “ontic” than it is the “ontological”. Our being is 
characterised by a complex relationship between ourselves as fluctuating 
and transformative beings and the world around us, which is also fluctuating 
and transformative. In this uncertainty, we continually seek (consciously or 
not) places where we can ground ourselves within the world, or at least 
experience this groundedness in the world, regardless of whether it is 
actually there or not. I therefore leave the question of the truthfulness or 
falseness of myth in parenthesis, and instead concentrate solely on what 
myths do.  What is missing from the existential approaches to political myth 
is an engagement with more recent sociological and psychological research 
into the existential issues. While the concept of significance 
(Bedeutsamkeit) is useful to explain a key function of myth, it does not 
reveal how political myth assuages anxiety in a key modern context. To 
elaborate on this, I argue in section 1.4 that the literature on political myth 
needs to engage with the literature on ontological security. 
1.4 Political Myth and Ontological Security 
 
The theory of myth and significance discussed by Hans Blumenberg 
and Chiara Bottici resonates closely with established psychological and 
sociological research into the concept of “Ontological Security”. In this 
section, I argue that the existentialist literature analysed in section 1.3 
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overlaps with studies on ontological security. Furthermore, I argue that the 
existentialist approach to political myth in particular is substantially 
enhanced when the concept of significance (Bedeutsamkeit) engages 
directly with ontological security. This is primarily because what 
Blumenberg and Bottici both discuss is reflected in decades of ontological 
security research, and it reveals just how important political myths are to our 
understanding of politics.  I see the main point of interaction between 
political myth and ontological security as follows: the process of 
significance-making (Bedeutsamkeit) through the work on myth is also a 
process of ontologically securitising.
151
 The work on myth ensures that even 
when one’s physical security is threatened, one’s security of being can be 
re-assured. This is because myth does not answer questions of existence in 
the sense of survival, but also wider questions about who we are, what we 
might become 
Traditional approaches to the study of security have tended to focus 
on peoples’ physical/somatic survival or wellbeing. International Relations 
theories from the tradition of neo-realism in particular often reduced 
“security studies” to the security of the state.152 Others would later point out 
the fundamentally the socially constructed and contested nature of security 
and, in particular, how issues could be brought out of the realm of politics 
and “securitised”.153 Critical scholars who were influenced by the Frankfurt 
School began to see a more positive role of security as a potential source of 
“emancipation”.154 Yet the academic disciplines of Political Science and 
                                                          
151
 This is not to be confused with the securitisation theory discussed in either 
Economics or International Relations. 
152
 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics. 
153
 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis (Colarado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); Barry Buzan and Ole 
Wæver, "Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in 
Securitisation Theory," Review of International Studies 35 (2009); Thierry 
Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political agency, Audience and 
Context," European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (2005); "A Theory 
of Securitization," in Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and 
Dissolve (Oxford: Routledge, 2011); Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, 
Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," International Studies Quarterly 
47 (2003). 
154
 Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory," Journal of Internatinoal Studies 10, no. 2 (1981); Ken Booth, 
"Security and Emancipation," Review of International Studies 17, no. 4 (1991); 
Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); João 
45 
 
International Relations were comparatively slow to discuss ontological 
security, which had otherwise discussed in sociology and psychology over 
several decades
155
.  The main assertion of ontological security scholars is 
that ontologically secure individuals have the capacity to cope in a world 
changing around them. Such individuals are able to provide a sense of 
continuity and order to events.
156
 Indeed, the psychiatrist R.D. Laing first 
coined the term “ontological security” to refer to a “continuous person” that 
enjoys a stable and whole existence in reality.
157
 An ontologically secure 
person has: 
… a sense of his presence in the world as a real, alive, 
whole, and, in a temporal sense, a continuous person. As 
such, he can live out into the world, and meet others: a 
world and others experienced as equally real, alive, 
whole and continuous. Such a basically ontologically 
secure person will encounter all the hazards of life, 
social, ethical, spiritual, biological from a centrally firm 
sense of his own and other people’s reality and 
identity.
158
 
 
By contrast, an ontologically insecure person would feel:  
more unreal than real; in a literal sense, more dead than 
alive; precariously differentiated from the rest of the 
world, so that his identity and autonomy are always in 
question. He may lack the experience of his own 
temporal continuity.
159
 
The insecure person would effectively be threatened by the daily 
experiences of life, would lack a sense of self and agency, and would be 
subjected to fears, anxiety, and dread, in different forms and at different 
times.
160
 The most prominent modern-day scholar of ontological security is 
the sociologist Anthony Giddens. Giddens accepted the psychological 
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foundation of Laing’s ontological security theory, but concentrated more on 
the relational aspect. This is because Giddens was interested in the 
intersubjective nature of social existence, which he describes as the 
“mutuality of experience.”161 For Giddens, ontological security refers to a 
“person’s fundamental sense of safety in the world and includes a basic trust 
of other people” and obtaining this trust is “necessary in order for a person 
to maintain a sense of psychological well-being and avoid existential 
anxiety”.162 Giddens emphasises the importance of a continuous narrative, 
or “sense of self” which can be found in the self’s ability to “keep the 
narrative going”. When we are ontologically secure, we feel whole and can 
act in comfort since we bracket out “questions about ourselves, others, and 
the object-world which have to be taken for granted in order to keep on with 
everyday activity”.163  
Stuart Croft points that there seems to be three points of agreement 
in the accounts of Giddens and Laing about the key elements of a “normal” 
sense of ontological security.
164
 The first is the need for biographical 
continuity, which is easily grasped reflexively and communicable, and can 
thereby be socially recognised. The narrative itself may be fragile as it is 
only one reading of events and could be subjected to “hostile” readings. 
However, it would be “robust” as it would “withstand (and thereby give 
meaning to) considerable changes in the social environment, allowing for “a 
sense of agency, that is the subject of reflexivity, of self-monitoring; and 
this self-identity is performed in, through, and by an everyday routine.”165 
Secondly, there is a web of trust relations that enables individuals to operate 
within “cocoons” that protect and filter out dangers to the self in daily life. 
Ontologically secure individuals have trust in items, individuals, and do not 
worry about the collapse of that trust – even if it does require constant re-
grounding.
166
 Thirdly, there is what Croft identifies as a “self-integrity, an 
ability to be ‘alive’, that is, to act within the scope of those elements under 
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reflexive control.”167 The social structure allows ontologically secure 
individuals to map their decisions on predictable bases, relative to their 
reading and construction of their own biography.
168
  
This description of security differs markedly from traditional 
understandings that have dominated the study of politics and international 
relations. In the latter literature, security is reduced to questions of survival 
and self-preservation in a purportedly natural condition of international 
anarchy.
169
. Ontological security refers to the sense of security gained in the 
process of being rather than our immediate physical safety. Ontologically 
secure individuals will possess “answers to fundamental existential 
questions which all human life in some way addresses.”170 Ontological 
security prevents “the fear of being overwhelmed by anxieties that reach to 
the very roots of our coherent sense of ‘being in the world’”.171 However, 
this is always under threat by what Giddens referred to as “critical 
situations”. These are “… circumstances of a radical disjuncture of an 
unpredictable kind which affect substantial numbers of individuals, 
situations that threaten to destroy the certitudes of institutionalized 
routines.”172 They are fundamental moments in time which require people to 
make choices about how to respond.  As Croft elaborates: 
Critical situations emphasize the fragility of ontologically 
secure entities: that established, everyday routines that 
allow a foundation to life can be interrupted; that trust 
structures – tokens, experts’ roles – may lose their 
centrality; that agency may be questioned, as the actor 
considers means of acting that conform to his/her self-
identity; and that the sense of biography could suffer 
temporal dislocation.
173
 
These situations cause identity threats and produce Angst which is a 
“generalized state of the emotions of the given individual.” This differs 
from fear, which is “a response to a specific threat and therefore has a 
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definite object”.174 In Angst, the meaning we have constructed for our 
“being-in-the-world” may be damaged, and it is in these moments we once 
again need to find significance (Bedeutsamkeit).  Indeed, the literature on 
ontological security has deep connections to the existential tradition in 
general. Anthony Giddens in particular was influenced by Kierkegaard.
175
  
Yet while there are analytical similarities, it is possible that Sartre and 
Nietzsche in particular may have objected to the implication that we require 
stabilising routines in order to function within the world. Ontological 
security theories have little to say about using anxiety for a positive 
constructive purpose, whether it is to discover radical freedom or gain self-
mastery as depicted by the Übermensch.  There is an undercurrent to 
ontological security which appears to posit that human beings fear freedom 
and may even make active attempt to avoid it, as Erich Fromm would likely 
have argued were he to have come into contact with the concept.
176
 There is 
a link here between this moderately conservative outlook and Blumenberg’s 
understanding of myth and his intellectual influences. As mentioned in 
section 1.3, Blumenberg was influenced by Arnold Gehlen and his view that 
human beings were vulnerable creatures who sought relief brought the 
burden of being open to the world (weltoffen).
177
 Blumenberg saw avoiding 
the vastness of the absolutism of reality as a key precursor to developing 
culture and other phenomena, including myth. Significance (Bedeutsamkeit) 
is needed to manage the numerous possibilities that the absolutism of reality 
produces, and myth is one important way of providing it.  But significance 
is also an act of “naming the unknown”, thereby granting us the perception 
that our surroundings and objects within them have a level of ontic 
definiteness, or at least we no longer question their existence. This describes 
exactly the experience of an ontologically secure person; there is enough 
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that can be “taken-for-granted”, clear roles to be understood, routines to 
follow, and at least the certainty that things are as they are. An ontologically 
secure person is placed 
However, it would be easy to assume that ontological security refers 
only to creating a sense of stability in a somewhat banal and routinised 
manner. At first glance, the entire theory of ontological security seems to be 
premised on the idea that human beings answer the existential problems of 
“being” that they experience by seeking a sense of order, stability, and 
coherence in their lives. Yet conflict and violence – two major sources of 
instability – have been recurring features of human history, despite 
seemingly being counter-productive to these objectives. However, this has 
actually been accounted for in ontological security research. As Bahar 
Rumelili argues in her introduction to her 2015 edited volume Conflict 
Resolution and Ontological Security: Peace Anxieties: 
They [conflicts] sustain the political and social 
production of definite objects of fear, systems of meaning 
that clearly differentiate friends from enemies, and 
unequivocal moral standards premised on the necessity 
for survival. At the individual, group, and state levels, 
they become embedded in habits and routinised practices, 
and enable state actors to maintain stable and consistent 
self-narratives that inform their actions. At the individual 
level, the fears and deprivations induced by conflict and 
the emotional behavioural responses developed to deal 
with them, no matter how costly and negative, generate a 
sense of stability and certainty, and enable actors to 
simultaneously bracket out existential questions and to 
know what they are doing and why they are doing it.
178  
 
The paradox is that the mobilising aspect of political myth often 
constructs situations that are highly volatile, but losing them would mean 
losing the conditions that enable ontological security. What is missing in 
this research is how narratives about these conflicts can provide people with 
a sense of significance (Bedeutsamkeit), and how this in turn helps to 
intersubjectively construct (following Croft) ontological security. Myths 
often posit highly dramatic situations, with elites often constructing events 
as existentially threatening to the audience. Yet this very act does something 
exceptionally important: it concretises what may otherwise be abstract, 
disconnected, or indifferent to people. Put more specifically, who we are, 
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who the enemy is, the threat they may pose, seem more concrete and 
certain, thereby making any overwhelming feeling of Angst highly unlikely. 
We may feel fear, anger, or hatred, but this is (following Kierkegaard and 
other existentialist philosophers) preferable to the aimlessness of Angst.  
Although it is not the central focus of my thesis, it should be noted 
that the political myth literature provides a new way to link the dramatic and 
exceptional to the ontological security literature. This will require further 
exploration in future research. However, what does become clear in chapters 
5 and 6 especially is that “critical situations” as Giddens put it provide 
moments in which the work on myth can be undertaken in order to re-
establish a sense of ontological security. This thesis will take some of the 
earliest steps in bridging these literatures through the examples provided in 
those chapters. 
1.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has elaborated on an existential theory of political 
myth. It has built upon the works of Hans Blumenberg and Chiara Bottici in 
particular, but has sought to ground them within the wider existential 
philosophical tradition and subsequently connect them to the concept of 
ontological security. After introducing the discussion in section 1.1, I sought 
to provide a definition of political myth in section 1.2. Although the concept 
of political myth is controversial and no definition is flawless, I critically 
engaged with the existing literature as it has developed throughout the 20
th
 
and early 21
st
 centuries. I noted that there seems to be three aspects of the 
work on myth: the cognitive, integrative and mobilising. In section 1.3 I 
elaborated on the insights of existentialist philosophy in order to provide the 
groundwork of an explanation for why we need political myth. I began my 
outlining the core themes of existential philosophy, focusing particularly on 
the ideas of estrangement and Angst. In section 1.4, I highlighted that 
political myth does more than provide significance in a political context: it 
also provides us with ontological security.  The intention of this chapter was 
to provide a broader understanding of the philosophical framework that 
informs precedes my methodology and empirical chapters. It is perhaps the 
most important chapter for these very reasons. That said, it elaborates on an 
existential (in the philosophical sense) dimension to politics that is under-
51 
 
emphasised in much of the humanities and social sciences literatures. 
Although I analyse this through a theory of political myth, the questions of 
Angst in politics could be explored from other angles.  
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Chapter 2: Isolating Myth from Other Social Phenomena  
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to differentiate myth from other important social 
and political phenomena. This is necessary as there is always a risk of 
conflating myth with concepts such as ideology and religion especially. This 
would be a crucial mistake because it means losing the specificity of each 
concept. Myth has the disadvantage of often being used pejoratively to 
describe a false claim or untrue story. It can also be used to describe 
primitive stories of origin which have since been overcome by modern-day 
science. This means it can simply be used as a tool of dismissal rather than 
being an interesting modern-day category to analyse in itself. Moreover, 
losing the specificity of myth means simultaneously losing other important 
occurrences that are related to ideology and religion but which are not 
explained by them. I begin this chapter by discussing the relationship 
between myth and ideology. Much of the literature in political science 
stresses that myth and ideology are closely linked
179
. As Bottici has pointed 
out, the risk is that these studies often conflate the two phenomena and 
thereby miss the specificity of both, but myth in particular. Although I 
acknowledge that both myth and ideology often appear together in practice, 
I argue in section 2.2 that they should be distinguished in terms of their 
form. Myths are dramatic and figurative narratives designed to answer 
existential questions, whereas ideologies are fundamentally concerned with 
ideas, and often the construction of seemingly coherent political principles. 
Not all ideologies take narrative form, and not all myths advance grand 
ideas about human life and political governance.   In section 2.3 I similarly 
argue that myth and religion should be separated. Both undeniably answer 
existential questions which underpin much of the human condition, but 
religions attempt to offer larger, more universalising and timeless answers to 
these questions. I make a similar distinction between political myths and 
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political religions.  In section 2.4 I argue that myth should not be understood 
as necessarily being in tension with reason and science. Instead, I posit that 
myths can answer different fundamental existential needs that reason and 
science may not necessarily address. I also critique the view that myths have 
been “overcome”, as was the popular view in 19th and early 20th century 
scholarship. Instead, I argue that myths remain core to our social 
experiences. 
2.2 Myth and Ideology 
 
This section seeks to separate political myth and ideology. This is 
important because many studies of political myth place them closely 
together and arguably conflate them.
180
 This is not to diminish these studies, 
since they provide us with important examples of political myth that we 
would be poorer without. My argument is that political myths and political 
ideologies can influence one another and may appear together in practice, 
but that they should be kept analytically distinct. Ideologies are constituted 
by ideas which offer purportedly coherent systems of thought about a range 
of political issues, whereas political myths are dramatic narrative processes 
designed to provide a sense of significance and maintain ontological 
security.  Even if ideologies were able to provide significance and 
ontological security, they still do not necessarily take on narrative form.  In 
many respects it is unsurprising that myth and ideology are considered so 
closely-related. Both are essentially cognitive devices to make sense of the 
world. As the anthropologist Clifford Geertz once put it, human beings are 
“self-completing animals” and we require these maps to orient ourselves in 
the world.
181
  
Ideology first entered the lexicon in the era of the French 
Revolution. The term was coined by Destutt du Tracy who, by combining 
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the word “idea” with the suffix “logy”, sought to create a “science of ideas.” 
For du Tracy, ideas should be subject to the methodologies of the natural 
sciences in order to “apply reason to observed factors and eschew a priori 
deductions.”182 Scientists of ideas would attempt to expose and refute 
“false” ideas.183 While this is rarely how ideology is understood today, the 
concept still suffers under a plurality of definitions (Terry Eagleton counts 
at least 16 of them).
184
 That said, the different approaches to ideology tend 
to fall within two overarching categories: the pejorative and the neutral.
185
 
Among those influenced by Marxism and continental philosophical 
traditions such as poststructuralism, pejorative approaches are more popular. 
However, alongside Chiara Bottici, I will adopt a more neutral 
understanding of the concept. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, 
pejorative understandings of ideology themselves risk becoming ideological 
dismissals of alternative worldviews. Secondly, a pejorative understanding 
of ideology would necessitate a pejorative understanding of political myth, 
especially if the concepts are closely related. I begin this section by 
discussing important works on ideology before distinguishing the concept 
from myth. While there are overlaps between ideology and myth, there are 
key differences which would affect the analysis unless explicitly stated. 
Pejorative understandings of ideology purportedly began when 
Napoleon Bonaparte denounced “les ideologues” as visionaries divorced 
from reality whose theories were “shadowy metaphysics” which search “for 
first causes on which to base legislation of peoples, rather than making use 
of laws known to the human heart and lessons of history.”186 As Alan 
Cassels elaborates, when the term re-emerged with the writings of Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels it still retained a “Napoleonic stricture” as 
“unscientific” and this formed the basis for the development of the thesis of 
“false consciousness.”187 For Marxists, ideology acts as an obscuring force 
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which serves the interests of elites. As Marx and Engels put it in The 
German Ideology: 
“The ideas of the ruling class in every epoch the ruling ideas, 
i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at 
the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has 
the means of production at its disposal, has control at the same 
time over the means of mental production… the ideas of those 
who lack the means of mental production are subject to it… 
The class which has the means of material production at its 
disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental 
production.”188 
It is within the interests of the ruling classes to maintain this material 
and intellectual force. Ideology acts as a form of distortion, which makes the 
alienation of subordinate classes from their labour seem natural. This 
pacifies the masses and prevents the possibility for revolution and 
emancipation of the proletariat. This relationship of dominance and 
subservience is obscures and perpetuates the injustices of capitalism.
189
  
Various efforts have been made to develop and refine this 
interpretation of ideology. For instance, Louis Althusser attempted a deeper 
analysis of the power of the different forms of coercion exhibited by the 
state by distinguishing between “state power” and “state apparatus.” The 
latter was divided into two sub-fields: the “repressive state apparatus” 
(RSA) and the “ideological state apparatus” (ISA). The RSAs are 
effectively the violent wing of the state which encompasses institutions such 
as the Police, Army, Prisons and Courts etc. The ISAs are somewhat more 
subtle. Instead of functioning by repressive violence as the RSAs do, they 
impose ideology through public institutions such as the education system, 
trade unions, religions and other aspects of culture. Althusser claimed that 
the ruling classes utilise ISAs – the most dangerous of which is the 
“educational” – to sustain their positions of dominance.190 
Prior to Althusser, Karl Mannheim provided a more nuanced 
understanding of ideology. Mannheim argued for two concepts of ideology 
which he referred to as the “particular” and the “total.” Ideology begins with 
the former as an individual epistemological investigation into the world and 
eventually – through a dialectical process – forms the general worldview of 
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an entire group, or the “total.” The shifting between the “particular” and the 
“total” invariably causes a distortion and potentially the deliberate 
obscuration of facts since it begins to simultaneously reflect the worldviews 
of the individual and the whole group. Therefore, individual group 
knowledge is fundamentally inseparable from and formed by the social 
conditions within which they are situated.
191
 
Mannheim’s understanding of ideology finds some similarities in the 
work of Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism
192
- although it 
must be stressed that she does not mention Mannheim directly. Arendt 
wrote extensively on the nature of ideology with a particular emphasis on 
totalitarian movements, particularly the Nazis. She understood ideologies as 
“isms which to the satisfaction of their adherents can explain everything and 
every occurrence by deducing it from a single premise.”193 Ideologies, 
according to her, attempt to fuse scientific approaches with philosophy and 
thus become a form of “scientific philosophy.” In reality, for Arendt, they 
have little in common with science: 
“To an ideology, history does not appear in the light of an 
idea… but as something which can be calculated by it. What 
fits the “idea” into this new role is its own “logic,” that is a 
movement which is the consequence of the “idea” itself and 
needs no outside factor to set it into motion. Racism is the 
belief that there is a motion inherent in the very idea of race, 
just as deism is the belief that a motion is inherent in the very 
notion of god.”194 
 
This is in fact contrary to a more scientific approach which would 
examine historical and philosophical ideas from a supposedly objective and 
neutral perspective. It is therefore far removed from Du Tracy’s hope for a 
science of ideas. Ideologies (in a pejorative understanding) are anti-
theoretical insofar as they do not tend to ask questions but instead have pre-
given conclusions. As such, they can frame history according to singular 
premises which fit that ideological paradigm. Ideological thinking, for 
Arendt, both isolates peoples and ultimately “ruins all relationships with 
reality.”195 
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Chiara Bottici offers a critique of pejorative understandings of 
ideology, especially when they are linked so closely to political myth in 
much political science research. Myths imbue these ideologies with a sacral 
element, as “the term myth designates a story which has the status of a 
sacred truth.”196   Bottici argues that pejorative ideological views lend 
themselves open to (ironically) being ideological and that they risk falling 
into the trap of distinguishing between “myth” versus “reality.” This is 
problematic because “by counterpoising myth and ideology with the 
‘reality’ of facts, one is trapped once again in an approach to political myth 
in terms of its claim to truth.”197 Furthermore, this would leave me in a 
position of adopting a pejorative understanding of myth as an inherently bad 
or undesirable social phenomenon. With pejorative understandings of both 
concepts, we risk reducing them to negative terms to criticise ideas and 
beliefs that we simply do not like or agree with. I therefore adopt the 
widely-used neutral understand of ideology that Bottici and Challand 
summarise as denoting “a set of ideas by which human beings posit, 
understand and justify their social action.”198 
 Nonetheless, there are undeniable similarities between political 
myth and ideology regardless of whether one takes a “pejorative” or 
“neutral” understanding of the term:  
… an ideology is a set of ideas by which human beings 
posit, understand and justify ends and means of a more or 
less organised social action. The intersection with the 
concept of political myth is clear: a political myth also 
entails a set of ideas by which human beings posit and 
represent the ends and mean of social action. Both 
political myth and ideology are mapping devices that 
orient in the social and political world.
199
 
Despite the incorporation of “ideas” within this understanding, not 
all ideas can be understood as a political myth. For Bottici, further 
conditions must be met. Firstly, these set of ideas “must take the form of a 
narrative, that is, of a series of events cast in a dramatic form” and, of 
course, not all ideologies have a narrative form. Secondly, on the basis of 
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this narrative form, it must be able to ground (begründen) or “coagulate and 
reproduce” significance (Bedeutsamkeit). As Bottici summarises, it is this 
emotive, narrative form that distinguishes myth from ideology:  
To put it plainly, political myths are narratives that put a 
drama on stage. And it is from the impression of being 
part of such a drama that the typically strong pathos of a 
political myth derives. I can theoretically share an 
ideology which leaves me completely indifferent on the 
emotional level, but no political myth can be shared and 
at the same time remain emotionally indifferent. In this 
case, it is simply not a political myth for me. And this, I 
think, is ultimately the reason why the concept of 
political myth and that of ideology should be kept 
separated.
200
 
Separating the two concepts does not deny that political myths and 
ideologies are closely related in practice. Liberalism, conservatism, fascism, 
environmentalism, and many other ideologies, can all be enhanced in 
discourse by making reference to myths. For instance, the myth of the 
General Strike is closely linked to socialist revolutionary and Marxist 
ideologies, and myths about the foundation of the USA are heavily linked to 
liberal ideology. Nonetheless, they are analytically distinct. Political myths 
are dramatic and figurative narrative processes, which may contain themes 
of heroism, villainy, tragedy, and joy, whereas ideologies are a body of 
purportedly coherent ideas which comment on an array of political and 
economic issues which myths do not. They can also underpin the entire 
political programmes of political leaders. 
2.3 Myth and Religion 
 
In this section I argue that political myths and religions should also 
be understood separately even if, as with ideologies, they can appear similar 
in practice. Both undeniably answer existential questions which underpin 
much of the human condition, but religions attempt to offer larger, more 
universalising and timeless answers to these questions, whereas political 
myths are characterised by being more particular and context-bound. I also 
distinguish political myth from political religion, as discussed by Eric 
Voegelin and Emilio Gentile. I argue that political religions claim to hold 
answers to the fundamental existential concerns that political myths do, but 
in a far more absolutist and totalising manner. This has been most vividly 
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seen in the totalitarianism of the 20
th
 century which, as Hannah Arendt 
pointed out, was qualitatively different to all previous forms of 
government.
201
 Most myths do not posit absolute claims of the world and 
rarely discuss ultimate meanings of existence. By contrast, this is precisely 
what religions (especially Abrahamic ones) do. As discussed in section 1.3, 
Blumenberg explains that myths are “distinguished by a high degree of 
constancy in their narrative core” but also “by an equally pronounced 
capacity for marginal variation.”202 The potential for “themes and 
variations” distinguishes myths from “holy texts” which “cannot be altered 
by one iota.”203 Blumenberg has Christianity in mind when he makes this 
argument. Christians advanced immutable claims to universal truths which 
were designed to replace other mythologies and be applicable to everyone, 
everywhere, regardless of context.
 204
  This meant that Christianity could 
avoid, as Blumenberg rather bluntly puts it, avoid “the annoyance of the 
contingency of saving its events in space and time, by making them 
representable everywhere through its cult.”205  
The distinction between myth and religion can also similarly be 
made in the political sphere. This means that political myths differ quite 
clearly from “political religions”.  One of the most well-known authors on 
political religions is Eric Voegelin.
206
 Voegelin noted the rise of 
“Gnosticism” in politics in the twentieth century as a result of the demise of 
traditional forms of religious belief and the resulting existential uncertainty 
this creates. In the 20
th
 century, this led people to a period of “Gnostic 
speculation” in search of alternate sources of faith. People tried to re-
construct a sense of divine purpose, which they did by “substituting more 
massive modes of participation in divinity for faith in the Christian 
sense”,207 and this was central to the success of Nazism and Communism, 
both of which, for Voegelin, became political religions. To understand this 
argument, it is important to note that Voegelin distinguished between two 
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overarching forms of religion: Überweltiche Religionen (transworldly 
religions) and Innerweltliche Religionen (inner-worldly religions).
208
 The 
former can be described in the traditional sense and the latter could be 
understood as a form of religion within the world which, Voegelin argues, 
occurred as a reaction to the Enlightenment. Voegelin was most concerned 
with the power of these inner-worldly religions and the dangers they cause. 
People can adhere so strongly to inner-worldly religions that their 
“revelations” simply “do not break apart under the attack of scientific 
criticism” and “the concept of truth is transformed instead”.209  
Voegelin’s observation identifies something qualitatively different 
about totalitarianism to other forms of political order seen throughout 
human history. Hannah Arendt best explains this in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, when she argues that Nazi and Soviet Communist regimes 
are new forms of government and not merely modern versions of other 
tyrannies. Arendt explains that these ideologies were able to a single, 
universal, comforting answer to the mysteries of the past, present and future. 
For Communism, this was the history of the class struggle and for Nazism it 
was race struggle. If adherents accept these premises, then such actions are 
simply inevitable or natural parts of society and history. This then justifies 
authoritarian state structures and tools for government.
210
 The ideology 
becomes so totalising that it permeates all aspects of the adherent’s social 
existence. It provides answers to all concerns across the inner-worldly 
cosmos in the same way that traditional trans-worldly religions do. Some 
scholars have taken the concept of political religion and applied it to other 
forms of political. For instance, Emilio Gentile argues that liberal 
democracies can become political religions. In an extensive passage, he 
opens his book Politics as Religion by making the bold case to consider the 
USA as a “civil religion”: 
The American civil religion has its own “holy scriptures,” the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, which are 
treasured and venerated like the Tables of the Law. It has its 
own prophets, such as the Pilgrim Fathers. It celebrates its own 
sacred heroes such as George Washington, the “American 
Moses” who freed the “new people of Israel” from slavery 
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under the English and led them to the Promised Land of 
freedom, independence, and democracy. It venerates its 
martyrs, such as Abraham Lincoln, the sacrificial victim 
assassinated on Good Friday of 1865, after the American 
nation has been subjected to the purifying fires of a cruel civil 
war to expiate its guilt and re-establish the hallowed nature of 
its unity and mission. John Kennedy and Martin Luther King 
Jr. then became further examples of martyrdom for this civil 
religion, alongside the figure of Lincoln. Like all religions, this 
civil religion has its own temples for the veneration of its 
leading figures, such as the monument to Washington, the 
Lincoln Memorial, and Arlington Cemetery, where the tomb of 
the Unknown Soldier is revered as a symbol for the citizens 
who fell to save their nation. Finally, the civil religion has its 
sermons and liturgy; the presidential inaugural speeches, 
Independence Day on 4 July, Thanks giving Day, Memorial 
Day when the war dead are commemorated, and other 
collective ceremonies that celebrate personalities and events in 
American history turned by a myth into a “sacred history” of a 
nation elected by God to fulfil its particular mission in the 
world.”211 
 
While Gentile’s argument is interesting, it does raise the question as 
to whether any nation-state with similar political structures could be 
considered a religion. It may be better to understand these phenomena as a 
series of myths, symbols, ideologies, and historical memories that altogether 
inform an overall political creed. The qualitative difference between 
totalitarian government and other forms seems, to me, to offer a far more 
convincing case for them to be considered political religions. What Gentile 
does identify, in my view, is how a series of political myths have come to 
guide political action and imbue liberal ideology in the US. 
To sum up, the observations in this section provide for us a clear 
distinction between an inner-worldly political religion and political myth. 
Firstly, political myth can be distinguished from transworldly religions (to 
use Voegelin’s categories) since political myths answer inner-worldly 
concerns. Secondly, while political myths can inform and empower political 
religions, the former does not construct the totalising coherency nor 
command the obedience and submission that the latter does. This, I have 
argued, is a feature that is best understood as being part of totalitarian 
regimes. 
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2.4 Myth and Science 
 
In this section I argue that myth should not be understood as being in 
tension with reason and science. Instead, I posit that myths can answer the 
fundamental existential needs discussed in chapter 1 that reason and science 
do not necessarily fulfil. Political myths do not answer questions that are 
“ontic” or necessarily independently existing “things-in-themselves”. 
Instead, they are concerned with ensuring that people generate a sense of 
significance (Bedeutsamkeit). It does not matter whether a myth is able to 
accurately reflect truth or falseness, but whether it can answer the existential 
issues discussed in section 1.3. My argument is that the objectives of myth 
and science are different and should not be assumed to be always 
opposed.
212
 However, the most important point to take from section 2.4 is 
that myths are not narratives from a bygone era that have been overcome, 
but are part of the very fabric of our social experiences. The idea that myth 
was exclusive to “primitive” societies and cultures underpinned much 19th 
century anthropological research. In a seminal study, Bronislaw Malinowski 
described what he viewed as the function of myth: 
Myth fulfils in primitive culture an indispensable 
function: it expresses, enhances and codified belief; it 
safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the 
efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the 
guidance of man. Myth is thus a vital ingredient of 
human civilization; it is not an idle tale, but a hard-
worked active force; it is not an intellectual explanation 
or an artistic imagery, but a pragmatic charter of 
primitive faith and moral wisdom.
213
 
 
Malinowski was a man of his time in attributing it to primitive 
cultures. He seems to view myth as only functional for those cultures and 
something which - he and European societies in general -had overcome. 
This view of linear development is further emphasised in James George 
Frazer’s wide-ranging study The Golden Bough. In this work, Frazer 
discusses the importance of magic and ritual in the formation of myth. 
According to him, beliefs about magic and ritual were central to myth, and 
that magic was in fact primitive method for trying to learn about the world. 
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Indeed, in an oft-cited passage, Frazer referred to magic as “the bastard-
sister of science.”214 When a civilisation realises that magic does not work, 
they progress away from it and instead adopt more scientific approaches. 
Lucien Lévy-Bruhl drew sharp distinctions between “primitive” and 
“western” minds throughout his oeuvre. Western minds were reasonable and 
logical, whereas the primitive mind could not distinguish the supernatural 
from reality. He, like many others at the time, believed that there was a 
historical and evolutionary teleology leading from the primitive to the 
Western mind.
215
 Myths were in a sense pre-logical, and a prior stage of 
development towards Western civilisation, which was held as an ideal 
progressive outcome – or perhaps the only legitimate outcome.216 
These claims are not generally shared by researchers of myth today. 
Even though many scholars accept that myths exist in contemporary 
societies, some scholars still see them as a hindrance to scientific progress. 
Ernst Cassirer viewed myth as inferior to scientific thought, because the 
latter is founded upon “a progressive analysis of the elements of experience” 
whereas the former “lives entirely in the presence of its object – by the 
intensity with which it seizes and takes possession of consciousness in 
specific moments.”217 This means that scientific thought is grounded in 
progress and continually moves forward, whereas myth is entirely 
concerned with the present. Consequently, if myth supersedes science and 
rationality, the progress of humanity is frozen and this may, in certain 
circumstances, lead to regression.  Cassirer’s cites the “myth of the Aryan 
race” as the main example of this regression, and his entire theory of myth is 
heavily tied to this particular example.  
For Cassirer, myths are an expression of deep human emotions. 
However, in modern society they are generally suppressed by science and 
reason, although not eradicated by it. Therefore, Cassirer warns that we 
must always be prepared for “violent concussions” that can “shake our 
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cultural world and our social order to its very foundations”.218 They are 
often at their most stark when there is a rapid disruption to the established 
social and political order. Cassirer understood these moments as “critical 
moments” in which:  
…the rational forces that resist the rise of the old 
mythical conceptions are no longer sure of themselves. In 
these moments the time for myth has come again. For 
myth has not really been banished or subjugated. It is 
always there, lurking in the dark, waiting for its hour and 
opportunity.
219
  
 
Myth is only suppressed by science and reason but not eradicated by 
it and, therefore, we must always “be prepared for violent concussions that 
may shake our cultural world and our social order to its very 
foundations.”220 Mary Midgley takes the opposite position to Cassirer. She 
argues that modern science is not the opposite of myth or even incompatible 
with it. Science is, in fact, dependent upon it. For her, myths are “not lies” 
or “detached stories” but “imaginative patterns, networks of powerful 
symbols that suggest particular ways of interpreting the world.”221 She 
claims science is underpinned by (among other things) a myth of its own 
omnipotence, meaning that it is the only way to answer “every kind of 
question… and that must naturally include questions about value.”222 
Midgley has made similar accusations against evolutionary biologist 
Richard Dawkins and Jacques Monod.
223
 She argues that their works 
perpetuated a dramatic image which “showed heroic, isolated individuals 
contending, like space warriors, alone against an alien and meaningless 
cosmos” which “established the books as a kind of bible of individualism, 
most congenial to the Reaganite and Thatcherite ethos of the 80s.”224 
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The issue is that, rather than being hindrances to “progress”, humans 
adapt myths to the new conditions created during times of progress.
225
 
Vincent Mosco persuasive argues that many people are currently influenced 
by the “myth of cyberspace” which promises the creation of a “new world” 
through the development of increased interconnectedness that results from 
advances in digital technology.
226
 Even the most technical and scientific 
endeavours can be mythologised and, for some, this may even provide them 
with the sense of significance and ontological security they require.  
2.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has worked to distinguish myth from other phenomena. 
This is important to ensure that the specificity of myth is not lost, and that 
what I analyse in the empirical material using my theoretical framework is 
clearly understood. While I may not resolve every tension, I believe this 
section summarises the key differences that justifies myth being considered 
a separate analytical category. In section 2.2 I analysed the concept of 
ideology, from its initial understanding as the “science of ideas”, to its later 
distinction between its pejorative and neutral variants. I argued that, 
although myth and ideology may often appear together in practice, they 
should be conceptualised differently. In section 2.3 I distinguished myth 
from religion. In particular, I focused on the role that myth - and especially 
political myth – plays in answering finite or “inner-worldly” questions, 
whereas religion tends to answer questions about the totality of the universe 
which myth – and certainly political myth – does not. While there are 
certainly more similarities here, political religions attempt to explain the 
totality of the “inner-worldy” cosmos that political myths normally do not – 
an example of this being totalitarianism. Finally, in section 2.4 I discussed 
the relation between myth, science, and reason. I explained that myths do 
not answer questions that are “ontic” or necessarily independently existing 
“things-in-themselves” but, rather, they are concerned with ensuring that 
people generate a sense of significance (Bedeutsamkeit). I argued that myth 
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is not a phenomenon exclusive to “primitive” societies, but still remains 
essential to Western politics today. Although this chapter cannot resolve 
every debate about the differences between myth and ideology, religion, and 
science respectively, it is likely that any remaining ambiguities will be 
addressed in the empirical analysis of myth in chapters 5 and 6. This is 
because it will enable us to see how the work on myth operates in practice.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology  
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses the methodological approach I take when 
analysing the empirical material. These approaches are grounded in an 
interpretivist epistemology that pays particular attention to the usage of 
language in the work on myth. The objective is to try to find the specific 
aspect of speech and text (in the sense of written words) that indicate that 
the work on myth is present. Most fundamentally, what qualifies as myth 
are those statements that construct a dramatic and figurative narrative that is 
designed to answer existential needs for significance (Bedeutsamkeit) and 
ontological security. Nonetheless, there are normally linguistic cues that 
indicate when the work on myth is present. I identify these as deixis (person, 
place and time) and the linguistic tropes of metonymy and synecdoche. The 
chapter also elaborates on how I select and analyse my source material. This 
raises a series of questions about source selection and the strengths and 
limitations of intepretivist methodologies more broadly. I am careful to 
point out that I do to comprehensively resolve these issues, but I do 
nonetheless provide a determined defence of my approach. I also stress that 
my examples in chapters 5 and 6 should not be read as comprehensive, 
empirical “case-studies” that reflect traditional approaches in social science 
research. Rather, they should be seen as a discussion about a particular 
empirical example and as illustrations of the theoretical argument and 
analytical framework. This is a qualitative approach that scrutinises the 
work on myth in uniquely individual sources.  
3.2 Locating the Work on Myth Linguistic Tropes and Deixis  
 
This section discusses two important features of language which 
often form a key part of the work on myth: tropes and deixis. A trope is a 
figure of speech where “words are used with senses that differ (or ‘turn 
away’) from their literal senses, so the sense of words in metaphors, 
metonyms, allusion, irony, hyperbole and so on diverge from their normal, 
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literal senses.”227 Tropes are especially useful when a political speech or 
newspaper column hopes to appeal to emotion. When directed towards the 
speaker, they evoke positive emotions and values, such as pride, honour, 
courage and solidarity. By contrast, when used against opponents, they 
evoke negative emotions such as fear, shame, estrangement, and 
ostracism.
228
 There are several important tropes in modern political 
discourse and language more generally. The most relevant for this analysis 
are metaphor, metonymy, and a specific type of metonymy known as 
synecdoche.  Deixis effectively refers to the act of “pointing” via language, 
and any such linguistic form which accomplishes this “pointing” is called a 
deictic expression. The speaker is as the “deictic centre”, and others are 
positioned in relation to who and where the speaker is, and when he or she is 
speaking. As renown linguist Charles J. Fillmore put it: 
Deixis is the name given to those aspects of language 
whose interpretation is relative to the occasion of 
utterance: to the time of utterance, and to times before 
and after the utterance; to the location of the speaker at 
the time of the utterance; and to the identity of the 
speaker and the intended audience.
229
 
Elsewhere, I have made usage of deictic theories to make arguments 
about the mobilising potential of political myth.
230
 I did this by referring to 
Piotr Cap’s work on legitimisation via proximisation. This strategy seeks to 
grant legitimacy to a speaker’s claims but persuading the audience that the 
referent object being discussed, such as a threatening entity, is literally 
“closing in” on them.231 Joanne Esch similarly did this with an analysis of 
the legitimising rhetoric of the Bush administration’s declaration of the “war 
on terror.”232 While this also features at times in the empirical material in 
chapter 5 and 6, it is not alone sufficient to capture the work on myth in this 
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context. I focus on three forms of deixis that are important for the analysis 
in this thesis. They are person deixis, place deixis, and time dexis, which are 
often understood as the major grammatical types of deixis.
233
 Person deixis 
refers to “human participants” which will typically be the speaker 
him/herself, supporters and allies, enemies and opponents, or other members 
of the audience. This therefore means that person deixis is seen in pronouns 
that “encode the identity of participants in the speech” by pointing to 
individuals (such as a president) or a group (such as a nation), the latter of 
which are, incidentally, often referred to by a metonym. The pronoun “we” 
is crucial to person deixis. It is often unclear as to who it refers to exactly 
and, indeed, it gains power precisely through this imposition as it invites the 
audience to ally themselves with the speaker.
234
  
Place deixis is concerned with spatial relations discussed in a 
speech, and shown with demonstrative adjectives such as “here” and 
“there”, or “this (way)” or that (direction).”235 It “encode(s) spatial relations 
relative to the location of the speaker” but can also be words or expressions 
that point to a specific location.
236
 The difference between “this” and “that” 
is important to bear in mind when analysing place deixis. “This” would refer 
to an object in a pragmatically given area close to the speaker’s location. By 
contrast, “that” would refer to objects beyond the pragmatically given area 
close to the speaker’s location. This subtle difference is important in an 
analysis of myth because often “that” can be used to refer to entities that are 
separated from the speaker by a significant distance. This could be used in a 
negative context when referring to an undesirable out-group. Motions verbs 
are also particularly important in place deixis. Verbs like “coming” “going” 
and “travelling” represent movement towards and away from the deictic 
centre.  
Time deixis encodes time relations relative to when utterances are 
made. Words such as “now”, “then”, “ago”, “today”, and “yesterday” point 
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to a specific time in relation to the point at which a particular utterance is 
made. Time deixis is often crucial the work on myth. For instance, the myth 
of the General Strike requires orators to construct a temporal link between 
the present conditions of existence and a time of future struggle and, 
ultimately, liberation. Founding myths similarly require drawing a link 
between the conditions of the present and those of the past. The myths about 
the foundation of the EU speak of the tragedies of war and the journey 
towards pacification of the continent that the EU has pioneered up to today. 
These utterances are often linked to place deixis. For instance, the expansion 
of the EU with the 2004 enlargement was often referred to as the 
culmination of a journey towards the “reunification of Europe”.237 This is a 
reference to a purported time when Europe was unified, separated through 
the tragedies of war and genocide, and has now finally been reunited. Place 
deixis, time deixis, and in some respects person deixis, are all represented as 
a coherent yet emotive narrative that provides a sense of significance to the 
European project. As the empirical examples demonstrate in Part II of the 
thesis, these three forms of deixis often appear in quick succession as part of 
constructing the work on myth. 
Deixis would not be useful as a standalone indicator for the presence 
of myth. What deixis does is to reinforce the position of speaker and listener 
in relation to these existing contexts. For instance, a political speech may 
refer to “British values” and contrast these with “un-British” values, such as 
those found represented by more radically conservative aspects of Islam. If 
the speaker uses pronouns such as “we”, and associates that “we” with 
signifiers for British values, which itself serves as a metonym to describe all 
people in the geographical space designated as “Britain”, then the audience 
can be persuaded that they are part of this “we.” By referring to 
characteristics of “they” such as Sharia Law - which often works as a 
metonym for illiberal practices of justice such as amputation and capital 
punishment - the audience is able to comprehend how distant they are (as in 
“we”) from the “they.”  The ideas which formed these differences in the 
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first place, however, are not constructed through deixis, but through other 
social and psychological means learnt over time. 
Metaphors are also an important aspect of the work on myth and. In 
political myth, these metaphors often exist to construct dramas and evoke 
strong emotions. As the Roman rhetorician Quintilian put it, metaphors are 
“designed to move the feelings, give special distinction to things and place 
them vividly before the eye…”238 Charteris-Black argues that metaphors are 
not used randomly in rhetoric, and that they regularly contain an underlying 
pattern that often signal the speakers’ intentions. He offers the term 
“purposeful metaphor” to explain how and why these metaphors provide 
“coherent representations” of story being actively told by the speaker.239 
Charteris-Black argues that this use of metaphor turns a speech into a 
narrative, rather than an independent set of non-associated metaphors. He 
understands these as “myths”, or a “narrative-based representation of 
powerful, intense, often unconsciously driven, emotions such as grief, fear, 
happiness and enjoy” which are “purposeful but their origin is in the 
unconscious.”240 He provides an array of examples, but places particular 
emphasises the importance of heroic “journey metaphors” that appeared in 
the speeches of Martin Luther King and how these were adapted by Barack 
Obama. In his analysis of one the following speech by Obama during his 
presidential campaign in 2007 is particularly interesting: 
“And if you will join me in this improbable question, if 
you feel destiny calling, and as I see, a future of endless 
possibility stretching before us; if you sense, as I sense, 
that the time is now to shake off our slumber, and slough 
off our fear, and make good on the debt we owe past and 
future generations, then I’m ready to take up the cause, 
and march with you, and work with you. Together, 
starting today, let us finish the work that needs to be 
done, and usher in a new birth of freedom on this Earth 
[Italics in original].”241 
Charteris-Black points out that these metaphors draw from the 
domains of war, sleep and journeys, and personifications of “destiny” and 
“freedom”. The dense usage of metaphor contributes to creating an elevated 
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style which intends to motivate the audience to carry out the necessary 
actions to bring about the changes. “War” as metaphor implies struggle and 
effort whereas “sleeping” equates to inaction. In this example, metaphors 
are crucial in creating the emotions necessary for inspiring political purpose 
and social action.
242
 While Charteris-Black’s elaboration of myth does not 
go into the same depth that mine does (he draws predominately from the 
political science approaches of Flood and Edelman)
243
, he accurately 
outlines the emotive aspect of the process. Most usefully, however, he offers 
an approach that allows researchers to see how myth is expressed in rhetoric 
through metaphors. For practical methodological purposes, his approach is 
useful and can be expanded upon with reference to the theory of myth I 
have constructed in this thesis. This means I view metaphors as part of the 
process of answering the existential needs for significance (Bedeutsamkeit). 
This is especially true in times of crisis and tragedy, where metaphors aid 
myth by substituting the literal, hard, “absolutism of reality” with more 
simplified, parsimonious and purposeful understanding of social reality.  
What types of metaphors are important for this thesis? Mainly metaphors 
that invoke some of the core themes of myth: good and evil, tragedy and 
joy, origins and futures. Metaphors that speak of conflict, journey, and 
particularly those which construct self-other dichotomies such as 
“Britishness vs Islam”, “good vs evil”, “freedom vs terrorism.” Even more 
relevant are those metaphors that “position” people in relation to the 
speaker, as we see in person, place, and time deixis (see section 4.2). The 
next section discusses two other tropes that relate closely to metaphor: 
metonymy and synecdoche. 
Other important tropes (although to a much lesser extent) in the 
work on myth include metonymy and synecdoche. Metonymy occurs when 
the “name of a referent (or thing referred to) is replaced by the name of an 
attribute, or entity related in some semantic way, or by spatial 
proximity…”244  This substitution is not based on similarity as it is in the 
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case of metaphor, but association. For instance, Number 10, or 10 Downing 
Street, would be a metonymical expression referring to the UK Government. 
The same would be the case for the White House in the US. “The City” is 
often used as a metonym for the City of London, and thereby to describe 
major parts of the banking and financial sectors in the UK. Finally, the 
“Crown” is often a metonym that represents the monarch. Synecdoche is a 
specific type of metonymy which a part of something is used to refer to the 
whole or something, or the whole is used for a part. For instance, some may 
refer to their cars as “wheels.” In this case, the part of the car referred to (the 
wheels) represents the entirety of the car. In the phrase “all hands on deck”, 
meaning all people are required to help or participate with something, the 
word “hands” is a synecdoche representing the entirety of a person. 
For Lakoff and Johnson, metonymy and metaphor are related but are 
ultimately “different kinds of processes [italics in original]”; metonyms have 
a “primarily referential function” which “allows us to use one entity to stand 
for another”, whereas metaphors are principally “a way of conceiving one 
thing in terms of another, and its primary function is understanding.”245 
While metaphors create a relation of similarity between objects from 
different domains, this is not the case with metonymy.
246
 That said, 
metonymy can at times also serve the purpose of providing understanding. 
For example, in the case of a synecdoche which refers to the “part for the 
whole”, there could be many parts that can stand for the whole, but the part 
we pick determines which aspect of the whole we are focusing on. Lakoff 
and Johnson use the example of the expression “good heads” to demonstrate 
this: 
When we say we need some good heads on the project, 
we are using “good heads” to refer to “intelligent 
people.” The point is not just to use a part (head) to stand 
for a whole (person) but rather to pick out a particular 
characteristic of the person, namely, intelligence, which 
is associated with the head.
247
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There are at least two common instances where metonymy, 
particularly as synecdoche, interacts with the work on myth (although 
Lakoff and Johnson do not discuss myth). These are, the “controller for the 
controlled” and “the place for the object.”248 For the former, statements like 
“Nixon bombed Hanoi” and “Napoleon lost at Waterloo” make a prominent 
individual comes to represent the entirety of the military personnel involved 
in those conflicts. Regarding the place for the object, statements like “Let’s 
not let Thailand become another Vietnam” and “Pearl Harbor still has an 
effect on our foreign policy”, places come to represent the entirety of the 
historical event.
249
 Yet this is far more than just a curious use of language; it 
draws on the imaginations that people have about these events, and both of 
those examples are also invoked in statements designed to guide action in 
the present. It also relates strongly to time, place, and person deixis (above) 
All of this is crucial in political myth, which may recall key historical events 
(or interpretations of them) that people are aware of. The analysis of part II 
shows that metonyms for core historical events (or, at least, interpretations 
of these events) such as “the Blitz”.  
Bottici and Challand have both discussed the importance of 
synecdoche in political myth. They emphasise that political myths are often 
condensed into “icons” that, through synecdoche, are “able to recall the 
whole work on myth that lies behind them.”250 In order to answer the 
question of where such narratives actually lie, Bottici and Challand 
subsequently draw from Sigmund Freud, Ernst Cassirer, and Erich Fromm, 
to construct a working hypothesis for the existence of a “social 
unconscious.”251  A particular icon or utterance that represents only one part 
of the work on myth can, by means of synecdoche, recall the rest of it. 
Naming historical events, cultural references, monuments, etc., in specific 
circumstances may all represent and contribute to the work on myth. For 
instance, the July 7
th
  London bombings (incidentally referred to by the 
metonym “7/7”) were often compared to an attack on London that 
resembled the Blitz (see Chapter 5). This allowed the public to recall a 
whole series of stories with associated symbols, like the calm, resilient 
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community spirit shown by Londoners, images of the underground (often 
known as the Tube) and air-raid shelters occupied by families, which 
altogether provided a powerfully emotive way of interpreting the attacks. 
3.3 Selecting and Interpreting Sources 
 
This section serves two purposes. Firstly, it outlines each of the 
types of source material I draw from and how I analyse them. Secondly, it 
discusses how I justify my approach and the methodological limitations that 
arise from it.  Rather than proceed with the traditional “case-study” model 
that most social science studies do, I decided to analyse two key events in 
the work on myth from multiple perspectives. Those are, the London 
bombings of 7
th
 July 2005 (chapter 5) and the murder of Lee Rigby on 23
rd
 
May 2013 (chapter 6). I select source material from within a month of the 
two events, as this is the immediate time period where the work on myth 
becomes most prominent, largely because of the existential issues outlined 
in chapter one. I draw from two main sources. The first are political 
speeches from the Prime Minister and House of Commons debate following 
the events. The second are columns from Newspapers, two of which are 
generally understood as being “left-leaning” and two that are “right-
leaning”. I select one tabloid and one broadsheet from each category. For 
the left, I selected the Daily Mirror as a tabloid and The Guardian as the 
broadsheet. For the right, I selected the Daily Mail as a tabloid and The 
Telegraph as a broadsheet. 
Political speeches are a crucial in any analysis of the work on 
political myth. They are often made by individuals with substantial 
symbolic and social capital. Speeches are carefully orchestrated to appeal to 
public needs and sentiments and, where possible, to persuade them towards 
a particular view. My analysis of political speeches is informed by the 
methodological approach outlined in section 3.2. I apply many of the 
methodological insights offered by Jonathan Charteris-Black because he is 
(to my knowledge) the only scholar to offer a comprehensive analysis of 
figurative language and political myth in modern political speeches. 
252
 This 
unique approach which is grounded in the discipline of linguistics, and it 
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provides a useful supplement to my existing theoretical framework. 
Charteris-Black’s approach is particularly useful for understanding the 
structure and syntax of political speeches. His critical analysis of metaphors 
and myths in particular shows how rhetorical devices are deliberately 
deployed for maximum emotive impact. I selected government speeches for 
the period 2010-2015 coalition and the present Conservative government 
primarily from www.gov.uk. Unfortunately, speeches from previous 
governments were not attainable on that website. I therefore also used the 
British Political Speech Archive, located at www.britishpoliticalspeech.org. 
This website allows users to narrow their searches by selecting speeches 
from influential politicians. I also searched news websites to locate 
particular speeches and speakers who were not recorded on each of these 
websites. My search terms in all instances were: “Islam”, “Islamic 
extremism”, “Terror”, “Terrorism” “British values” and “Britishness”.  
Furthermore, I conducted searches based on particular time periods. For 
instance, I searched for speeches in the month following the 7
th
 July 2005 
bombings to see if evidence of the work on myth could be found.  In 
addition to this, I cited some speeches which I encountered through 
secondary literature, and have credited the authors where this has occurred. 
Context is also vitally important. Where it is made clear, I consider the 
timing of the speech, other events occurring at the same time, the place it is 
made, and who the audience are. This ensures that I can embed the speech 
within wider discourses and, in fact, this often strengthened the arguments 
for my theoretical framework. 
I also analyse political speeches in the House of Commons. 
Primarily, this is because a great majority of UK political speeches are made 
in the House of Commons, and there are often subsequently debates about 
them. Parliamentary debates also allow for direct responses to speakers and, 
crucially, this is where influential non-government MPs are able to have 
their say. This includes those who are in positions of greater power such as 
ministers and shadow ministers, but also back-bench MPs who may, at 
times, also hold other prominent positions in society (symbolically or 
otherwise). Parliamentary debates occur under very fixed and formal rules. 
There are often limitations on speech time and the style of language that can 
be used, which could easily be deemed “unparliamentary.” Falling foul of 
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these rules can result in suspension from the chamber, and this is something 
that MPs are likely to be careful to avoid. Secondly, parliamentary debates 
can result in the passing of bills which later become laws, or to begin a 
military campaign. This gives parliament a clear sense of immediate power 
that is not present in a political speech or interview. The debates that occur 
prior to a parliamentary vote can persuade MPs to vote one way or another 
if they are undecided, and this is especially the case in a free (non-whipped) 
vote. UK Parliamentary debates are available in the Parliament database 
known as Hansard, which can be reached at www.hansard.parliament.uk. 
This website has records of all recorded parliamentary debates and bills 
adopted.
253
  
Newspaper columnists are also important contributors to the work on 
myth. Newspapers are circulated to millions of people every day, and even 
more people now read articles online. Columnists respond to events 
normally in line with the editorial opinion of the newspaper they write for. 
They are important mouth-pieces of the media and thereby must be included 
in an analysis of the work on myth. Determining which newspaper outlet 
and which columnist to discuss is challenging. I found that I had to make far 
more subjective judgements than I did with a clear ready-to-hand database 
that was available for political speeches and parliamentary debates. I try to 
justify each selection based on measures of their influence and sometimes 
raw numbers can be good indicators for this. For instance, I spend some 
time analysing the articles of Melanie Phillips, who works for the Daily 
Mail, which is now the most visited online newspaper website in the world. 
Furthermore, she has more appearances on shows such as BBC’s Question 
Time than any other non-politician.
254
 Although these indicators are not 
perfect, they are at least defensible indicators for source selection in 
qualitative research.   
The rationale behind my source selection was as follows. Firstly I 
tried to find some balance in the political affiliation of the newspapers in 
                                                          
253
 Archived debates are found at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/commons/by-
date/commons-hansard-bound-volumes/ 
254
 George Arnett, "Which Politician is on Question Time the Most? It's not Nigel 
Farage,"  The Guardian (19 March 2005), 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/mar/19/politician-question-time-
nigel-farage-labour. 
78 
 
question. While mainstream UK newspapers are more likely to be right-
wing, I try to balance this by giving as much attention to left-wing 
publications as possible. This meant that my analysis of right-wing 
publications comes mostly from the Daily Mail and the Telegraph, and my 
left-wing analysis is from the Guardian and the Daily Mirror. 
Unfortunately, a significant challenge has been obtaining the electronic 
records of many of these papers. The Sun and The Times could both have 
been selected, but both require subscriptions, and even the Telegraph has a 
limit to how many articles can be read online until a subscription has to be 
paid. This meant that some material was obtained via secondary sources, 
and credit has been given when this occurred. 
I judged the importance of sources through Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of symbolic capital. Symbolic capital is “the acquisition of a 
reputation for competence and an image of respectability and 
honourability.”255 This means that senior political figures, while often 
derided in the media, are individuals with a sense of respectability and 
importance in the public sphere. Similarly, Newspapers such as the Daily 
Mirror, The  Guardian, Daily Mail, and The Telegraph also have an element 
of symbolic capital that makes them more likely to be trusted than other 
sources.   This still opens me up to another significant flaw in qualitative 
interpretivist research: the temptation to “cherry-pick” data. This means 
constructing an argument based on parts of the data that suit the overall 
argument while ignoring evidence that contradicts it. While some have 
claimed cherry-picking is often done deliberately by qualitative 
researchers,
256
 Ema Ushioda points out that many may do it inadvertently 
“through a lack of skill or experience in handling qualitative datasets, or 
though lack of critical reflection”.257 David Silverman argues that 
qualitative researchers should be able to “convince themselves” that their 
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conclusions are based upon a critical and systemic analysis of their data.
258
 
If authors are unable to do this sincerely, it may indicate that the data has 
not been analysed critically and reflexively. 
Regardless of the intentions of authors, it is inescapable that they are 
likely to read data (or “text”) differently depending upon the social and 
material context in which both data/text and author are situated. This 
observation has been made by philosophers of hermeneutics for decades, all 
of whom have emphasised that there are no detached or objective and 
detached readings of texts.
259
 The social world is constituted by layers of 
interpretation and it would be extremely difficult – perhaps even impossible 
– to detach ourselves from our position in society and take an impartial, 
“objective” view of events.  As a consequence, I cannot claim an entirely 
neutral and impartial reading of my source material and it is likely that 
others would read the same material differently. However, I have attempted 
to be as reflexive and critical as possible. This is demonstrated on some 
occasions in chapter 5 and 6, when I engage with material that may at first 
seem to contradict my main argument. However, I offer a defence of my 
theory against these examples even if, of course, it remains my own 
subjective reading of the material. However, if everybody took the 
hermeneutic position to an extreme, the humanities and social sciences 
would be significantly impoverished. This is the case for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, we risk using our subjectivity as an excuse to take an 
“anything goes” mentality to methodology and social science more broadly. 
Secondly, social science needs the capacity to make comparisons between 
cultures, ideas, and even eras. As Richard Ned Lebow warns, if the 
hermeneutic approach is taken to its extreme, it would “all but cripple social 
science” as it would “restrict comparison to cultures and eras bounded by 
shared concepts.” Incidentally, this would also be a hard condition to meet, 
as “concepts are continually evolving and are usually not understood or used 
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the same way by actors within the same discourse.”260 If we accept our 
interpretations are not timeless, universally applied, but may still be widely 
shared and relevant across different times and spaces, we can avoid 
submitting to the naïve claim that we are able to be entirely objective, 
neutral, and impartial. 
 Despite this, I will not retreat from the responsibility of being 
critically reflexive and explicit about my own position in relation to my 
research. Indeed, this latter point is crucial in the case of this particular 
thesis. The subject-matter of this thesis has been part of real-life experiences 
for me growing up in the United Kingdom and being involved in political 
activism in party politics and human rights organisations. Throughout my 
teenage years and into early adulthood, I noticed the gradual worsening of 
tensions between communities, increasingly inflammatory media rhetoric, 
more authoritarian and occasionally violent counter-terrorism measures, 
and, overall, the incremental polarisation of society. My interest in 
researching political violence, terrorism, narratives, and emotions all stems 
from world-experiences. Undoubtedly, this has influenced my source 
selection and the theoretical framework of this thesis. 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has offered a methodology that synethises approaches 
in linguistics with my theoretical framework of political myth outlined in 
Chapters 1 and 2.  Section 3.2 identified two essential components to 
language that indicates the presence of the work on myth. These are deixis 
and tropes. Tropes are a figure of speech where words are used in ways that 
differ from their literal senses. I identified metaphor as being an important 
trope that is often invoked in the work on myth in order to dramatise and 
evoke powerful emotions. Although they are less prevalent, metonymy and 
its subtype known as synecdoche are also often present in the work on myth. 
The discussion in 3.2 began with explaining “deixis”. Deixis is the act of 
“pointing” via language and is crucial for the work on myth as it allows 
speakers and listeners to position themselves in relation to the subject matter 
of the myth. In moments of crisis, in which people’s ontological security has 
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been challenged, deixis can contribute to re-orientating people towards a 
more solidified sense of being-in-the-world. This orientation effectively 
supersedes the Angst since it provides a sense of groundedness that is 
required for significance. Deixis is thereby crucial in the subsequent 
empirical analysis of chapters 5 and 6. Of secondary importance are 
metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche, the latter being a subtype of 
metonymy.  
In section 3.3 I elaborated on the empirical material that I intend to 
use in chapters 5 and 6. I explained that my analysis from political speeches 
and  parliamentary debates draws heavily from the works of Jonathan 
Charteris-Black, who has written extensively on political rhetoric, including 
the use of metaphor and myth by speakers.
261
 Finally I outlined the general 
limitations that come with qualitative research grounded in interpretivism 
and how this may affect my thesis. The biggest drawback is the temptation 
that researchers have to “cherry-pick” their data. I explained that my reading 
of the empirical material is from my own perspective and is based on my 
own social, historical, and temporal contingencies, what Hans J. 
Morgenthau would have called Standortgebundenheit.
262
 I am reading the 
material from a specific philosophical perspective and with a particular 
theory of political myth in mind. It is therefore entirely possible that others 
would read the same empirical material differently and may ultimately come 
to different conclusions to me. I thereby do not claim to be providing an 
objective or neutral reading of the text, but I do claim to offer one that is 
theoretically well-grounded and aware of its limitations. This 
methodological chapter has also made a new contribution to the way we 
analyse political myth. It provides a methodology with particular linguistic 
cues through which we can analyse the work on myth in a moment of 
political crisis. It has drawn links between the role of deixis in linguistic 
utterances and the existentialist dimensions of political myth. The role of 
positioning and “pointing” in the work on myth is crucial for addressing the 
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vacuity that Angst may create. This linkage of linguistics and existential 
philosophy can be a productive way through which we can interpret political 
myth during times of crises, as is demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6.  
This concludes part I of the thesis where my analytical framework 
was outlined. Part II interweaves this framework into my empirical material 
to discuss the issue of Britain’s perceived conflict with radical, violent 
Muslims. 
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PART II: Britain’s Conflict with Radical Violent Muslims 
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Chapter 4: An Outline of the Work on Myth  
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter identifies the core features of the work on myth that can 
be seen in Chapters 5 and 6.  The political myth that I argue is highly 
dominant in British discourse tells a story that Britain is in an existential 
conflict with a violent, radical form of Islam and Muslims. This enemy, it is 
claimed, must ultimately be overcome and defeated, or British people will 
face grave consequences. This is not a political myth in the more 
mainstream usage of the term as a false narrative, story, or argument. 
Rather, it is a dramatic and figurative narrative process that responds to a 
need for significance and, constructing ontological security is an important 
part of this process. There are two broad sides who are embroiled in this 
struggle in political myth.
263
 On the one hand, I point out two features of the 
collective self that are often invoked in the work on myth. The first is the 
notion that Britain is an exceptionally resilient country. This narrative often 
draws from memories of the British stoicism in the face of the Blitz during 
the World War II. The second narrative I highlight indicates that there are 
particular British values, and these often intersect with tolerance and 
liberalism. The work on myth indicates that the values of these violent, 
radical Muslims are utterly incompatible with those of Britain owing 
primarily due to their barbaric practices. These include terrorism, the 
suppression of women, and a general hatred of British values. 
I distinguish between two variations to the work on myth that appear 
in the media especially. Although myths retain a consistent narrative core, 
they often have develop variants in order to be relevant to a particular 
context. This balance between constancy and variation is important to the 
work on myth, as Hans Blumenberg himself pointed out. The variations in 
the myth are split between the “left-leaning” and “right-leaning” 
interpretations. The former is more forgiving of “good” Muslims and makes 
more effort to distinguish them from “bad Muslims”, and is also more likely 
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to defend multiculturalism. The right-wing variant is more likely to be 
hostile to multiculturalism, and may even cite fundamental issues within 
Islam itself as being responsible. It also argues that British response to these 
issues has not been strong enough. 
4.2 Britain’s Existential Conflict with Islamic Extremism: The Triumph 
of British Resilience and British Values 
 
My argument is that narratives about Britain facing an existential 
conflict with a pernicious violent radical form of Islam have become a 
political myth. It must be once again stressed that I do not refer to these as a 
political myth because I believe they are false, but because they have taken 
on a dramatic and figurative form that serves to provide people with a sense 
of significance and ontological security. The myth posits that Britain is 
facing an existential threat from this radical other and that it must ultimately 
triumph and resolutely destroy this threat. This is essentially a story of good 
and evil, the former being legitimate and the latter being illegitimate. At the 
point of legitimacy, are those who are identifiable as British. There are two 
main features to this. The first is the notion that Britain is an exceptionally 
resilient country. This narrative often draws from memories of the British 
stoicism in the face of the Blitz during the World War II. The second 
narrative posits that there are particular British values, and these often 
heavily overlap with liberalism. The myth posits these values will ultimately 
be victorious, but that this success will depend upon Muslims adopting these 
values in order to not be drawn into terrorism. Opposing Britain (the point 
of legitimacy) is the violent radical Islamic other (the point of illegitimacy). 
Those associated with this identificatory pole are barbaric with values that 
are irreconcilable with Britain. These barbaric practices involve acts of 
grotesque violence through terrorism, the continuous subjugation of women, 
and a hatred of British values.  However, there is also a tension within 
British understandings of this Other. That is, there are “good” Muslims who 
are amenable and able to be subsumed within Britishness, and the “bad” 
Muslims who are irreconcilable with them. Good Muslims must do more to 
prevent people becoming “radicalised”, or, transition from “good” to “bad”.  
I refer to myth in line with my theoretical framework in chapter one 
in which it was defined as a dramatic and figurative narrative process that 
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responds to a need for significance, and constructing ontological security is 
an important part of this process. It makes the threatening other less distant 
and unknowable to us, thereby eradicating Angst. In most cases, it will also 
reduce our sense of fear and even if it does not, fear is instinctively easier to 
manage than Angst, as a range of existential philosophers have argued (see 
section 1.3). Terrorist attacks are crucial moments in which political myth is 
most needed. Borrowing from Ernst Cassirer, myth may indeed always be 
“lurking in the dark, waiting for its hour and opportunity”264 even if the 
argument in this thesis (unlike Cassirer’s) would not refer to myth as 
necessarily a regression to a prior stage of humanity (see section 2.4).  In the 
aftermath of terrorist attack, political myths can serve as a uniting force at a 
time of grief. For these reasons politicians and media commentators seek to 
provide this sense of certainty for the audience with powerful and dramatic 
rhetoric that removes all ambiguity for these events (although maybe not 
consciously so).  
I am not arguing that this political myth exists solely in Britain, or 
that it was created following 9/11
265
 – although that was an important 
moment. Instead, this is a myth that is closely related to the the idea of the 
“clash of civilizations”, which Bottici and Challand have persuasively 
argued is also a political myth.
266
 Far from being just a name and theory 
created by Samuel Huntington,
267
 it has become a global political myth that 
has permeated societies, and is seen in books, arts, media, comics, films. It 
has become a cognitive scheme through which people look at the world and 
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a drama which mobilises people’s passions and emotions. The myth has 
appeared on numerous occasions throughout global media and has often 
been directly referred to as the “Clash of Civilisations”.268 Perhaps one of 
the most pertinent features of this clash has been the controversy of the 
cartoon crisis in Denmark, where offensive pictures of the Prophet 
Muhammed were drawn, causing riots across much of the Middle-East.
269
 
This would later tragically resurface with an attack on the offices of French 
satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, on 7
th
 January 2015, which killed 12 
people.
270
  While there have been numerous studies that indicate British 
people have begun to develop far more negative attitudes towards Muslims, 
and that there has been a longitudinal increase in the amount of people who 
believe Islam and the West are incompatible,
271
 this is not always made 
immediately obvious in political and media discourses in times of crisis. 
Rather, the debate in the UK makes a distinction between “good” and “bad” 
forms of Islam and Muslims. The former are compatible with Britishness, or 
at least they can be tolerated within the country. This is often made manifest 
in times of crisis, particularly terror attacks, when political and media elites 
continually seek to make a distinction between good Muslims who would 
utterly condemn such actions, and bad Muslims who would actively 
condone or do little to prevent such occurrences. 
As previously indicated, it is important to note that the clash of 
civilisations myth (as Bottici and Challand also point out) was not 
manufactured in the 1990s, but has been a product of orientalist discourses 
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discussed most prominently by Edward Said.
272
 Some of the hostility has 
been grounded in theology and, as Ivan Kalmar has demonstrated, this 
developed particularly during the period of the Renaissance and 
Enlightenment. At this time, people had begun to question there was a 
debate in Europe about the nature of the divine and also human power. 
From this, a perception that Islam allegedly requires submission to a 
merciless God and despotic government (oriental despotism) has helped to 
ground Christian debates (even today) about divine power, which ultimately 
augments perceptions of Islam as being unduly authoritarian.
273
 Beyond 
theological debates, Jonathan Lyons has noted that a thousand years of 
Western imaginations of the Muslim world have produced grand totalising 
narratives about it.
274
 These often contribute to shaping perceptions and, by 
implication, fuel the political myth of the clash of civilizations. Many 
modern-day discourses emphasise the perceived socially conservative trends 
of Muslims within Western societies and in Islamic countries,
275
 and we see 
indications of this throughout the empirical examples in chapters 5 and 6. 
In a UK-specific context, both media and political elites have 
constructed the violent, radical Islamic enemy as the latest incarnation of a 
long line of enemies. This was especially the case following the London 
Bombings of July 7
th
 2005 (7/7).  Darren Kelsey notes that the Blitz, IRA 
bombings, and 7/7 were often mentioned “in a diachronic sequence to 
project the repetition of attacks, endurance and defiance in London.” He 
points to an article in The Sun which states: 
Adolf Hitler’s Blitz and his doodlebug rockets never once 
broke London’s spirit. Years later, the capital was 
bloodied but unbowed by two decades of deadly attacks 
by the mad bombers of the IRA. So yesterday’s outrage 
by the fanatics of al-Qaeda – Britain’s 9/11 – will achieve 
only one end… To make this nation ever more 
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determined that those who violate our way of life must 
never win.
276
 
… 
After 9/11, Americans made a huge song and dance of 
their defiance against terrorism. The worst attack in their 
history was a shocking wake-up call. There was none of 
that in London after Thursday’s atrocities; just a grim 
determination to resist, to carry on as normal. To call it 
the Blitz spirit is an easy shorthand that rightly credits 
what Americans call the ‘greatest generation’. But it does 
not fully do justice to the stiff-jawed stoicism in the face 
of evil that has been our lot on this tiny Island for 
centuries.
277
 
 
The above quote typifies a core aspect of the Britain/Britishness 
identificatory pole that is demonstrated in the empirical material. That is the 
notion there is a specific form of British resilience that has overcome 
enemies in the past and will continue to do so. Crises such as the London 
bombings of 2005 and the murder of Lee Rigby put the notion of British 
resilience to the test, and it is in these moments that politician and mass 
media commentators strove to reassure the public that Britain would remain 
strong, secure, and steadfast in its opposition to terror. The notion of British 
resilience directly appeals to people’s sense of security not just in the 
physical and somatic terms, but also and perhaps primarily in their security 
of being. When this particular aspect of the work on myth is invoked by 
government and media elites, it is designed to provide a sense of 
significance which ontologically securitises and persuades the audience that 
they can carry on with their lives. They can rest assured that they will 
overcome their enemy, just prior generations of Britons did. This is a 
powerful collective self-narrative that is likely invoked in many 
idiosyncratic variants by many people(s) across the globe.  
As pointed above, this aspect of the work on myth appears quite 
commonly in the UK with reference to the 1940s and the Blitz spirit, and 
this is especially the case following the July 7
th
 bombings in London, since 
they occurred only a few days before Britain celebrated 60 years since the 
end of the Second World War. Given the importance of the Blitz in British 
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identity (as discussed in section 4.3), this left an opportunity for political 
figures and media commentators to draw parallels between the two events. 
While they were different in terms of their scale and the number of 
casualties, Londoners were often urged to draw from the so-called “Blitz 
spirit” to overcome this latest insidious threat. Darren Kelsey has conducted 
an extensive study that revealed how prevalent the Blitz spirit was in 
Newspaper articles in particular.  This was aptly reflected in an editorial in 
the most popular UK paper, The Sun, on the Saturday following the attack: 
Sixty years ago tomorrow, Britain finally beat Nazism. 
Men, women and children from every walk of life – not 
just the military – worked fearlessly and tirelessly to 
crush Hitler’s tyranny. Gritty Londoners proved to be 
unbeatable. Many brave people sacrificed THEIR lives so 
that we may enjoy OURS in freedom today. Each was a 
hero in their own way. The nation stood firm and the 
nation won. Today Britain calls upon a new generation of 
heroes to fight an enemy every bit as sinister [bold: 
mine].
278
 
 
The Sun article is a clear articulation of the work on myth theorised 
in Chapter 1. The article venerates the behaviour of all Britons (particularly 
Londoners) during the Blitz and utilises this as an example for how 
contemporary Britons should responds to the 7
th
 July bombings. It vividly 
describes how Britons united to overcome substantial adversity against a 
tyrannical other, and an enemy “every bit as sinister” now threatens the UK, 
necessitating the same response. All three aspects of deixis (chapter 3) are 
at play here. Firstly, person deixis is present in the article when each 
individual in the Blitz period is referred to as a “hero” and “unbeatable” 
and, more importantly, modern-day Britons are called to replicate their 
behaviours. Secondly, by directly linking otherwise contingent situations 
that occurred at different moments of time, the article evokes time deixis in 
a manner that constructs a sense of common heritage for British people. 
Finally, these are all linked together via place deixis, wherein the 
geographical space and imaginations of “Britain” in the Blitz period 
represents all Britons today.  It is vital to not underplay the importance of 
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the “Blitz” in British identity discourses (see section 4.3). To many British 
people, the word “Blitz” is a metonym that represents a whole series of 
images. From bomb shelters and Air-Raid Wardens, to the symbol of St 
Paul’s cathedral enduring against a backdrop of devastation and ruin, to a 
resilient public going about their business and carrying on despite these 
horrific conditions.  
So why are the 1940s so important to contemporary Britishness? I 
would argue that much of it comes down to the ease at which the audience 
can comprehend that plot and its consequent malleability. As Mark 
Connelly describes: 
It [The Blitz] has a great script: a small gang of fiercely 
independent people refuse to cave in to the bad guys. The 
bad guys decide to punish the wilful defiance in an 
appalling show of might. Despite the hardships, the small 
gang becomes more tightly bound, laughs in the 
face of terror, takes everything the forces of evil can dish 
out and sends them packing.
279
  
 
This is a highly dramatic story that evokes powerful imagery and, as 
such, is ripe to be incorporated in the work on myth. As outlined in section 
1.2, myths are dramatic and figurative narratives that reflect our needs for 
significance. They often contain themes of tragedy and joy, heroism and 
villainy, among many others. The Blitz is a grandiose story of success at a 
time of great difficulty, and one that is seen to embody core characteristics 
of Britishness. Many stories of British resilience are often mentioned as a 
way of sustaining this image. A widely-cited American witness reported that 
“… by every test and measure I am able to apply, these people won’t quit… 
the British are stronger and in a better position than they were at its [the 
Blitz] beginning.” Apparently, people referred to the raids as if they were 
the weather (the variability of which is another British identity-trope). A day 
or night of heavy raids would mean that the weather had become “very 
blitzy.”280 Many claim that mental health did not become a major concern 
despite the bombs.
281
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London Underground are iconic, particularly one taken by Bill Brandt at 
Elephant and Castle Underground Station in 1940.
282
 Old, established 
symbols like the Underground had become symbols of a contemporary 
struggle. As Croft points out, St Paul’s Cathedral was prominent among 
these symbols. Its survival provided hope for Londoners, and it has since 
become, as also indicated by the website of the Monarchy puts it, a symbol 
of “the victory of the British spirit during the war of 1939-45, in that, 
although badly damaged and shaken, it survived the ordeal by battle in an 
almost miraculous way.”283 In recent years, a bizarre cultural phenomenon 
has taken hold embodied in the phrase “Keep calm and carry on”. The 
origin of this phrase was a motivational poster produced by the British 
government in 1939 in preparation for World War II.  The purpose was to 
increase the morale of the British public in the face of forthcoming air 
attacks on cities. Despite this, it was rarely displayed in public at the time 
and was only re-discovered at a second-hand bookshop in Alnwick, 
Northumberland in 2000.
284
 The poster has since been appropriated 
commercially. It has been reproduced on T-shirts, mugs, wallets, mobile 
phone covers, and has even been used as the title for several self-help and 
motivational books.
285
  
One critical aspect of the Blitz period is often invoked today is 
Winston Churchill and the speeches he made during the 1940s.
286
 The most 
know of these was “We Will Fight them on the Beaches”. The core passage 
of this speech is as follows: 
We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we 
shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with 
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growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we 
shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we 
shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing 
grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we 
shall fight in the hills, we shall never surrender, and even 
if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a 
large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our 
Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the 
British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God’s 
good time, the New World, with all its power and might, 
steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old.
287
 
 
While few would be able to recite this speech in its entirety, the call 
to “fight them on the beaches” and that we shall “never surrender” are likely 
to be known to the vast majority of Britons. Churchill’s speech powerfully 
evokes the integrative aspect of myth through deploying person deixis (we), 
place deixis (Britain, British Empire) and time deixis through the prophecy 
that Britain would endure and liberate the “new world” could liberate the 
“old world” in the future if necessary. Churchill’s usage of parallelism and 
repetition makes the speech seem poetic and memorable.  The whole speech 
conjures  up images of determination, strength, and the centrality of 
Britain’s place in the world.  It is also embodies many themes that are 
crucial in the work on myth: the struggle between the forces of good and 
evil, the need for victory and the cost of defeat, the scale of the threat posed, 
are all central characteristics and themes of heroism and resilience, are all 
present. It was a time of profound fear, in which the ontological and, indeed, 
somatic/physical future of Britain and Britons were in serious doubt. The 
fear would at least be placated temporarily by invoking unity, and a clear, 
underlying objective was articulated. Churchill’s call for Britons to brace 
themselves to their duties, and the division between the “broad, sunlit 
uplands” and the “abyss of a new Dark Age,” are all constitutive of a 
Sorelian strategy to incite a determination to act. The promise of glory in 
victory which would be remembered across historical epochs placed imbued 
the audience with a sense of empowerment and responsibility. The 
simplifying aspect of the work on myth also rendered Churchill an almost 
infallible, heroic figure. His misdemeanours, such as the deployment of 
troops in south Wales, the campaign in Gallipoli, and the return to the Gold 
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Standard, and the controversy over the bombing of Dresden, have all been 
broadly forgotten.   
This speech is exceptionally important to British identity, and direct 
invocations of it or at least allusions to it are seen throughout chapters 5 and 
6. Many speeches, debates, and Newspaper articles in the immediate 
aftermath of 7/7 made reference to the “Blitz spirit” against a new, 
equivalent enemy. Churchill is often seen as the antithesis of Neville 
Chamberlain, who adopted the policy of “appeasement” towards the Nazis 
in the 1930s. One month after the 7/7 attacks David Cameron, who was then 
a candidate for leadership of the Conservative party, warned not to repeat 
the errors of the policies of appeasement in the 1930s with “jihadists.”288 
More recently, this rhetoric resurfaced when the government sought to 
justify extending British air strikes in Syria in December 2015. Senior 
government figures compared ISIL to the Nazis, and asked encouraged MPs 
to vote in favour of military action by asking them whether they were 
“Churchill or Chamberlain?”289  Indeed, Britain has internalised the 
narratives of resilience in the Blitz (and World War II more widely) so 
strongly that they have arguably become the most important contributing 
factor to constructing a sense of Britishness. As Stuart Croft points out, this 
is because prior claims about Britishness lack legitimacy owing to many of 
the more unsavoury aspects of the British empire: 
“There can be no universal claim to the greatness of the 
British Empire at a time when freedom and self-
determination seem to be such universal values. There 
can be no claim to the strength of rule of the country (and 
empire) when claims to meritocracy are stronger than 
those of the class system… And in any case, Britain’s 
imperial past is littered with invasions, killings and 
mistreatment of local populations (as in the repression of 
the Mau Mau rebellion), unfortunate inventions (such as 
the concentration camp in South African), slavery and 
exploitation.”290 
 
None of these negative aspects of the British Empire could possibly 
be incorporated into any narrative of self that could be deployed in moments 
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of perceived crisis. The reason for this is it would likely encourage 
audiences into further self-doubt when significance, certainty, and security 
are required.  In the more existential terminology discussed by Kierkegaard 
(section 1.3), this may create a tension within the infinite and subsequently, 
for those who adhere strongly to these narratives, it could create issues for 
behaviour in the finite. These narratives may not always be at the forefront 
of people’s minds during their daily lives (despite occasional references to 
keep calm and carry on), just as other features of our lives that give us 
ontological security are not. However, they can become extremely powerful 
tropes to provide us with a sense of significance, incites mobilisation, and 
ontologically re-securitises wherever the fundamental trust relations and 
collective self-narrative may have been undermined.  
The second self-narrative that appears throughout the empirical 
material is the importance of British values. Whereas British resilience tells 
grand stories of resistance to previous tyrannies and generates promises of 
future successes, British values are seen as a constant feature of the 
collective-self. They are useful signifiers to identify who conforms to 
Britishness and, crucially, who does not. This rhetoric became increasingly 
prominent following the election of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
coalition government in 2010. Prime Minister David Cameron in particular 
discussed British values both prior to and following the murder of Lee 
Rigby, as is discussed further in Chapter 6. So what are these values? 
Primarily, that Britain is a liberal and tolerant country that values traits such 
as freedom and democracy. Unlike the narrative of British resilience (see 
above), the idea of British values has a much more direct impact upon a 
more generalised sense of self or, the way one functions “in-the-world” on a 
daily basis. However, these values can be challenged and called into 
question in moments of crisis. In chapter 5 and 6, there are numerous 
examples of political and media elites invoking the notion of British values 
in order to (consciously or not) ontologically securitise by evoking a sense 
of significance (Bedeutsamkeit). This normally appears in conjunction with 
the mobilising aspect of myth; the British public is asked to “mobilise” to 
defend these values that constitute a large part of their collective sense of 
self.  
96 
 
David Cameron in particular has been determined to promote the 
ideas of “British values”. On the 799th anniversary of the Magna Carta, 
David Cameron wrote an article in the Mail on Sunday which defined 
British values as “a belief in freedom, tolerance of others, accepting 
personal and social responsibility, respecting and upholding the rule of 
law.”291 He describes these values as “British as the Union flag, as football, 
as fish and chips.” While other countries have similar values: 
… what sets Britain apart are the traditions and 
history that anchors them and allows them to flourish and 
develop. Our freedom doesn’t come from thin air. It is 
rooted in our parliamentary democracy and free press. 
Our sense of responsibility and the rule of law is attached 
to our courts and independent judiciary. Our belief in 
tolerance was won through struggle and is linked to the 
various churches and faith groups that have come to call 
Britain home. These are the institutions that help to 
enforce our values, keep them in check and make sure 
they apply to everyone equally. And taken together, I 
believe this combination – our values and our respect for 
the history that helped deliver them and the institutions 
that uphold them – forms the bedrock of Britishness 
Without it, we wouldn’t be able to walk down the street 
freely, to say what we think, to be who we are, or do 
what we want. Newspapers like this wouldn’t exist. MPs 
like me would not have been democratically elected. And 
our property wouldn’t be our own.292 
Cameron here incorporates core tenets of liberalism with Britishness, 
and evokes the integrative aspect of myth through person deixis (we and 
our) and, just as with Churchill above, uses repetition and parallelism to 
make this point. By writing about the origins of British values in the Magna 
Carta, he is also evoking time deixis. He draws a direct link in time from the 
creation of the Magna Carta to the present position of Britain. Furthermore, 
Cameron evokes the mobilising aspect of myth by repeating his frequent 
call for “muscular liberalism” to promote British values. This was to be all-
the-more pertinent, particularly as Britain has been too “squeamish” about 
promoting its national identity, and passively tolerant of extremism.
293
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Indeed, Cameron has often made it clear that British values must be invoked 
specifically against the enemy, radical, extreme, violent (although not 
exclusively so) Islamic other.   This was most explicitly demonstrated in 
2011 when David Cameron gave a speech at a security conference in 
Munich.  In this speech he outlines, in no uncertain terms, the fault lines of 
the existential conflict between liberal Britain and its enemy: 
We have got to get to the root of the problem, and we 
need to be absolutely clear on where the origins of where 
these terrorist attacks lie.  That is the existence of an 
ideology, Islamist extremism.  We should be equally 
clear what we mean by this term, and we must 
distinguish it from Islam.  Islam is a religion observed 
peacefully and devoutly by over a billion people.  
Islamist extremism is a political ideology supported by a 
minority.  At the furthest end are those who back 
terrorism to promote their ultimate goal: an entire 
Islamist realm, governed by an interpretation of 
Sharia.  Move along the spectrum, and you find 
people who may reject violence, but who accept 
various parts of the extremist worldview, including 
real hostility towards Western democracy and liberal 
values [bold: mine].   
 
With this opening section of his speech, Cameron draws clear 
demarcations between legitimate and illegitimate understandings of Islam 
and Muslims. Islam is a peaceful religion followed by over a billion people, 
and an illegitimate understanding constituted by those who hold hostility to 
“Western” values of democracy and liberalism. At the most extreme points 
of illegitimacy are those who advocate violence in pursuit of their goals. 
However, Cameron articulates a view that extends the enemies of Britain 
from those who participate in violence to those who may argue for the 
extremist view but still condemned violence. In other words, those who 
articulate values that are contrary to those held by Britons are still the 
enemy. This has two effects that have implications for the work on myth. 
First, Cameron provides a clear cognitive map that allows the audience to 
recognise both the violent and non-violent radical understandings of Islam 
as illegitimate. No distinction is required in any analytical or normative 
sense. Returning to the terminology outlined in chapter 1 and especially 
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section 1.3, this represents an attempt to concretise the enemy and override 
any potentially Angst-inducing ambiguity. The enemy is no longer 
indifferent or distant from the audience. Rather, they are a concretely 
recognisable “other” with definitive features and who, crucially, oppose all 
that the audience holds dear.  
Cameron subsequently addresses the need that young British 
Muslims have for significance (Bedeutsamkeit) and ontological security, but 
which he feels they currently lack. He laments what he perceives as the 
confusion that many young Muslim men feel between their Muslim identity 
and their British one. Indeed the “traditional Islam” of their parents has 
customs that can “seem staid when transplanted to modern Western 
countries.” However, these same people also find it difficult to “identify 
with Britain” as well, because “we have allowed the weakening of our 
collective identity.” Due to the “doctrine of state multiculturalism”, Britain 
has “encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each 
other and apart from the mainstream” and has “even tolerated these 
segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to 
our values.”294 What Cameron decides here is Angst: young British Muslims 
have nothing to ground them in the vastness of the absolutism of reality. 
They do not feel they can affiliate themselves with traditional 
understandings of Britishness, and are therefore ontologically insecure. This 
Angst (or at least estrangement) can have serious consequences, insofar as 
some seek to fill the void by turning to violence. The answer, for Cameron, 
is to homogenise these competing identities into collective Britishness that 
would supersede other divisions that have been allowed to exist through 
“state multiculturalism”. This would enable individuals and communities to 
construct consistent self-narratives that resolve these existential 
uncertainties, and give people the significance they need in life to resist the 
lure of violent jihad.  
Cameron appears to express the loss of his own ontological security. 
He displays immense frustration at what he perceives as Britain being weak 
in its defence of its values and the breakdown of its common identity. State 
multiculturalism has allowed the erosion of this solid sense of identity. His 
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concerns in this regard are shared by many on the right of the political 
spectrum, as section 4.3 explains and sections 5.3 and 6.3 further 
demonstrate. Cameron laments the inconsistency between our criticisms of 
“white” people and “non-white” people: 
So, when a white person holds objectionable views, racist 
views for instance, we rightly condemn them.  But when 
equally unacceptable views or practices come from 
someone who isn’t white, we’ve been too cautious 
frankly - frankly, even fearful - to stand up to them.  The 
failure, for instance, of some to confront the horrors of 
forced marriage, the practice where some young girls are 
bullied and sometimes taken abroad to marry someone 
when they don’t want to, is a case in point.  This hands-
off tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that 
not enough is shared.  And this all leaves some young 
Muslims feeling rootless.  And the search for 
something to belong to and something to believe in 
can lead them [bold: mine].
295
  
 
What Cameron expresses here is a sense of frustration at a perceived 
loss of control. Cameron also transposes this position onto young Muslims 
who, by feeling “rootless” are experiencing the exact problem that 
Kierkegaard may have seen as (in part) an expression of Angst and perhaps 
Blumenberg would have identified with the chaos of the absolutism of 
reality. For Cameron, the answers to this are simply the liberal values that 
the rest of the country enjoys. Cameron describes how liberal-minded 
people have been too afraid to confront the barbaric practices of some 
Muslims. In this case, the barbaric practice of young girls being entered into 
forced marriages is mentioned. However, all of this has been aided and 
abetted by the “passive tolerance” that has contributed to people believing 
not much is shared in common. The only solution that Cameron envisages is 
to do what is core to the entirety of the political myth: promote “our” values 
to ensure that young Muslims do not feel rootless and also to ensure that 
radicalisation does not happen. However, not only does he ask for the re-
establishment of a consistent identity, but he evokes the mobilising aspect of 
myth by asking people to actively confront the unacceptability of radical 
Muslims and vacuousness of young Muslim rootlessness with decisive 
action. Put more simply, he asks people to confront these issues with a more 
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vigorous and aggressive form of liberalism, which he calls “muscular 
liberalism”: 
…we must build stronger societies and stronger identities 
at home.  Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive 
tolerance of recent years and a much more active, 
muscular liberalism.  A passively tolerant society says 
to its citizens, as long as you obey the law we will just 
leave you alone.  It stands neutral between different 
values. But I believe a genuinely liberal country does 
much more; it believes in certain values and actively 
promotes them.  Freedom of speech, freedom of 
worship, democracy, the rule of law, equal rights 
regardless of race, sex or sexuality.  It says to its 
citizens, this is what defines us as a society: to belong 
here is to believe in these things.  Now, each of us in 
our own countries, I believe, must be unambiguous and 
hard-nosed about this defence of our liberty [bold: 
mine].
296
 
 
 
All of this must be confronted with “confidence” and with a 
willingness to tackle the “ideas that warp so many young minds at their 
root.” It is a problem that affects “all continents,” and is a threat not just to 
“our lives” but to “our way of life.” Cameron works specifically on the 
mobilising aspect of political myth. He seeks to ground significance and 
ontologically securitise by convincing the audience that this is a struggle in 
which they are all embroiled. Cameron is also effectively calling for is a 
united, high entitativity-group who fall under the banner of British 
liberalism. There is no scope for “rootless” Muslims to carve out a sense of 
identity independent of either the “good/bad” categorisations. Cameron also 
posits what is an ontological crisis for Britain itself. Its own tolerant values 
have resulted in a state multi-culturalism that has had a negative impact 
upon Britain’s ability to deal with these difficult issues. He seeks to 
transcend this uncertainty by drawing clear fault-lines and boundaries, and 
uniting people in an attempt to defeat this illegitimate understanding of 
Islam. Not only is this a strategy to challenge uncertainty, but it is also 
fundamentally Sorelian. He is calling for effective multilateral action across 
society to challenge these ideas and promote what he perceives as 
Britishness. In doing this, he also makes “Britishness” seem like a clearly 
definable, unitary identity that can be tangibly and uniformly promoted.    
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It is not just in speeches that we see the work on myth reflected.  The 
government project known as CHANNEL is the main guiding process for 
“de-radicalisation.” It is a referral-based programme that works with local 
authorities and other organisations to locate and address “risk factors” in 
individuals. Between 2007 and 2013, over 2,500 individuals were referred 
by the police and others to CHANNEL. Over 500 young people were among 
those who “received support” from the programme.297 The number of 
referrals has increased dramatically in 2015. Between June and August 
2015, 796 people were referred to CHANNEL, with 312 of them being under 
the age of 18. Currently, over 8 “potential extremists” are being identified in 
Britain every day.
298
 As Jose Liht et al usefully summarise, the signs of 
extremism which can lead to referral include, but are not limited to or 
determined by:  
(a) Expressed opinions, including support for violence 
and terrorism; (b) possession of violent extremist 
literature or imagery, membership or contribution to 
violent extremist websites and/or chat rooms, or literature 
on weapons or bomb-making; (c) behaviour or 
behavioural changes including withdrawal from family 
and peers, hostility or association with extremist 
organisations; and finally (d) aspects of personal history 
including involvement in organisations espousing the use 
of violence or overseas military/terrorist training.
299
 
 
The language within the main CHANNEL documents depicts the 
person who is potentially radicalised as the vulnerable victim of an insidious 
Other. It is a programme which “focuses on providing support at an early 
stage to people who are identified as being vulnerable to being drawn into 
terrorism.”300 It aims to provide support before their “vulnerabilities are 
exploited by those who would want them to embrace terrorism, and before 
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they become involved in criminal terrorist related activity.”301 Although it 
claims there is no simple profile of those who are likely to be radicalised, 
the document lists the following as the causes of radicalisation: 
 Exposure to an ideology that seems to sanction, 
legitimise, or require violence, often by 
providing a compelling but fabricated narrative 
of contemporary politics and recent history 
[Emphasis: mine] 
 Exposure to people or groups who can directly 
and persuasively articulate that ideology and 
then relate it to aspects of a person’s own 
background and life history 
 A crisis of identity and, often, uncertainty about 
belonging which might be triggered by a range 
of further personal issues, including experiences 
of racism, discrimination, deprivation and other 
criminality (as victim or perpetrator); family 
breakdown or separation 
 A range of perceived grievances, some real and 
some imagined, to which there may seem to be 
no credible and effective non violent 
response.
302
 
The third bullet-point indicates why the government has attempted to 
challenge uncertainties about belonging by promoting “Britishness.” 
However, it is the threat of those who distort, or indeed “fabricate” reality, 
who we must be most cautious about. Those people – who would fall within 
the “bad” Muslim identificatory pole – must ultimately be kept away from 
the vulnerable people that channel aims to promote. This means that those 
who are able to deliver a CHANNEL programme are heavily regulated. For 
instance, those who hold “extremist views” or support “terrorist-related 
activity of any kind”, are not allowed to receive funding to deliver 
CHANNEL. Such people may be non-violent, but their views would 
nonetheless poison the minds of the vulnerable and could lead to them 
becoming terrorists. 
The role of women is also seen as a key determinate of the conflict 
between Britain/Britishness and the threat posed by the “Other”. The 
position of women is used to describe the comparative freedom of women in 
the UK and other Western countries compared to many Islamic states. 
Historically, the appearance of Muslim women has been an object of 
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fascination and desire, but also of disgust, pity and fear.
303
  In modern 
Western the overwhelming focus has been on wearing of the Niqab, which 
some see as anathema to a post-Enlightenment age where individual choice, 
liberty, and freedom are paramount, and questions of nationhood, 
citizenship and identity are at the fore.
304
 The “veil”, as it is commonly 
referred to, is often viewed solely as a symbol of gender inequality. Many 
instinctively assume that women who wear the “veil” are being oppressed, 
especially they are not playing a role of perceived freedom that other, non-
Muslim women display. This effectively grants Muslims who wear these 
items of clothing as being granted a level of entitativity; a consistent, pure 
group entity, that is oppressed and not integrated. Niqab, Hijab, and Burqa-
wearers are stereotyped as subservient and their Muslim identity is assumed 
to be unmistakable, undeniable and unable to be concealed. As  Neil 
Chakraborti and Irene Zempi argue, it is often seen in the public sphere as a 
powerful symbol of “otherness” and even “the symbol of Islam.”305 One of 
the most controversial expressions of opposition to the “veil” was made by 
former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw in 2006. Straw stated that he asked 
women wearing the veil to remove it in his constituency surgeries and that 
he preferred speaking to non-veiled women as he could see their faces. He 
also expressed concern that the veil is a “visible statement of separation and 
difference” and that “wearing the full veil was bound to make better, 
positive relations between the two communities more difficult.”306 His 
comments were echoed by other politicians, most notably those with the 
highest symbolic capital: Prime Minister Tony Blair, who called it a “mark 
                                                          
303
 Meyda Yeğenoğlu, Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of 
Orientalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
304
Nasar Meer, Claire Dwyer, and Tariq Modood, "Embodying Nationhood? 
Conceptions of British national identity, citizenship, and Gender in the 'Veil 
Affair'," The Sociological Review 58, no. 1 (2010). 
305
 Neil Chakraborti and Irene Zampi, "The veil under attack: Gendered dimensions 
of Islamophobic victimization," International Review of Victimology 18, no. 3 
(2012): 280. 
306
 Quoted in David Bartlett, "Straw in plea to Muslim women: Take off your 
veils," Lancashire Telegraph 5 October 2006. It should be noted that Straw 
apologised for his remarks in a public meeting in 2010, to much derision from the 
right-wing press. See: Kirsty Walker, "Jack Straw says sorry over Muslim veil 
comment sparking accusations of political opportunism," Daily Mail 27 April 
2010. 
104 
 
of separation”307 and Chancellor Gordon Brown, who said it would be 
“better for Britain” if fewer women wore the veil.308 
All of these indicate that these forms of clothing are associated with 
the “bad” form of Islam that is deemed incompatible with either good forms, 
or Britishness in general. Perceptions of those wearing either Hijab, Burqa, 
or Niqab, is critical to the cognitive and integrative aspects of the political 
myth. The integrative aspect is reinforced by the social construction of the 
veil as a symbol of the barbaric practices of the enemy, namely the 
subordination of Muslim women by Muslim men. This has been reflected in 
government approaches to these issues. As Katherine Brown argues, the 
Government takes an implied view that:  
Muslim women are by their nature not radical and 
by their circumstances most likely to support 
‘mainstream’ Islam. If their dress or behaviour 
appears radical (such as wearing a niquab or jilbab) 
then it is because of undue pressure from male 
relatives and community ‘culture.”309 
 
This provides those on the perceived points of legitimacy with 
cognitive boundaries through which to interpret women wearing the veil 
publicly. It is a socially-learned view of Muslim women that informs 
people’s perceptions and which is reproduced in practices across fields and 
social spaces. It is also a simplistic view that misses the variegated 
meanings that these items of clothing have and the different motivations that 
women have for wearing it. As such, the idea that some women opt to wear 
them as an expression of freedom, independence or religious identity, seems 
inconceivable to Western liberal non-Muslims.
310
 What results is continual 
tension, division, and a lack of understanding. The “veil” is associated 
within the “bad” form of Islam as an identificatory pole because it is seen as 
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simply incompatible with a core aspect of the British self: human rights, 
liberalism, and, ironically, tolerance.  
Government responses have generally been to try and replace 
multiculturalism with “monoculturalism.”311 This rhetoric is often informed 
by assumptions about Islam and Muslims that are grounded in very partial 
understandings that are saturated with essentialisms. As Milly Williamson 
and Gholam Khiabany point out, Islam and the “Islamic world” are often 
detached by people from the material and historical conditions – which 
include diversity in geography, history, politics, language etc -  and are 
presented as an “exceptional case” in government circles and the mass 
media, resulting in Muslims being “racialised and essentialised.”312 Citing 
Aziz Al-Azmeh, they claim that this ignores that there are “as many Islams 
as situations that sustain it.”313 The trouble is that all these different Islams, 
and indeed different Muslims, are often conflated and simplified in the work 
on myth. The heterogeneity of Muslim communities in the UK, in terms of 
class, age, gender, etc., often goes unrecognized in policy and practice.
314
  
Despite claims to tolerance the possibility of Muslims to become “liberal,” 
Muslims in the UK are increasingly viewed with suspicion, cast as “aliens” 
and permanently vulnerable to “radicalisation.”315 Indeed a negative 
depiction of Muslims has been longstanding. As Strawson argues, the 
“fanatical Muslim warrior threatening civilization has been an enduring 
image in the West since the crusades.”316 The period after 9/11 saw media 
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depictions of this enemy not just as a threat to “Our Christian” and “social 
democratic values” but that they are also committed to our eradication.317 
As Liz Fenteke observed in 2004, Islam is often portrayed across Europe as 
the “enemy within” with norms and values that threaten “the whole notion 
of Europeanness itself.”318 
4.3 The Work on Myth: Between Left and Right 
 
As Blumenberg observed, “[M]yths are stories that are distinguished 
by a high degree of constancy in their narrative core and by an equally 
pronounced capacity for marginal variation”.319 The variation in myth is 
absolutely crucial for its ultimate survivability. While the narrative core of 
an existential conflict between Britain and violent radical Islam remains 
constant, there is variation in how the content of the work on myth is 
expressed. As will be shown in chapters 5 and 6, the empirical cases show 
two distinguishing variants to the myth.. One is more typically expressed by 
those on the right of the political spectrum, and another is expressed more 
generally on the left. While both accept the fundamental premise that there 
is an existential threat posed by a radical, violent, Islamic other, the way 
they express this view differs. The right-wing (particularly the press) are 
more likely to blame tolerance of multiculturalism and an unwillingness to 
defend “our values” for fear of upsetting minorities. This same demographic 
is also far more likely to blame Muslims or Islam itself for failure to prevent 
any terrorist attacks. By contrast, left wing analysis also tends to defend 
multi-culturalism and will often remind people that the attackers are a small 
minority of Muslims and, occasionally, that the attackers themselves had 
“nothing to do with Islam”. Left-wing media commentators in particular 
often refer to the mental deficiencies of the bombers. They are often 
presented as insane, deluded, or otherwise mentally challenged. 
Right-wing journalists frequently argue that “good” Muslims must 
do more to tackle “bad” Muslims. Indeed, questions of trust and integration 
are often raised if they do not do this. An example of this is an article for 
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The Spectator by Theo Hobson, who asks whether “British Muslims affirm 
British values” or whether they have “outsiders to our way of life” and even 
“can we trust them?” Hobson urges us to answer this question with nuance, 
and not in “a self-righteous and simplistic way.”320 He argues for a 
“dialectical” strategy he calls “tough trust” which would be intended to 
“nudge British Muslims in an even more liberal direction” or, as he puts it, 
we would say “we trust that you are perfectly good liberals at heart.” On one 
side of the dialectical strategy, it would raise the question of whether British 
Muslim do enough to tackle extremism. On other, non-Muslims display a 
sense of “trust” to Muslims: 
Because we fundamentally trust you, we must say, we 
reject the notion that Islam is essentially anti-liberal, 
theocratic, incompatible with individual rights, with 
freedom of religion, with equality between the sexes, 
with acceptance of homosexuality. You disprove this, by 
being Muslims who affirm British values. We trust that it 
is only a tiny minority among you who advocate a purist, 
reactionary form of Islam that calls for violent jihad. In 
other words, we must assume that the vast majority of 
British Muslims are, in effect, liberal Muslims. By this I 
mean Muslims who reject the conservative Muslim view 
that society needs religious unity, that nonbelievers do 
not deserve equal treatment, that secularism is a bad 
thing. There has recently been much talk of whether 
Islam can reform itself – whether it can reject its violent 
theocratic tendency and explicitly affirm liberal values. 
Well, in a sense we must dismiss such a debate as 
redundant. For we must assume that British Muslims 
already espouse a reformed, or liberal, form of Islam – 
one that is compatible with British values. The alternative 
would be to regard Muslims as an alien presence in our 
midst, a fifth column. This we must refuse to do.
321
 
 
The only way for Muslims to demonstrate the compatibility of their 
religion with support of individual rights, freedom of religion, gender and 
sexual equality, is if they can be shown to affirm British values. If Muslims 
do not affirm “British values” then the alternative would be to regard them 
as an “alien presence in our midst” or a “fifth column.”322  There is, 
however, no necessary reason why Muslims cannot be understood as British 
as long as they espouse these values. 
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Similar views tend to be most rigorously expressed by the right-wing 
media following terror attacks. An editorial on the 9
th
 of July 2005, two days 
after the 7/7 attacks, entitled “No Tempered Messages about This Atrocity”, 
describes the appropriate and inappropriate responses of Muslims.
323
 It 
praises the responses of the Muslim Council of Britain and the Muslim 
Association of Britain for condemning the bombers, whilst not trying to 
blame their actions on UK Foreign Policy. As the editorial puts it, these 
organisations were not so tasteless as to add a “but.” The editorial then 
makes some blunt assertions as to the nature of Islam and human in-group 
and out-group relations. Firstly, it claims that the Qu’ran and Hadiths have 
“little to say about peace” but “a good deal to say about justice,” citing one 
passage from the Qu’ran to emphasise this point.324 Since this is the case, 
the article asks what encourages Muslims to “repudiate both their faith and 
their nation and turn to the bomb?” Whilst, “no one can ever really know 
precisely what is going on in the head of a fanatic,” the article argues that it 
is gained from sympathies within their communities and so should be 
understood as “in-group identification.” This makes individuals either blind 
to, or tolerant of, those who may transgress the boundaries of acceptable 
conduct within the group. According to the bombings changed the attitudes 
of “some British Muslims” who had, until now, sought to “temper their 
repudiation” with understanding. However the bombings in London have 
now left “Muslim Londoners in no doubt as to who their “in-group is.”  
The position of women is also a key focus of right-wing media 
attention. Opinion polls in the UK generally show support for banning the 
Burqa. A YouGov poll of 1792 adults for The Sun in 2013 showed that 61% 
support a ban, but that overall levels of support vary between age groups. Of 
those between the ages of 18-39, 46% agreed that it should be banned and 
44% disagreed. Of those above age 40, 69% agreed and 23% disagreed.
325
 
Allison Pearson of the Daily Mail argued that the veil, which she referred to 
as people wearing “nose-bags over their faces,” was “downright 
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intimidating” as it “implies a submission that is upsetting when women here 
fought so hard to be free.”326 On 18th October 2006, the British tabloid 
newspaper the Daily Star had the front-page headline “BBC PUT 
MUSLIMS BEFORE YOU!”, accompanied by a picture of a woman in a 
face-covering Niqab making a two-fingered gesture.
327
  The more right-
wing variant of the political myth is more directly concerned with filling the 
void that may be left with Angst by concretising the self and other. In 
particular they intend to evoke the mobilising and integrative aspects of 
myth by emphasising the barbarism of the enemy and the need of Britons to 
take on and defeat them. In response to 7/7 (chapter 5), there are many 
examples of the right-wing press comparing contemporary Britons to 
previous generations who had fought and overcome other heinous enemies, 
most notably the Nazis. There is much condemnation of those who would 
seek to dilute their imaginations of collective Britishness, and this outrage is 
chiefly targeted at those who propagate multiculturalism. Right-wingers also 
tend to challenge Muslims who are believed to not extol British values or, 
worse still, not condemn or actively condone the terrorism that many of 
their peers commit. As is demonstrated in both chapters 5 and 6, the right-
wing press makes this case often, and in particular with resentment towards 
perceived establishment failings to defeat the enemy. This goes beyond 
traditional preoccupations with physical/somatic security, but the security of 
being of the audience. One prominent example of this that we see following 
7/7 is evoked by Melanie Phillips. She warns that London threatens to 
become “Londonistan”, replete with barbaric values, without a more 
concerted and vigorous defence of Britain and Britishness.
328
 What Phillips 
and other right-wing commentators and politicians do is attempt to evoke 
concrete emotions with direct tangible objects such as fear and anger. As 
unpleasant or undesirable as these emotions would be they are preferable to 
be allowing anxiety and estrangement to proliferate, as Kierkegaard and 
                                                          
326
 Allison Pearson, "Here's why the veil offends me," Daily Mail 2006.  
327
Quoted in: Paul Baker, Costas Gabrielatos, and Tony McEnery, Discourse 
Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representations of Islam in the British Press 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1. 
328
 Melanie Phillips, "No Surrender: Stop Appeasing this Terror or Suffer Total 
Defeat,"  Daily Mail (11 July 2005), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/columnists/article-355395/No-surrender-Stop-
appeasing-terror-suffer-total-defeat.html; Londonistan: How Britain is Creating a 
Terror State Within (London: Gibson Square, 2006). 
110 
 
other existentialists would have pointed out (see section 1.3). This means 
reminding the audience of a variety of identity themes, and this is often 
expressed in themes from the Blitz (British Resilience) and British values, 
all of which are starkly defined against the perceived threat to the 
audience’s ontological and physical/somatic security. 
Left-wing commentators share many of the concerns of right-wing 
commentators. However, the examples throughout chapter 5 and 6 
demonstrate that they are substantially more likely to attribute the blame to 
the failings of British foreign policy. Following 7/7, both politicians and 
some media comments blamed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 for the attack. 
The Daily Mirror was keen to stress that the attack was an example of the 
carnage in Iraq reaching London and that the invasion would also be “in the 
dock” along with the killers.329 Nonetheless, the Daily Mirror also 
frequently evoked the narrative of British resilience following the attacks 
just as the right-wing press did, and it was also keen to offer a commentary 
of the apparent demands of the attackers.
330
 We therefore see many of the 
same attempts to evoke the integrative aspect of myth and the same attempts 
to ground significance and ontological security.  While the 7/7 showed only 
minor divisions between the left and right, the work on myth appeared to 
differ following the murder of Lee Rigby. The right tended to continue 
criticising the weakness of the response to terror and the threat of radical 
Islam, whereas the left took aim at the recent emergence of the far-right 
group the English Defence League (EDL). Left-wingers were in general 
concerned with the dangers of Islamophobia, and would often emphasise the 
role of British foreign policy in inciting attacks such as the murder of 
Rigby.
331
 As chapter 6 elaborates further, the rise of the EDL and increase in 
popularity of other far-right movements added a new imperative to tackle 
right-wing extremism at the same time or, at least, that was the perception 
among left-wing politicians and commentators. The variant of the work on 
myth discussed by left-wing commentators and politicians also 
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demonstrates an attempt to find significance and assuage Angst at a time of 
great pressure. The left often goes further than the right in making absolute 
distinctions between “good” and “bad” Muslims, the latter of which are 
often completely disassociated from the former. In response to the murder 
of Lee Rigby in particular, left-wing commentators attempt to portray the 
attackers as an insignificant and often mentally deranged minority who have 
little to no connection to good Muslims. The “cause” is therefore the failings 
of British foreign policy and entrenched Islamophobia within British 
society. 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I summarised the core features of the work on myth 
which will be discussed for the remainder of this thesis. The political myth 
can be summarised as a perceived existential conflict between Britain and a 
radical, violent form of Islam and Muslims, with victory of the former over 
the latter being the essential outcome. I explained that there are two 
identificatory poles: one that represents Britain and the side of “good”, 
which includes the subthemes of “British resilience” and “British values”. 
The former makes numerous references to the Second World War and the 
“Blitz spirit”, and the latter is concerned with “British values” and Britain’s 
self-perception as a tolerant society. I also argued that there is a distinction 
between left-wing and right-wing variation of the work on myth. Although 
myths retain a consistent narrative core, they often have develop variants in 
order to be relevant to a particular context. I pointed out that this expresses 
Blumenberg’s observation that constancy and variation are both important 
to the work on myth. I noted that the right-wing variation of the work on 
myth tends towards attacking multiculturalism and Islam. The left-wing 
variation of the work on myth is more likely to defend Muslims and 
multiculturalism, and also more likely to make emphasise the distinction 
between “good” and “bad” Muslims.  
I would like to stress that this chapter has not discussed British 
identity in its entirety and, indeed, it would be beyond the scope of the 
thesis to do so. One of the reasons for this is that there are numerous ways 
that one can discuss British identity, many of which have nothing to do with 
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this political myth.
332
 The chapter has focused on the construction of 
Britishness in relation to the rhetoric found in chapters 5 and 6, although it 
is not only in this context that we see these themes appear. By this I mean 
that narratives about Blitz and British resilience (often manifesting as the 
“stiff upper-lip”) are generally important narratives of Britishness. The next 
two chapters are more empirically grounded and focus on two moments of 
perceived crisis in which the work on myth became particularly prominent. 
These indicate the importance of the work on myth in significance-making 
(Bedeutsamkeit) and in (re)establishing ontological security. 
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Chapter 5: The London Bombings of July 7
th
 2005 
5.1 Introduction 
 
On 7
th
 July 2005, the London Underground and London Buses were 
attacked by suicide bombers, killing 57 people. The 7
th
 July bombings were 
far more than a savage violent attack on civilians that ended lives and 
maimed the bodies of others. It evoked an existential crisis of being and its 
relation to the world in multiple ways. Symbols London like the 
Underground and the buses had moved from places of familiarity and 
mobility to being places of vulnerability. The assumed trust-relations and 
networks that are so central to establishing ontological security had been 
challenged. In order to placate the Angst that this rupture in ontological 
security had created, political and media figures evoked the work on myth 
as part of an attempt to (re)ground significance (Bedeutsamkeit), 
consciously or not. The work on myth posited all Britons as being involved 
in an existential conflict with a violent, radical, Islamic other, who must 
ultimately be overcome. While this may evoke a sense of fear in some 
people, this is, as Kierkegaard would also have surmised, more manageable 
than the chaos found in raw anxiety. This process of significance-making 
also results in people ontologically (re)securitising themselves in the world 
where anxiety may otherwise dominate. More specifically, people can feel 
ontologically secure (if not always physically/somatically secure) in the 
knowledge of where they are situated in relation to these events. Namely, 
that they are at the point of legitimacy among clearly identifiable “friends” 
against the similarly definite “enemies” at the point of illegitimacy (section 
4.2)  
What follows in this chapter is an engagement with two important 
sources that played an important part in the work on myth in the immediate 
aftermath of the attack. These are politicians and newspaper commentators. 
In section 5.2, I analyse political speeches using the methodological 
framework outlined in chapter 3 and the theoretical framework discussed in 
chapter 1. I demonstrate that politicians continually sought to interpret 
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events along the core themes of the political myth. My emphasis is primarily 
on Prime Minister Tony Blair, but I also demonstrate that this occurred in 
debates in the Houses of Parliament, where members of opposition parties 
also contributed to the work on myth. In section 5.3 I conduct a similar 
analysis of the work on myth in response to the 7/7 attacks in left-leaning 
and right-leaning Newspapers. I note that both sides accept the fundamental 
narrative core of the work on myth: that Britain is in an existential conflict 
with a radical and violent form of Islam and Muslims. However, there are 
differences between the left-leaning and right-leaning variants of the work 
on myth as elaborated on further in section 4.3. However, all approaches 
serve the same purpose: to ground a sense of significance (Bedeutsamkeit) 
in order to ontologically (re)-securitise at a time of perceived crisis. While 
their interpretations may differ slightly, the fundamental narrative core of 
the myth is broadly consistent. There is no ambiguity as to the nature of the 
conflict: it is existential, there are concrete threats, and it must be overcome.  
 
5.2 Politicians After the July 7
th
 London Bombings 
 
On the day of the attacks, Blair gave two speeches, one at 
Gleneagles where a G8 international summit was taking place, and one later 
in the day at Downing Street. Blair opted to temporarily leave the summit 
for face-to-face meetings with the police and other emergency services. The 
gathering of the G8 at the summit in Gleneagles had gathered major media 
attention, not just because of the world leaders who would be present, but 
because it met to address poverty in Africa and climate change. Blair states 
that this made the timings of the attacks all the more barbaric. However, he 
sends a warning to terrorists and their sympathisers: 
It's important however that those engaged in terrorism 
realise that our determination to defend our values and 
our way of life is greater than their determination to 
cause death and destruction to innocent people in a desire 
to impose extremism on the world. Whatever they do, it 
is our determination that they will never succeed in 
destroying what we hold dear in this country and in 
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other civilised nations throughout the world [bold: 
mine].
333
 
At this point, news of the attacks was still breaking any many people 
were still missing and unaccounted for. Yet even in this moment, Blair 
invokes person deixis by aligning the audience with “our values and our 
way of life”. He concludes with the mobilising aspect of myth by re-stating 
their “our determination” that the terrorists will “never succeed” in 
destroying “what we hold dear in this country and in other civilised nations 
throughout the world.” Intriguingly, the promise that they will not destroy 
“what we hold dear” serves as a metonym to represent qualities which are 
important to the “being-in-the-world” of people across the country. This 
extends beyond merely their physical safety but their values and ideals. 
These core facets of Britain’s self-narrative, and which contribute to our 
ontological security, were otherwise placed under threat by the attacks. Blair 
seeks to avert the uncertainty of Angst by reminding people of the values 
that are familiar, but with a heavier sense of dramatic purchase that 
simultaneously makes the both friend and enemy seem more concrete. 
Later that evening, Blair gave a speech at Downing Street where he 
paid tribute to the “stoicism and resilience of London who have responded 
in a way typical of them”, an implication of the narratives about resilience 
discussed in section 4.2. Blair sets out clearly, unambiguously, and with a 
sense of passion, what the terrorists were trying to do and how British 
people would respond to it. He states that they were trying to “cow us”, and 
“frighten us” out of doing what we would normally do. However, he 
dramatically portrays the resilience that the British people would respond 
with: 
When they try to intimidate us, we will not be 
intimidated, when they seek to change our country, our 
way of life by these methods, we will not be changed. 
When they try to divide our people or weaken our 
resolve, we will not be divided and our resolve will 
hold firm. We will show by our spirit and dignity and 
by a quiet and true strength that there is in the British 
people, that our values will long outlast theirs. The 
purpose of terrorism is just that, it is to terrorise people 
and we will not be terrorised… This is a very sad day 
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for the British people but we will hold true to the 
British way of life [bold: mine].
334
 
In both these speeches, Blair makes extensive use of the rhetorical 
schemes of “antithesis” by contrasting the thoughts of the terrorists with the 
reality. He dramatically enhances this through the rhetorical scheme of 
“epiphora”; a series of repetitions of phrases, mostly beginning with the 
words “we will”. Blair strengthens this dramatically by using person deixis 
to sharply distinguish between “we/us” and “they/them” and by connecting 
this to an emotionally-charged understanding of Britishness and the British 
“way of life”.  Altogether, the speech was constructed with the intention of 
providing a sense of reassurance and to mobilise people at a time of 
substantial difficulty. It is at such a time that the integrative aspect of myth 
becomes so important (see section 1.4). When Blair reminds people that 
“we” are strong and resilient, overrides the self-doubt and uncertainty that 
the attacks were designed to create.
335
 He makes it clear that this was a 
threat not merely to physical security as one might expect, but the qualities 
of that very “self” - represented with the metonym of “British way of life”. 
However, Blair provides the assurance which will allow people to carry on 
and display the resilience of these values (implicitly referring to those 
discussed in section 4.2). 
Blair’s speeches exemplify how narratives about conflict can 
become sources of ontological security. Without key figures of 
interpretation (whether politicians or media elites) such events would seem 
to be meaningless acts of violence, existing only to serve as another event in 
Blumenberg’s “absolutism of reality.” Yet Blair does not reassure people on 
the basis that there is no threat. Rather than leaving people, as Blumenberg 
put it, in a state of “indefinite anticipation” wherein we have the 
“intentionality of consciousness without an object”,336 Blair makes it clear 
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via person deixis who the villains are and how “we” will respond to them. 
Although person deixis is normally analysed purely as a lexical trigger, in 
moments of crisis such as this it has profound implications for answering 
existential concerns, particularly when we need to position ourselves in 
relation to events which may not have directly affected us. As discussed in 
section 3.2, this has the function of making these events seem directly 
relevant to us. In more Kierkegaardian language, this brings events beyond 
our immediate control towards the finite, insofar as they may ground our 
actions in the immediate. We may, for instance, discuss these events with 
others, or change our behaviours to be more watchful of those we may 
perceive as a threat. For some (and certainly some more than others), this 
may guide the way in which our “being” relates with other “beings”, and 
this is a point emphasised by Heidegger when he stated that Dasein is 
always “being-with” others.337  
On the afternoon of the attack, Home Secretary Charles Clarke MP 
briefed the House of Commons on what had occurred and the emergency 
measures that were being put in place. The Shadow Home Secretary David 
Davis MP responding by expressing his view that the morning’s attacks 
were “of almost unspeakable depravity and wickedness” that was an 
“assault on our society” and an “attack not just on our capital city, but on 
our country and our way of life as a whole”.338 He called for unity in 
response to these attacks as: 
A prime aim of terrorists is to demoralise and divide our 
communities. It is right that we should be angry at today's 
atrocities, but it is no less essential that we should remain 
both clear-headed and united. We say to the terrorists that 
they will not succeed in setting us against one another. 
Britain has a long history of dealing with terrorism. 
We have joined together to fight it in the past; today 
we do so again. For now, the terrorism that walks the 
streets of London has no face, but whatever its origin, 
whatever its motive, our response will be the same—the 
British people will not be cowed and the terrorists will 
not win [bold: mine].
339
 
Davis effectively utilises time, place, and person deixis in order to 
evoke the mobilising aspect of the work on myth (see section 1.2). He uses 
time deixis to draw direct connections between previous incidences of 
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terrorism, and reminds Brits that they have a “long history of dealing with 
terrorism” and that they have joined together to fight it in the path, and must 
do so again. This is an implicit reference to the “troubles” in Northern 
Ireland - and this reference is also made explicitly by Ian Paisley MP later in 
the debate.
340
 Davis thereby activates a cognitive schema that reads this 
particular incident of terrorism as if it were the same or similar to those 
British people have already experienced. This is effective because it means 
that despite the present terrorist threat having “no face” – a metonym used 
to personify the attributes of the terrorists - the response to the attack can 
simply be the same. In this statement, one is able to provide a name to the 
unknown and effectively ground (begründen) significance (Bedeutsamkeit) 
by providing a “name” to this unknown threat. Despite the clear and real 
physical threats that were being faced by the British public at that time, such 
statements allow the public to reclaim a semblance of ontological security 
by being assured about how to respond to this threat.  
The time deixis used by Davis in the above quote (in bold) is also 
important. Time can be a vital part of the work on myth, as it can often 
provide a narrative of origins and a clear direction for the future. This also 
serves the purpose of ontological security, particularly since it allows the 
audience to provide a consistent collective self-narrative for themselves that 
endures across different contexts. Davis provides a cognitive map can be 
applied to interpret historical conflicts with the IRA to the present situation. 
By linking them temporally, Davis finds a way of turning the anxiety that 
could result from expressing the contingency of the situation (e.g., different 
enemies, different people, different ideas), into a familiar one which we 
know how to respond to. This is also an example of myths about conflict 
being a source of ontological security. Despite the clear drama of the 
situation (reflected in the dramatic nature of the language), and the potential 
dangers it poses, myth allows the audience to make the unknown known, 
and thereby prevents the anxiety that violence without meaning could 
generate.  These themes continued throughout the rest of the debate. In 
particular, MPs continued to praise the resilience of Londoners at that 
moment, comparing to it to that of previous generations.  In response to a 
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question by Andrew Dismore MP about continuing transport arrangements 
throughout the day, the Home Secretary Charles Clarke MP reminded 
people that it was a “truism” that “for generations the people of London 
have shown resilience in the face of appalling difficulties” and that 
Londoners would continue to “demonstrate the same courage.”341 Time 
deixis and integrative strategies in the work on myth are at play here. As 
Davis did earlier in the debate, Clarke draws direct connections between all 
Londoners in the present to preceding generations. For most Londoners, this 
would call to mind the threat of IRA bombings and memories of the Blitz 
and the Blitz spirit, the latter of which is a crucial part of modern British 
identity, as section 4.3 elaborates. Yet the more fundamental thing the 
remainder of the debate offered was to replace the chaos of the situation, 
which could be anxiety-inducing, to offering more concrete arrangements. 
While the debate was predominately about the practical measures being 
taken (e.g., public transport, police operations), there was also an attempt to 
re-articulate the sense of collective ontological security for people. By 
reminding people that they have a shared heritage of resilience, sourced 
from surviving the Blitz and the IRA, it allows Britons (and Londoners in 
particular) to fill what otherwise might be a void of meaning with something 
that is familiar. Although the present situation may be challenging and 
threatening, the audience can be assured that there are clear maps to 
interpret it. The other is transformed into a familiar evil, be it the IRA or the 
Nazis, and the self is transformed into a modern-day expression of Britons 
surviving and enduring under the Blitz and IRA attacks. Contingency, 
ambiguity, and the rather tenuous links drawn between these groups is 
effaced in order to articulate a sense of certainty at a time of crisis. 
Blair’s statement to parliament the following week was a particularly 
influential moment in the work on myth. Tony Blair began the discussion by 
making a statement to the house which sought to contextualise the events 
and provide a clear path for action. The issues were remained highly 
sensitive, yet Blair to make significance (Bedeutsamkeit) of events by 
invoking core themes of heroism, villainy, and the dramatic conflict 
between good and evil that 7/7 represented. He began by praising the 
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heroism of the emergency service and the “stoicism, resilience and 
undaunted spirit of Londoners… At the moment of terror striking, when the 
eyes of the world were upon them, they responded, and continue to respond, 
with a defiance and strength that are universally admitted.
342
 Blair goes on 
to liken this response to the acts of heroism found in World War II 
Yesterday we celebrated the heroism of world war two, 
including the civilian heroes of London's blitz. Today, 
what a different city London is—a city of many cultures, 
faiths and races, hardly recognisable from the London of 
1945. It is so different and yet, in the face of this 
attack, there is something wonderfully familiar in the 
confident spirit that moves throughout the city, 
enabling it to take the blow but still not flinch from 
reasserting its will to triumph over adversity. Britain 
may be different today, but the coming together and the 
character are still the same [bolt: mine].
343
 
This is a powerful example of the British resilience aspect of the 
work on myth (4.2) through the metonym of the “Blitz”. Blair subsequently 
combines the integrative aspect of myth alongside time deixis by positing 
that, although there were differences between London in 1945 and in 2005, 
there were still familiar features. He re-asserts a core part of London’s 
identity, the metaphor of a “confident spirit”, to re-assure that once again 
London will not “flinch” (personification) from its will to triumph over 
adversity.  This portion of Blair’s speech is highly dependent upon time 
deixis. It draws temporal connections between memories of the Blitz as a 
defining moment of Britishness or (or at least “Londonness”) and seeks to 
invoke these memories as a cognitive map to interpret the response to the 
recent attacks in London. He deploys a powerful metaphorical expression 
which claims that London has a “confident spirit that moves throughout the 
city” in order to emphasise a certain positive, inter-subjectively felt essence 
that prevents it from “taking blows” and “not flinching”. This is ultimately a 
way of re-assuring Londoners of their ontological security via the work on 
myth in two senses. Firstly, it concretises London’s identity away from a 
disparate collection of individuals into a solid, high-entitative category. Put 
more simply, all Londoners are defined in common as being part of this 
confident spirit that is able to withstand these blows. Far from needing to 
                                                          
342
 Tony Blair MP in HC Deb 11 July 2005, vol 545. 
343
 Ibid., col 567. 
121 
 
submit to Angst, Londoners can remain confident that they will not be 
deterred and will continue as normal. The enemy figure in the work on myth 
will not be able to break their resolve and will consequently be denied 
victory.  
Blair goes on to invoke the mobilising aspect of the work on myth. 
Via a form of pathos, Blair attempts to inspire a  determination to act (in the 
Sorelian sense) by positing an epic conflict between the representatives of a 
way of life that we “share and value” against an insidious force that seeks to 
destroy it: 
Together, we will ensure that, though terrorists can kill, 
they will never destroy the way of life that we share and 
value, which we will defend with such strength of belief 
and conviction that it will be to us and not to the terrorists 
that victory will belong.
344
   
The work on myth here in this passage is important because Blair 
distinguishes between physical security and ontological security – although 
not explicitly. Although the terrorists can “kill” (a threat to physical 
security) they cannot destroy “the way of life that we share and value”, or, 
that which brings it into the realms of “being” in the Heideggerian or 
“existing” in the Kierkegaardian sense. In other words, the  very mode of 
“being/existing” (in these philosophical senses) becomes heavily constituted 
by defending the very conditions of “being/existing” (e.g., “our way of 
life”) against the perceived threat. Blair then couples this with the 
mobilising aspect of myth (section 4.2) by making a Sorelian promise of 
victory for those values. While a tragedy may have befallen “us” (person 
deixis), we a renewed sense of significance (Bedeutsamkeit) can be found in 
defending these values and defeating the enemy. 
In his reply to Blair’s statement, The Conservative Party leader 
Michael Howard condemned, via metaphor, the “faceless killers” who “tried 
with the fires of hate to destroy the bonds of love.”345 Howard made a 
highly dramatic and figurative opening statement that embodied that made 
creative use of person deixis: the separation between the “other” (faceless 
killers) and all of “us”, who are metaphorically bound together through the 
“bonds of love”.  Throughout his reply, Howard repeats the themes of 
tragedy, resilience and heroism by placing the conflict with violent, radical 
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Islam as the latest episode in Britain’s continuous resolve shown in the face 
of evil. 
We all have cause to feel pride in the response of our 
fellow citizens. Any who doubted that, 60 years on, 
this generation of Britons had retained the resolve to 
stand united against the threats we face have found 
their answer… They failed to cause panic in our capital 
city. Instead, we went about our business, determined 
to show that we would not be defeated. They failed to 
undermine the institutions, the democracy and the 
values of which we are all so justly proud. Instead, 
our Government, our citizens and our way of life 
proved once again resilient in the face of evil… In our 
great capital city and beyond, the terrorists have united 
Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Jews, those of all faiths 
and those of none in our contempt for those who want 
to destroy that diversity and our democratic and 
liberal way of life [bold: mine].
346
 
 
Howard, like Blair, answers the existential questions raised by the 
bombings by contextualising them via time deixis alongside the VE 
celebrations which occurred on the preceding weekend – thereby invoking 
the British resilience narrative outlined in section 4.2. Britain was “once 
again resilient in the face of evil”, meaning that this was the latest 
occurrence in a long-line of conflicts against evil. Moreover, the bombings 
are seen as part of an ongoing story about a sustained assault by actors who 
oppose the virtuous forces of democracy and liberalism both of which, as 
section 4.2 showed, are core to the British sense of self. Via person, time, 
and place deixis, Howard positions the audience against the attackers, 
excluding them from the deictic centre. At the same time, a variety of 
different groups are united in his speech by person deixis against these 
enemies. Furthermore, this conflict is occurring not just within London, but 
across the world. This is an exceptionally strong invocation of the 
integrative aspect of the work on myth, insofar as it unifies at an 
extraordinary level. Finally, Blair, Howard and other MPs also invoke the 
“Good Muslim” and “Bad Muslim” dichotomy whilst making a call for 
mobilisation of the former against the latter. Blair’s calls for the “moderate 
and true voice of Islam” to be heard is backed by Mark Field MP, who was 
the representative of a constituency where two of the bombs exploded. Field 
asked Blair what steps he was taking to make sure that “all the UK’s 
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Muslim religious and community leaders take the initiative now to prevent 
any backlash by making public statements in their home towns 
unequivocally condemning the perpetrators of last Thursday’s atrocities.”347 
Blair’s response was to remind the House that the “vast majority of the 
Muslim community are completely condemnatory of those attacks and 
regard them as a betrayal of the true faith of Islam, and I am sure that is 
right.”348 In their exchange, both Field and Blair evoke the good/bad 
Muslim dichotomy discussed in section 4.2. The claim made by Field is that 
good Muslims must mobilise to unequivocally condemn bad Muslims, and 
Blair reinforces this by attempting to ensure the audience is aware of the 
separation between good and bad Muslims, rather than ensuring the entire 
community is “othered”.   
MPs from across the different political parties in the Commons re-
asserted all of the above themes in a question and answer format with Blair. 
Of these questions, David Winnick MP’s question is notable: 
Is it not of interest that some of the people who blame 
Government policies for what the murderous psychopaths 
did last Thursday are, in some instances, the very people 
who opposed military action in Kosovo to stop the ethnic 
cleansing of Muslims and, even more so, the liberation of 
Kuwait, which was 85 per cent Muslim, from enemy 
occupation 14 years ago? Is it not rather important that 
the people to whom I am referring—we know that there 
are one or two in the House from a speech made last 
Thursday—should stop making excuses for the mass 
murderers, whose hatred of humanity is no less than 
the Nazis? [bold: mine].
349
 
Winnick is referring to several left-wing MPs who had blamed 
Government invasion of Iraq for the 7/7 bombings. For him, this was 
grossly offensive as Britain had a history of intervening to save the lives of 
Muslims as they had done in Kosovo and Kuwait. He utilises time deixis 
and an externalised version of the integrative aspect of myth, to argue that 
the bombers were so barbaric (section 4.2) that their “hatred of humanity is 
no less than the Nazis.” The place of Nazism in the work on myth here 
remains familiar and, as has been shown throughout this section, is a 
shorthand to describe the evil that Britain has previously overcome 
elsewhere.  What Winnick evokes here is a schema that places the radical 
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violent Muslim as being so distant and one-dimensional as to harbour a 
hatred for the entirety of humanity, and thereby a special, exceptional case 
which can by implication only be defeated the way the Nazis were. Tony 
Wright MP goes similarly expresses support for this view. Indeed, despite 
his opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, he argues that those who draw 
links between that invasion and 7/7 are “not only talking nonsense, but 
dangerous nonsense.” He warns that  “we are dealing with a group of 
Islamo-fascists who are against any form of democratic politics, and on that 
we should all be united [bold: mine].”350 Winnick and Wright both draw 
connections between the bombers and their beliefs with fascism, with the 
latter using the term “Islamo-fascism” as a metonym to represent this 
comparison, a convenient way to combine all the negatives associated with 
“fascism” with the current predicament. All of them strenuously refute the 
claim that the bombings only occurred as a response to the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. Winnick draws links between these people and those who argued 
against previous missions to defend Muslims. Duncan-Smith and Wright 
further accuse people of those views of inciting division at a time where 
unity is required. The former endorses Winnick and asks the Prime 
Minister: 
May I also join with the hon. Member for Walsall, North 
(Mr. Winnick), who pointed out that those who have 
spent the past three days trying to divide us by blaming 
everyone for the reasons behind this were not only 
wrong, but shameful? The best answer to them was to be 
found in constituencies such as mine on Saturday and 
Sunday. There were wonderful crowds who gathered on 
Sunday to show the terrorists what they thought of them. 
They do not care about the terrorists; they care about 
peace. I and my constituents promise the Prime Minister 
and the Government that we will do our level best to back 
him in whatever he does to find these people.
351
   
 
This an extra statement of support for the Prime Minister, and a call 
from an opposition politician for unity and mobilisation. The crowds of 
people showed defiance and togetherness, which those who attempt to 
create blurry lines – such as by blaming the attacks on the Iraq war – are 
seen as being against this process of unity. This is an example of the 
simplification of politics that  can be caused by the work on myth. It 
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encourages a certain rigid and narrow logic that cannot be challenged 
without causing great offence.  
In a series of conference speeches throughout 2005, Blair more 
clearly and dramatically evokes the mobilising aspect of political myth. This 
is especially the case in his 16
th
 July 2005 conference speech, in which he 
articulates the core parameters of the epic conflict between good and evil:  
What we are confronting here is an evil ideology. It is 
not a clash of civilisations - all civilised people, Muslim 
or other, feel revulsion at it. But it is a global struggle 
and it is a battle of ideas, hearts and minds, both 
within Islam and outside it. This is the battle that must 
be won, a battle not just about the terrorist methods but 
their views. Not just their barbaric acts, but their barbaric 
ideas. Not only what they do but what they think and the 
thinking they would impose on others [bold: mine].
352
 
 
Blair represents the conflict as a clash between identities, values, an 
ideas, core to the audiences’ being-in-the-world,  and not just the acts of 
physical violence that cause somatic harm. Blair evokes the core of the work 
on myth (i.e., that there is a conflict) by referring not just to the physical 
threat but also explaining that this threat would seek to replace our values 
and ideas. It is a threat not just to our physical safety, but our ideas and 
values that make “us” (person deixis). While Blair mentions the civilisations 
myth, he specifically refutes that this is a clash of civilsations but, rather, a 
clash between civilised and uncivilised. In doing so, he in fact simplifies the 
myth further by removing any potential detached view of the situation. 
While a clash of civilisations could be read merely as a conflict between 
civilisations, with neither necessarily being preferred, a clash between 
“civilized” and “uncivilized” has unambiguous normative connotations. Via 
person deixis, Blair places the “we” within the realm of the civilised (the 
good), and “them/they” in the realm of the uncivilized (the bad). He then 
articulates the relation between the two as one of irreconcilable hostility, 
and which can only be resolve by the triumph of the civilised. By referring 
to this as a battle that “must be won”, Blair concretises the situation and 
directs all attention towards the enemy who we may fear and/or revile, yet 
these feelings are preferable to the overwhelming nature of Angst as 
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conceived by Kierkegaard and others (chapter 1). Similarly, Blair grounds 
(in the sense of Begründen) significance (Bedeutsamkeit) where the 
absolutism of reality may otherwise come to dominate.  The next stage in 
Blair’s work on myth centres around time deixis and place deixis. He 
begins by contextualizing the themes discussed above by referencing other 
purportedly familiar situations in British history: 
The 20th century showed how powerful political 
ideologies could be. This is a religious ideology, a strain 
within the world-wide religion of Islam, as far removed 
from its essential decency and truth as Protestant gunmen 
who kill Catholics or vice versa, are from Christianity.
353
 
By referring to two parts of familiar history to people in the Cold 
War and the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland, he is able to demonstrate (via 
time deixis) the clear links between the present moment in which he and the 
audience are situated, and a past with enemies who were overcome.  The 
scale of the challenge can be compared to overcoming the powerful 
ideologies of the twentieth century, and the violence that had been such a 
feature of Northern Ireland’s recent history.  This is typical rhetorical 
strategy that links time deixis with the work on myth, insofar as the past and 
present are combined to determine the action to be taken in the future. Blair 
elides the contingencies and differences  between the situations (different 
actors, motives and scales of violence etc.), for the sake of simplicity. He 
also solidifies the concrete nature of good/bad by claiming that terrorists 
who act in the name of these religions no longer represent the peaceful 
teachings of these religions. Blair goes on to warn that this ideology is 
global and cannot be beaten except by confronting it “head-on” and 
“without compromise and without delusion”.  
The extremist propaganda is cleverly aimed at their target 
audience. It plays on our tolerance and good nature. It 
exploits the tendency to guilt of the developed world, as 
if it is our behaviour that should change, that if we 
only tried to work out and act on their grievances, we 
could lift this evil, that if we changed our behaviour, 
they would change theirs. This is a misunderstanding of 
a catastrophic order. Their cause is not founded on an 
injustice. It is founded on a belief, one whose 
fanaticism is such it can't be moderated. It can't be 
remedied. It has to be stood up to [bold: mine].
354
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Blair makes it clear that we are in an existential conflict with the 
other and, despite our good and tolerant nature, any expectation that we can 
“lift this evil” by changing behaviour is fanciful.  This is because he 
effectively deploys person deixis to remove the enemy from the deictic 
center, ensuring that the public unambiguously sees the enemy as a fanatical 
fringe that must be defeat due to how irreconcilable they are with Britain 
and its values. Blair warns with a violent metaphor that we must pull the 
extremism “up by its roots” and that “we must join up with our Muslim 
communities to take on the extremists” and “worldwide, we should confront 
it everywhere it exists.”355 He also warns that our “tolerance” (as explained 
in section 4.2) and “our good nature” could be potential sources of weakness 
to be exploited by the terrorists. We must thereby accept the inevitability of 
conflict and opt not to compromise against an enemy that cannot be 
reasoned with. Blair moves on to outline the course of action that the 
collective “we” will achieve victory in the struggle:  
We must be clear about how we win this struggle. We 
should take what security measures we can. But let us not 
kid ourselves. In the end, it is by the power of 
argument, debate, true religious faith and true 
legitimate politics that we will defeat this threat. That 
means not just arguing against their terrorism, but their 
politics and their perversion of religious faith… It 
means championing our values of freedom, tolerance 
and respect for others [bold: mine].
356
 
 
With this particularly dramatic statement, Blair combines the 
mobilising aspect of myth by prophesising victory in the struggle, but also 
does so by bringing core aspects of the audience’s ontological security to 
the fore. More directly, this means Blair argues that victory would be 
achieved from the success of our familiar values, such as “freedom” and 
“tolerance”, and their expression in “true legitimate politics.” He effectively 
asks for the audience to concretise these self-narratives that contribute to 
their inter-subjectively constructed ontological security. This means actively 
promoting these self-narratives as a means to defeat the terrorists. Blair 
answers a call for grounding at a time of heightened  drama by replacing the 
nihilistic meaninglessness of violence with the concrete certainty that, 
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ultimately, the good (as embodied in the values discussed in section 4.2) 
will prevail over evil. Although people may be afraid, their fear would be 
made more manageable by the assurance of who they are, who the enemy is, 
and how one responds to them. The speech reduces the “indefinite 
anticipation”,357 as Blumenberg would put it”, that characterises Angst. 
Again, more concretely-focused emotions such as anger, fear, and hate that 
have a direct object are preferable to Angst, as discussed in chapter one. 
Blair also adapted many of these themes to his monthly press 
conferences. The most notable of these was held on On 5
th
 August 2005, 
where he signaled the government’s intent to introduce new anti-terrorism 
legislation. Blair opened by acknowledging the existence of anxiety 
reminded the audience that Britain’s values would not ultimately be 
defeated by the evil it faces: 
Since the 7th of July the response of the British people 
has been unified and dignified and remarkable. Of course 
there is anxiety and worry, but the country knows the 
purpose of terrorism is to intimidate, and it’s not 
inclined to be intimidated. Of course too, there have 
been isolated and unacceptable acts of racial or religious 
hatred. But they have been isolated, by and large Britain 
knows it is a tolerant and good natured nation, it’s 
rather proud of it, and it’s responded to this terrorism 
with tolerance and good nature in a way that’s won 
the admiration of people and nations the world over. 
However, I’m acutely aware that alongside these 
feelings is also a determination that this very 
tolerance and good nature should not be abused by a 
small but fanatical minority, and an anger that it has 
been [bold: mine].
358
 
 
Once again, Blair opts to emphasise the values of tolerance and 
goodness as being part of the British self, and one that Britain is aware of. 
Yet he makes us aware that the enemy is so insidious, so cruel, that it would 
seek to undermine this very positive aspect of the self that underpins our 
collective “being-with” (Mitsein).  The only option was to defend these 
positive values of the self against the enemy that threatens to not only 
destroy them, but first exploit them. Consequently, Blair outlined a series of 
counter-terrorism measures that would be put through parliament later in the 
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year. However, Blair stressed  that none of these measures were “aimed at 
the decent, law-abiding Muslim community of Britain. He acknowledges 
that “this [extremist] fringe does not truly represent Islam” and that “British 
Muslims in general abhor the actions of extremism” However, Blair offers 
this warning: 
But, coming to Britain is not a right. And even when 
people have come here, staying here carries with it a 
duty. That duty is to share and support the values that 
sustain the British way of life. Those that break that 
duty and try to incite hatred or engage in violence against 
our country and its people, have no place here. Over the 
coming months… we will work to turn those sentiments 
into reality. That is my duty as Prime Minister [bold: 
mine].
359
 
 
Blair here attempts to strengthen and concretise the demarcated lines 
between self and other, good and bad Muslim. He wishes to effectively 
legally distinguish between “decent law-abiding Muslims” who represent 
“true” Islam and those (who seem to predominately be foreign nationals) 
who promote violence and extremism as the opposite. Those who glorify 
violence or who do not fulfil their “duties” would be othered to the extent 
that they would not only be ostracised within Britain, but would be legally 
stripped of the right to be associated with it. Blair also augments the 
integrative aspect of myth by doing this, insofar as he reassures the public 
that these values that denote Britishness would no longer be exploited by 
this pernicious enemy. What this speech and the subsequent policy 
proposals did was strengthen the strength of intention towards the other. Put 
differently, Blair’s outlined in far more detail who the other was, how they 
are being enabled, and how they undermine our collective values. He asks 
the audience to be aware that we must mobilise against this very specific 
and detailed enemy. Blair established that the relation between the collective 
self and this more concretely defined other is one of perpetual conflict in 
which there can be only one valid outcome: the collective good triumphing 
over evil.  
5.3 July 7
th
 Bombings: Newspaper Reaction  
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This section demonstrates how newspaper commentators contributed 
to the work on myth following the 7
th
 July 2005 bombings. I begin first with 
the left-leaning media in the Daily Mirror and The Guardian.  As discussed 
in section 4.3, left-leaning publications tend to invoke the same features of 
the work on myth as described throughout chapter 4. In particular, the left 
makes many of the same references to the Blitz spirit and is particularly 
keen to talk of British resilience (section 4.2). There are, however, some 
crucial differences. Most notably, publications on the left are far more likely 
to cite UK foreign policy as a major contributor to the 7
th
 July 2005 
bombings. They are also less likely to directly condemn Islam and Muslims 
in the way that right-wing publications are. The Daily Mirror is among the 
first Newspapers to consider the role of the Iraq war in inspiring the London 
Bombings. 
 
 WAS it because of the war in Iraq? That's the question 
on everyone's lips. Why here? Why now? Who would 
commit such a cowardly, gruesome crime?  The answers 
are likely to make uncomfortable reading for Tony Blair 
and for supporters of the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions. 
The timing of the blasts, as Blair hosted George Bush in 
Gleneagles, is unlikely to be coincidence. Intelligence 
services warned of a heightened terror risk after the 
Government committed troops to the conflict in Iraq. 
Spain paid a terrible price for its support with last year's 
Madrid train bombings. Yesterday that carnage came to 
London.
360
 
 
While the article concedes that the ultimate responsibility of the 
attacks lies “firmly with the butchers who mercilessly killed and maimed… 
when the inquest starts, the Iraq war will also be in the dock.”361 With this, 
the Daily Mirror seeks to fill a void for interpretation that makes the 
“cause” of the attacks more certain. Whereas right-wing publications (and 
politicians) were more likely to resist attempts to link the attacks to British 
foreign policy, the Daily Mirror attempts to provide a cognitive map that 
links places the cause of the attacks more firmly with British foreign policy. 
They interpret the motives of the attackers link the cause, via place and 
person deixis, to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The equivalent of the attacks in 
Madrid was perpetrated in London, with the same antecedent conditions. 
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While the source of blame in left-leaning publications is often different to 
those on the right, the left nonetheless still approaches many of the core 
themes of the work on myth in the same way. For example, on the 9
th
 of 
July, The Mirror printed another piece that read as a narrative of Londoner’s 
experiences the following day of the attack. Entitled “Business as usual”, 
the article describes in detail how individuals responded with the standard of 
British resilience to the attacks. It remarks how tens of thousands of people 
carried on as normal, where people displayed “strong-hearted shared smile 
of encouragement and determination.”362 Most notably, there was an old 
soldier wearing medals earned in the Second World War. The article 
describes how his “lined, world-weary face said it all: “Hold firm. Have 
courage. Never surrender.” The article describes how the bombs may have 
“rocked London” and “disrupted the rhythm of our daily lives” but, 
crucially, not “our spirit.” It quotes a series of people who had commented 
on the events during the day: 
Those who travelled spoke defiantly and in one voice. 
"You cannot give into this kind of thing," said electrical 
worker Thomas Carr. "They're mistaken if they ever 
think that people would”… These were sentiments 
echoed in a tribute left at Tavistock Square - where the 
bus was ripped apart. It reads: "Yesterday we fled this 
great city but today we are walking back into an even 
stronger, greater city...London will go on"… City worker 
William Austin from Royston, Herts, said. "You have to 
carry on. I have meetings to go to today and there's work 
to be done." Opposite the station, the flag of St George 
fluttered. Someone had written on it: "Burning with fear? 
My a***!"
363
 
 
The article concludes with a powerful, rallying statement: “The eyes 
of the world are on us and we will be inspiring. Hold firm. Have courage. 
Never surrender.”364 This article invokes the British resilience aspect of the 
work on myth (section 4.2) in much the way that right-wing articles do. It 
makes heavy usage of metaphor, in particular by describing how the bombs 
“rocked London” but did not defeat “our spirit”. It also uses, in almost 
poetic fashion, a synecdoche that reveals how the lines on the face of an 
elderly gentleman “said it all”: that one must hold firm, not surrender and 
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have courage. This synecdoche recalls countless images of the Blitz spirit 
component of the “British resilience” narrative discussed in section 4.2. The 
article describes numerous examples of Britons rallying in defiance of the 
enemy by carrying on despite such adversity. Indeed, this article represents 
an attempt to re-orientate people with a sense of significance in a time of 
potential Angst by inviting the audience to engage with the subjective 
experiences of its author. What the author describes is a series of encounters 
with others, or specific moments of “being-with” (Mitsein)365 in which 
people re-assert their ontological security, by assuring themselves and 
others than London will continue as normal, and that they are resilient 
against any attempts to challenge undermine this. The article concludes by 
evoking the mobilising aspect of myth (section 1.2 and 1.4) when it asks 
people to emulate those quoted, and “inspire” the world, who have their 
“eyes on us”.366   
The British resilience theme is continued in another opinion piece 
published on the same day as the above article. It points out that, while the 
death toll continued to rise, “so does our determination not to be cowed or 
beaten by terror” – a powerful metaphor that reveals how the strength of 
British resilience and (by implication) its ontological security will only 
increase despite the horror of deaths. The article further discusses the theme 
of heroism, by praising the “remarkable” stories of heroics from members of 
the public and emergency services. It then boldly claims that “no other 
country would have reacted as we did to such an atrocity.367 While the 
article had up to this point referred to the narrative of British resilience, it 
also followed right-wing publications in describing the dichotomy between 
the values of the bombers and those of Britons:  
The fanatics who slaughtered indiscriminately stand for 
everything most Britons hate. Intolerance, bigotry 
and contempt for life. The response to their attacks has 
been the best possible reply to them. Politicians, 
emergency services, police and, most of all, ordinary 
people have united in compassion and determination not 
to be beaten. July 7, 2005, was a terrible day. But so 
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much good has come out of it that we shall remember it 
with pride as well as sorrow [bold: mine].
368
   
 
Intolerance and bigotry are irreconcilable with the values that Britain 
has, and the calm, measured, yet determined response has been the best way 
to stand up for these values. This had been so inspiring that despite the 
tragedy and grief “so much good” had out of it that Britons can take pride 
in. Via person deixis, the reader is incorporated within a nexus of people 
who have stood together to resist and provide the best reply to the attacks, 
and this is a positive thing despite July 7
th
 2005 being etched into the 
memory as a terrible day (time deixis). Together, people have constructed a 
sense of significance (Bedeutsamkeit) by making the attacks a potent event 
that is directly connected to the reader, and not some indifferent event that 
occurred at a geographic distance which is of little interest to them. By 
constructing this sense of collective self, the article provides a cognitive lens 
that reduces any sense of estrangement from the events, and allows the 
audience to incorporate it as part of a consistent collective self-narrative – a 
vital pre-requisite for ontological security.
369
  The article also continues the 
general trend of assessing leaders in such times of crisis (the same occurs 
with David Cameron in Chapter 6). While most had focused on the 
performance of Tony Blair, this article assesses London Mayor Ken 
Livingstone. According to the editorial many people had doubts, including 
the Daily Mirror about Livingstone’s “fitness for office”. However, there 
were “no doubts now” as he had successfully “articulated the finest qualities 
of the people of the capital and their spirit of defiance.”370 Altogether, this 
article represents a powerful invocation of the work on myth; Britons have 
suffered a grave injustice at the hands of an enemy “other” who is an 
implacable antithesis of Britishness, but have displayed extraordinary 
resilience and unity and will continue to do so. It contributes to an unfolding 
dramatic and figurative narrative process which exists to construct a sense 
of significance (Bedeutsamkeit) at a time of crisis.  
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The Daily Mirror continued with another opinion piece on the same 
day entitled “So what do they want?” tries to provide an insight into the 
mindset of the enemy. This piece attempts to solidify the audience’s 
conception of the enemy other as fundamentally barbaric by presenting a 
dystopian scenario in which they are victorious in the conflict. The article  
claims that if the bombers ever achieved their aims, “Britain would become 
an Iranian-style Islamic Republic” which would mean a ban on contact 
between sexes and anywhere they might meet, including discos, bars and 
public swimming pools (which would all be closed down in any case). It 
would be a crime for women to be in public with their hair uncovered, and 
all women, and even girls as young as four, would be forced to wear a hijab, 
described as “an all-encompassing headscarf and baggy clothes to disguise 
her body shape even in the height of summer”.371 The article lists a range of 
other draconian laws, all of which would be enforced in every British city 
by patrolling “special religious police who would enforce this Islamic dress 
code and arrest any suspected ‘courting couples’”.372 Any adulterers would 
be “hanged or stoned to death in public at the new Wembley stadium”, the 
British Royal family would be “driven into exile”, and an “Islamic Britain” 
would declare war on the USA.
373
  
Presenting an enemy victory in a dystopian future is a powerful way 
to mobilise via a myth that has conflict at its heart. The victory of violent 
radical Islamic other would have disastrous consequences that would 
compromise all the things the reader holds dear. Despite this, and unlike in 
many right-wing articles no immediate blame is attributed to British Islamic 
communities themselves. The insanity and evil of the bombers is heavily 
stressed, however. To “normal people” the demand that Britain would 
become an Islamic Republic “seems insane”.  The article finishes with a 
warning and rallying call: 
 
The men who planted bombs on London's Tube and a bus 
to kill and maim did so because they see everything about 
the West as corrupt and evil. Killing the innocent was just 
part of their greater crusade. They think they are fighting 
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for the future of the entire world, for a universal Islamic 
state that will rule every human life. We must do all in 
our power to destroy them before they try again to 
destroy our way of life [bold: mine].
374
 
 
The article dramatically portrays a dystopian future of being 
governed by the other. The article makes clear use of person and place 
deixis to separate us; the barbaric values associated with them (person 
deixis) and which are discussed in section 4.4 and which belong in “Iran” 
rather than the UK (place deixis). This is a clear attempt to distance the 
point of legitimacy from the point of legitimacy in terms of geographical 
location. It reinforces a cognitive schema that associated the barbaric 
practices with other places in the world. It sends a feeling of disgust and 
horror when imagining Wembley stadium and being used to enforce these 
horrific values. The article thereby uses the integrative aspect of myth put 
together with mobilising aspect for a rallying call: a need to destroy them 
before they destroy our way of life. This is not just a literal existential 
conflict in the physical sense, but on our ideas, values, and identities. 
Furthermore, it would not just be an assault on the individual being (in the 
sense of Dasein) of the reader, but also on their relations with others (being-
with/Mitsein), and the fundamental trust-networks the reader has established 
throughout their lives. In other words, it would not just place their physical 
security into question, but also their ontological security. All that would 
seem familiar and learned would be replaced by at best fear and, at worst, 
Angst.  
As is more typical of the left, the attackers and their kin are 
portrayed as “insane” (see also section 4.3 and 6.3). This was a feature of an 
article on 13 July 2005, following the discovery that the bombers were 
British.
375
 It argues that the communities need to be engaged to “ensure that 
a tiny lunatic fringe are not driven into the arms of evil” but also that “it is 
impossible for anyone with a shred of humanity to imagine how these 
maniacs could bring themselves to commit such dreadful deeds” 
[bold:mine]. Indeed, the article argues that this enemy is completely 
unreasonable as, unlike IRA bombers, “there seems to be no possible 
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compromise nor [sic] solution that any government or the people of Britain 
can offer” Instead, they just want us to all “submit to the perverted values 
and way of life they espouse.” This “fanaticism” is not a “state of religion” 
but a “state of mind”, and an “ugly psychosis”. It seems that the “only light 
at the end of this dark and twisted tunnel is the realisation that these four 
demented men will be unable to take any more lives” [bold: mine]. The 
article here uses time deixis to link the present conflict with terrorism to 
incidents of the IRA. Indeed while the IRA were comparatively reasonable, 
this radical Islamic other cannot be negotiated with and is, indeed, insane. 
This allows them to differ from   much of the right-wing press by not laying 
the blame predominately on Muslim communities. Instead, it launches and 
attack on those who display bigotry and intolerance towards Muslims. 
Intriguingly, it continues with the theme of the attackers having mental 
deficiencies 
Britain became the great country it is today on the 
backs of successive waves of migrants who brought 
fresh energy, enthusiasm and talent to these shores. 
We must never forget that as the enormity of what has 
taken place sinks in… Yet throughout the country there 
have already been numerous brainless acts of violence 
against Muslim and even Sikh communities and 
institutions. The boneheads lashing out fail to 
understand the overwhelming majority of Muslims are no 
more responsible for the fanatics than ordinary football 
fans are for hooligans. The men behind the bombings 
abhor Muslims who live and work in Britain and refuse 
to follow their twisted logic [bold: mine]. 
 
The article goes on to refer to the far-right British National Party as 
“maggots” for their stirring up of hatred. Instead, we should “stay calm, 
carry on with our lives, sign a book of condolence” and join the vigil which 
was to be held the following day. What we find is that presenting the killers 
as “insane” serves to provide an absolutist, resolute distinction between 
normal Britons and Muslim Britons and this tiny, maniacal violent fringe 
group. This distinction between sane and insane cannot be bridged or 
overcome: they must simply be defeated. However, the left-wing variant of 
the work on myth continues to posit the reaction from right-wing extremists 
as part of the problem. The “maggots” of the BNP are also fundamentally 
deficient and mentally challenged and so they must also be defeated. One of 
the most potent effects this has is to simplify how the enemy is understood. 
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By referring to them as simply insane, one delegitimises any cause they may 
have or, at least, any attempt they have to justify themselves is deemed the 
product of unreasonable insanity.
376
 All of this exemplifies the integrative 
aspect of myth; by reducing the other to a singular category of insanity, it 
becomes easier to concretise the enemy into a high-entitative group defined 
by this very category. Consequently, the dialogue is impossible and the 
enemy will go to any length to win since they are not constrained by reason. 
Britain must therefore triumph over this enemy, and that also includes 
defeating the perceived stupidity of the far-right. 
As with other newspapers from the left and right of the political 
spectrum, the Mirror focuses on the importance of the Prime Minister. In an 
opinion piece entitled “At Last, a Grown-Up Response to Terror”, Paul 
Routledge praises Blair and New Labour’s response to the crisis. He argues 
that the government’s response has been “mature, proportion and wise” and 
that he could “for the first time in years… hand on heart, support the 
politicians I did my bit to put into power in 1997”.377 He praises the Prime 
Minister’s multifaceted approach to the crisis, but also acknowledges that 
this resurgent public support that crosses political party boundaries is not 
surprising as, “at times of trial, we Brits gravitate naturally to our 
institutions”.378 However, this support for Blair and many of the senior 
politicians wavers in an article on July 27 2005 entitled “Terror won’t take a 
Break”, after key government figures had decided to go on holiday.  It 
warns that Britain is facing its “greatest crisis since the Second World War” 
and, consequently, that “the British people are entitled to expect their 
leaders to remain at work in such a time of crisis”.379 These two articles are 
intriguing because they exemplify the close attention paid to leaders, most 
notably the Prime Minister (this is repeated in Chapter 6). However, the 
second article in demonstrates its frustration at the Prime Minister for going 
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away by evoking the Second World War. The act of comparing these two 
contingent events to justify a present-day interpretation of leadership 
indicates the important of the Second World War in British memories, as 
discussed in section 4.2. The dichotomy between the content of the two 
articles also indicates how central the role of leadership figures are in re-
establishing a sense of security in times of crisis. 
The themes discussed above in the Daily Mirror were also repeated 
in The Guardian, albeit with some difference. Ian McEwan elaborates in 
emotive detail how terror had caught people off guard following the 
jubilation at the successful bid for the Olympics. 
 
But terror's war on us opened another front on 
Thursday morning. It announced itself with a howl of 
sirens from every quarter, and the oppressive drone 
of police helicopters. Along the Euston Road, by the 
new UCH - a green building rising above us like a giant 
surgeon in scrubs - thousands of people stood around 
watching ambulances filing nose to tail through the 
stalled traffic into the casualty department [bold: 
mine].
380
 
 
McEwan here uses metaphor to personify terror as if it were a solid, 
personified entity which is detached from people who use it as a tactic. The 
“howl of sirens” represented the announcement of a “new front” (place 
deixis) that terror had established in its continuous struggle with Britain. Yet 
despite the shock of the attacks, British people behaved calmly: 
 
The mood on the streets was of numb acceptance, or 
strange calm. People obediently shuffled this way and 
that, directed round road blocks by a whole new citizens' 
army of "support" officials - like air raid wardens from 
the last war. A man in a suit pulled a Day-Glo jacket out 
of his briefcase and began directing traffic with snappy 
expertise. A woman, with blood covering her face and 
neck, who had come from Russell Square tube station, 
briskly refused offers of help and said she had to get to 
work [bold: mine].
381
 
 
The British resilience aspect of the work on myth is used by 
McEwan here. This is explicitly so when he refers to equipment used  “from 
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the last war” and mentions Air Raid Wardens. The symbol of the Air Raid 
Warden is a synecdoche that represents one part of the entire conflict in 
World War II, and is etched in British consciousness as an important feature 
of that war. Throughout the article, McEwan uses time deixis to link the 
audience with the present situation to past wars with a reference to the “last 
war” in which the Air-Raid Wardens had a prominent role. This implies that 
this is the latest episode of Britain’s conflicts with its enemies. The 
resilience that Britons demonstrated during this last war was, for McEwan, 
replicated on the day of the attacks, with the woman carrying on and going 
to work with blood on her insisting she had to get to work being particularly 
notable. This perception of Britain as resilient is particularly important for 
generating ontological security. While there is a definite concreteness of the 
enemy that one may fear, the knowledge that Britons are resilient and carry 
on despite such horror is a key identifier of Britishness that helps prevent 
Angst. Put differently, the knowledge of how Britons respond against these 
threats, however intimidating and fear-inducing they are, are at least have a 
direct and concrete object for people to focus on (self, other, fear, etc.), 
rather than being lost within the nothingness of Angst.  
Polly Toynbee similarly stresses the horror of the events and the fact 
it was expected to happen at some point. She claims many Londoners had 
imagined this over and over again, in “every rush-hour train and crowded 
bus” people would be “glancing warily at one another, eyeing packages and 
bags.” It was, as Toynbee says, “only a matter of time”:  
 
The minds of those who did it seem too remote to 
understand, too unknowable a twister to summon up 
much rage or thirst for revenge. A thousand questions 
about fanaticism will go for ever unanswered. Of course 
we must detect, prevent and expunge it as best we can - 
but it is a monstrous force of unreason beyond arguing 
with [bold: mine].
382
 
 
The sanity of the bombers is once again  brought into the discussion 
by a left-leaning commentator, and this is consistent with the analysis in the 
Daily Mirror and in left-wing responses to the murder of Lee Rigby (6.3). 
She uses person deixis to distance the attackers from everybody else, since 
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their minds are “too remote to understand” and “too unknowable a twister”. 
All that can happen – and as is core to the work on myth – is for us to 
“expunge” it. Toynbee’s article seems to be concerned with establishing a 
cognitive map to view the events and to augment high levels of entitativity 
for the enemy other. By questioning their mental faculties and describing 
their barbarism, Toynbee reinforces the distance between the readers and the 
attackers. This is a classic example of the integrative aspect of myth, as the 
other is concretely grounded as exceptional to the collective self, and the 
relation between them is thereby one of conflict, where good succeeds over 
evil. As fear and anger-inducing as this may be, this concrete relation at 
least provides a cognitive framework to interpret the situation in such 
unprecedented circumstances. The alternative would be estrangement or, at 
worst, Angst, as Kierkegaard would have viewed it. 
Just like the Daily Mirror, The Guardian does discuss the role of the 
Prime Minister Tony Blair. However, it does so in a far more critical light. 
Decca Aitkenhead was scathing of the way the news media used Blair’s 
moments of “hammy trademark declaration,” which were essentially 
performances and not information: 
News channels can’t get enough of them: on the day of 
the bombings, they kept interrupting coverage to repeat 
his tremulous broadcast from Gleneagles, and a few 
hours later he was back again with a new one, possibly 
worried that Ken Livingstone had outdone him. Both 
men’s performances were debated by pundits as though 
the primary importance of the bombs was the race they 
had triggered to coin the best soundbite.
383
 
 
While it may be critical of the role of the leaders, this article still 
nonetheless implicitly refers to their role as important. Even the most 
viscerally articles of the role of the leader do this. For instance, another 
article in The Guardian criticises other newspapers for continually repeating 
Blair’s rhetoric without critique. These newspapers had “allowed a 
combination of hubris and naivety to get the better of rational judgment. 
And they have been reluctant to allow difficult truths to get in the way of 
simplistic explanations and invocations to the Blitz spirit.”384 It further 
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attacked previous critics of Blair who were now rallying behind our 
apparent “latter-day Churchill”, despite him being responsible for the 
disaster of the Iraq war, was “now being feted as a great “wartime” 
statesman.”385 Yet even though the article is critical of those who make 
comparisons to Churchill, it still holds him as an important figure and a 
great war-time statesman. The fact that The Guardian claims Blair seeks to 
emulate him in these circumstances still ultimately shows that British media 
figures were still keen to make comparisons to the events on July 7
th
 with 
those of the Blitz. 
Like much of the left-wing, The Guardian also focuses on the 
victimisation of Muslims, the importance of diversity, and how good and 
bad Muslims must be distinguished from one another. It reports that the 
Muslim Council of Britain had received 30,000 messages of hate following 
the attacks, ultimately crashing their internet servers. Yet Muslims had been 
victims of the attacks and also were part of the doctors and nurses who 
treated the injured. The article comments that London contains “300 
languages, 50 non-indigenous communities with populations of 10,000 or 
more, and   virtually every race, nation and culture represented”.386 What 
makes London unique is that, unlike “other parts of Britain” all of these 
communities “overlap, allowing meaningful exchanges, and helping fear, 
distrust and division to be contained [bold: mine].” Ultimately this places 
London at the “front line” in the “battle to prevent a backlash.”387 This 
article invokes the sense that Britain is tolerant and diversity, a core 
purported part of “British Values” (section 4.2) even if this is not explicitly 
stated. It is also vital to the mobilisng aspect of the work on myth. Not only 
is the country threatened by the barbarism of the violent radical Islamic 
attackers, but also by the hatred of those who would incite a backlash 
against Muslim communities. It falls upon the audience, and particularly 
those in London, to challenge such a backlash. This is because it poses a 
direct threat to the diversity which is core to London, and thereby to the way 
one relates to other Londoners in the sense of “being-with”. These relations 
could become tainted with distrust and division and, adopting the existential 
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terminology, this could lead to a period of Angst and estrangement from the 
world. 
Max Hastings creatively invoked the “British resilience” aspect of 
the work on myth. He discusses this by referencing memories of World War 
II and the Blitz Spirit (see section 4.2), as is commonly done by right-wing 
publications: 
 
When 34 dancers were killed and 80 injured by a 
Luftwaffe bomb on London's Café de Paris nightclub on 
March 8 1941, people were dismayed, but not surprised. 
More than 4,000 British people died like this that month. 
Today, by contrast, one of the strongest objections to 
George Bush's grotesquely misnamed "war on terror" is 
that, if we took all measures associated with a state of 
hostilities, we would concede to terrorists the victory they 
must be denied. At the risk of sounding facetious, we 
must keep dancing.
388
 
 
Hastings utilises time deixis to connect the events of the present 
with the past, as has been consistent with most other discussions about these 
issues. It invokes the core themes of British resilience as discussed in 
section 4.2 and does so through a dancing metaphor, by asking people to 
keep “dancing” as was done previously during the Blitz. Hastings calls for 
the public to resist the panic that times of exceptionality would cause, and to 
concentrate on re-establishing ontological security at a time of profound 
difficulty.  The extent to which the Guardian was willing to use metaphors 
of the Blitz was further revealed when it devoted an entire article to Phone 
Boxes in London, known as the Gilbert Box. John Sutherland provides a 
short history of the Gilbert Box, referring to them as part of Britain’s 
heritage and “object of beauty.” However, they were not just objects of 
beauty, but had a far greater practical and symbolic purpose. 
They were designed to be tough enough to withstand the 
elements and (1924 being  just six years after the 
Zeppelin raids on London) to withstand bomb-blast 
(hence the small panes, and the underground cables). In 
the second world war, they would be found standing 
(and usable) amid a wilderness of Blitz wreckage. The 
hardiness was no accident… They were an emergency 
service. That's why they were painted pillar-box red. So 
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that they could be easily seen, in a crisis by someone still 
in shock… [bold: mine].389 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the attack, phone networks went down 
due to people trying to call friends and relatives. Sutherland therefore 
advocates that if London is targeted again, then the Gilbert boxes should be 
refurbished “not as lovable antiques for tourists, but as weapons [emphasis: 
mine]”. The dramatic rhetoric represents the situation in a war-like fashion, 
but does so by building on a feature of British identity that is associated 
with reassurance, communication, and continuity. However, it does this by 
asking them to metaphorically be turned into weapons of war. In other 
words, something positive and seemingly innocent must be mobilised as a 
weapon in order to defeat the enemy.  
Despite many of the differences between right-wing and left-wing 
approaches to the work on myth as outlined in section 4.3, one article in The 
Guardian  by Norman Geras entitled “There are Apologists among us” 
follows a style more reminiscent of right-wing publications. Geras lambasts 
those he perceives as “apologists” who could express “dismay” or “grief” 
without accompanying it with “we told you so” as part of “an exercise in 
blaming someone other than the perpetrator. Geras argues there were 
“apologists for what the killers do” among us who “make more difficult the 
fight to defeat them [the bombers]”. These are individuals who will cite Iraq 
as the only plausible cause. What these individuals fail to accept is that it is 
a “fanatical, fundamentalist belief system which teaches hatred and justifies 
these acts of murder” but, sadly, this fact “somehow gets a free pass from 
the hunters-out of causes.” Geras finishes with a rallying call: 
There are apologists among us, and they have to be 
fought intellectually and politically. They do not help to 
strengthen the democratic culture and institutions 
whose benefits we all share. Because we believe in and 
value these, we have to contend with what such people 
say. But contend with is precisely it. We have to 
challenge their excuses without let-up [bold: mine].
390
 
 
Geras attempts to present those who “make excuses” for these 
attackers as being a significant obstacle to tackling extremism, so much so 
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that Geras attempts to mobilise people against them as well. Geras 
implicitly evokes the idea of “British values” (e.g. democratic culture and 
institutions) that must be defended and, in this case, these values must be 
defended not only against the attackers and those who follow them, but also 
those who would offer “excuses” for them. This is representative of both the 
integrative and mobilising aspects of the work on myth. First, the audience 
is reminded of the nature of the existential conflict between Britain and a 
violent, radical form of Islam. The former is defined by a certain 
“democratic culture” from which we all benefit, and the latter is defined by 
a fundamentalist belief system that stands in diametric opposition to Britain 
and its values. Secondly, it seeks to strengthen these bonds by narrowing 
down who counts as part of the legitimate banner of the collective self. 
Those who offer “excuses” or attempt to offer alternative explanations must 
be resisted in order to maintain the integrity of “our values” and draw 
attention towards the evilness of “theirs”. This serves to ground a sense of 
significance for people and ontologically secure them by providing a clear, 
consistent understanding of the collective-self, the other, and the relation 
between them. Mobilisation is a powerful way to ensure that this succeeds, 
as discussed further in section 1.2. As discussed in section 4.3, right-leaning 
commentaries in the work on myth tend to attribute much of the 
responsibility to Muslim communities themselves or the weakness of 
government responses. They also express outrage at what they perceive as a 
culture of “political correctness.” Left leaning commentaries similarly 
accept the work on myth, but are more likely to question whether UK 
foreign policy may play a role in fueling terror. They are also more likely to 
warn against the dangers of Islamophobia and stress the minority of 
Muslims who would even consider participating in such attacks. 
My analysis of right-leaning media consists of the Daily Mail and 
The Telegraph, beginning with the former. On the 8
th
 July, the day after the 
attacks, Daily Mail columnist Melanie Phillips blames the “failure to secure 
our borders” as a major contributing factor to the violence. She further 
laments the “obsession” with the diversity agenda and an over-focus on 
“human rights.” She also makes several references to the timid responses of 
the UK to the threat, most notably the Government’s attempt to bring in ID 
cards which only enables ministers to: 
145 
 
… give the impression that they are doing something – 
while at the same time they do little to stop Islamist 
ideologues from using what has come to be known as 
“Londonistan” to promulgate their inflammatory 
diatribes against the West  and thus swell the ideological 
sea in which terrorism swims [bold: mine].
391
 
 
Clearly, the usage of “Londonistan” is deliberately orchestrated to 
provide the reader with the image that London has been transformed into a 
city that embodies Islam by incorporating the suffix “stan”.  The metonym 
“Londonistan” serves to replace the traditional signifier of the British capital 
city of London in a manner that is intended to incite a sense of outrage. The 
security of individuals both in their physical/somatic and ontological sense 
had been compromised. This is expressed in the integrative aspect of the 
political myth by revealing a critical blow that the enemy has inflicted upon 
the collective self. That is, the enemy has begun to undermine the freedom 
of the West and has begun to transform the city within their image, swelling 
the metaphorical “sea in which terrorism swims”. With this dramatic 
language, Phillips seeks to dispel any sense of Angst or estrangement by 
concretising the enemy and the situation Britons are in. Whereas Angst is 
categorised “intentionality of consciousness without an object”,392 anger and 
fear are both directed against a particular object. In this case, this anger is 
against the attackers themselves and the weakness of the responses of 
government. Phillips further laments what she perceives as the police being 
hamstrung by the “diversity agenda” and fears of being accused of 
“Islamophobia,” which means that even advice from “law abiding and 
patriotic Muslims” (thereby invoking the good/bad Muslim dichotomy 
discussed in section 4.2) is often ignored. She mocks the Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner Brian Paddick’s claim that “Islam and terrorists are two 
words that do not go together”, asking him, rhetorically, what he thinks Al-
Qaeda is – thereby representing the tendency of right-wing commentators to 
link them to Islam more broadly.  Ultimately concludes that, compared to 
the US Homeland Security Response to the terrorist threat:  
 
                                                          
391
 Melanie Phillips, "Failure to Secure our Borders Defies Belief,"  Daily Mail (8 
July 2005), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/columnists/article-355097/Failure-secure-
borders-defies-belief.html. 
392
 Blumenberg, Work on Myth, 4-5. 
146 
 
“[Britain], by contrast, has pussy-footed around. 
Terrified of being accused of Islamophobia and wrapping 
itself in the mantle of the “diversity” agenda, it has 
allowed the human rights culture and a lethal political 
correctness to frustrate elementary and commonsense 
measures to protect the people of this country. The 
nation has been sleepwalking into disaster. Yesterday, 
it paid the ultimate and terrible price [bold: mine]. ”393 
 
 
Phillips here makes use of metaphor and personification to describe 
Britain “sleepwalking” into disaster. She further emphasises  her perception 
that political correctness has weakened Britain, and encourages the country 
to mobilise against the violent other. Phillips hopes to further concretise the 
threat posed by the enemy other and leave the audience in no doubt as to 
who has enabled them to proliferate. Phillips’ subsequent column on 11th 
July 2005 entitled “No Surrender: Stop Appeasing this Terror or Suffer 
Total Defeat”, Phillips draws links between Britain’s conflict with the Nazis 
and the threat posed by terrorism. She draws comparison between the 
enemies of “then” and “now”: 
We now face an enemy which as no country, no uniform, 
and no visible shape but is instead a loose and shifting 
affiliation of groups across the world, bound only by their 
unifying cause… Unlike 60 years ago, our leaders shy 
away from giving this menace its proper name. They call 
it “terrorism”. But, in fact, it is nothing less than a 
world war being waged in the name of religion – with 
terror its weapon of attack – whose aim is to 
emasculate the power and reach of western culture 
and replace it by the hegemony of Islam [bold: 
mine].
394
 
 
Phillips here merges time and place deixis with the integrative aspect 
of the work on myth. She also invokes the British resilience (4.2) aspect of 
the collective-self narrative in order to draw direct comparison between the 
present situation and the Blitz. She unambiguously states the core aspect of 
the work on myth by referring to the conflict as fundamentally existential: 
an attempt to replace “emasculate the power and reach of Western culture” 
and replace it with the “hegemony of Islam”. The threat is therefore not 
merely to the physical/somatic security of Britons, but also their ontological 
security. That is, the established framework of familiarity experienced by 
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most Britons, including their culture, identities, and trust-networks, are all 
being directly undermined by this threat. Worse still, unlike the British 
government that fought the Nazis, the resistance to these attacks by the 
present government have been weak. Elsewhere in the article, Phillips 
argues that the commonly held belief that fighting al-Qaeda is futile as it 
will only turn people against the West is flawed. She claims this is “like 
complaining that the only reason London endured the Blitz was because 
Britain had declared war on Germany.”395 Like then, appeasing such 
aggression means “cultural suicide.” Instead, the collective “we” must 
accept that it is “in for the long haul” and can “no longer flinch from the 
truth, and from the means we must use to defeat the horror that we all face.“ 
Phillips explicitly posits that this is a conflict which can only be won or lost, 
with severe existential threats resulting from defeat: 
“… the choice is this: we take action which may 
increase the immediate problem or, in the long term, 
we suffer total defeat. Given such a choice, the only 
morally viable position is to fight terror with all the 
means at our disposal… [bold: added]396 
 
This invokes the key features of the work on myth: that Britain is 
existentially threatened by an “other” that cannot be reasoned with and must 
ultimately be defeated. Moreover, the final sentence is a clear expression of 
the mobilising aspect of the work on myth. She utilises person deixis by 
referring to “we”, implicating all concerned as being embroiled in this 
particular conflict. There are only two options: victory or defeat. Phillips 
presents a highly dramatic scenario in which the country must take on 
terrorism with all means at its disposal.  She seeks to ensure that the public 
are not indifferent and disconnected from these events, as they would be in 
the absolutism of reality. In other words, she presents the situation as such 
that many in the public are able to find a sense of significance 
(Bedeutsamkeit) within it. She acknowledges that this may cause short-term 
damage, but exceptional measures were required to attain victory in the 
long-run.  Curiously, other columnists from the Daily Mail take a different 
approach., as demonstrated by Suzanne Moore. She vividly describes how 
London effectively carried on as normal despite the tragedy: 
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 But when friends and relatives called from all over the 
place, the one thing that was hard to convey was how 
normal everything very quickly became. Rolling news 
now relies on some deeply perverse impulse that makes 
us somehow want bad things to be even more horrifying 
than they already are. So I switched off the TV and 
picked up my daughter and took her to the park to feed 
the ducks. As usual, the park was full of all kinds of 
people from all kinds of backgrounds doing all kinds of 
stuff - t'ai-chi, smoking spliffs, pushing kids on swings, 
skateboarding.  The Turkish-Cypriots where I live were 
ensconced in their men-only cafes as ever. The Somalian 
shop was flogging its impossibly cheap SIM cards. The 
schoolkids were necking down chicken and chips.  I had 
watched the hospitals' spokespeople calmly telling us that 
they were doing their best.
397
  
  
She then goes on to remark that the events overall reminded of her 
why she loves London. It was not the “buildings” sights “or villages” but 
“its people”: 
our political leaders should understand this: the war on 
terror cannot be won by your macho posturing. Terrorism 
will be defeated by those who refuse to be terrorised, by 
the sheer bloomin' awkwardness that Londoners showed 
last week. The dead will be mourned, the injured 
taken care of and, yes, we have been hurt. But we have 
not been terrorised. It is clear that the terrorists not only 
will fail, they did fail on July 7 [bold: mine].
398
 
 
In a different way to Phillips’, Moore’s article answers a need for 
significance in this situation by hardening the integrative aspect of the work 
on myth and attributing naturally-resilient characteristics to Londoners. This 
ability to carry on and endure under substantial pressure was part of the 
ontological security of Londoners and emphasises their collective sense of 
being (which would be “being-with”). While she challenges those who 
invoke the comparisons to the Blitz (and thereby goes against one aspect of 
the narrative in section 4.2), she nonetheless invokes the general sense that 
Londoners cope under substantial pressure. They refused to be “terrorised” 
due to their “sheer bloomin’ awkwardness” which means that the terrorists 
ultimately failed on 7 July. Londoners picked stability continuity and 
stability over the Angst that the terrorists had wished to create. Put 
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differently, Londoners chose to sustain the very modes of being that reflect 
their ontological security. Indeed, this continuity is also the way to defeat 
terrorists, rather than the “macho posturing” of political leaders.  The 
fundamental core of the work on myth – that Britain faces an existential 
conflict with violent, radical, Muslim others, remains central to the article. 
This will ensure that the terrorists continue to “fail in future”. Indeed, this 
final sentence is Sorelian insofar as it prophesises victory in the face of the 
enemy, albeit in a less grandiose and certainly less violent manner. 
This said, the revelation that the bombers were British provoked a 
severe challenge to the ontological security of Britons.
399
 The Daily Mail 
reacts to this most strongly, with one editorial describes as “frightening and 
profoundly depressing” that the bombers were British-born and “educated in 
our schools”, drawing “upon all our civilising benefits.” It argues that the 
Muslim community should: 
… take a long hard look at itself… abandon the ‘myth’ 
that Islam has nothing to do with the atrocities and reject 
Islamic infallibility… The Muslim community, such a 
positive and dynamic addition to our national life, faces 
hard choices. Does it wish to integrate itself into our 
community, to play a full, unequivocal part in the Britain 
of today, a country characterised by the live-and-let-live 
values of tolerance, good humour, and fair play? Or does 
it wish to allow sections of the community to turn in on 
themselves, embracing the kind of fundamentalist 
extremism that breeds hatred of the West and ultimately 
martyrs?
400
 
 
This article follows the general trend of right-leaning publications in 
laying some blame on Muslims for fact that there are people within their 
                                                          
399
 As Sanz Sabido highlights, the immediate post 7/7 discourses often emphasised 
the “’foreign’ nature of ‘terrorism’ and [made] its perpetrators look “foreign”. See: 
Rut M. Sanz Sabido, "When the "Other" Becomes "Us": Mediated Representations 
of "Terrorism" and the "War on Terror"," PLATFORM: Journal of Media and 
Communication 1 (2009): 78. This This assumption was made in the Sunday 
Telegraph and other newspapers that the bombers were part of a “foreign based 
Islamic-terrorist cell” before it emerged that they were British. See: Nick Davies, 
Flat Earth News (London: Chatto and Windus, 2008), 34. This was also a topic 
discussed in a well-known speech by Gordon Brown where he calls for a national 
day of Britishness in order to construct an “essential common purpose”. See: BBC 
News, "Brown speech promotes Britishness,"  (14 January 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4611682.stm. 
 
400
 Daily Mail, "Fundamental Challenges Lie Ahead,"  (13 July 2005), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-355635/Fundamental-challenges-
ahead.html#ixzz3QEJSqVJG. 
150 
 
communities who wish to commit acts of terror. Muslims are asked to make 
a choice, and one that reflects the good/bad Muslim dichotomy that features 
heavily in the work on myth and is discussed further in section 4.2. Namely, 
would Muslims prefer to be associated with a core part of the British self in 
terms of (although not explicitly stated) British values such as tolerance, 
good humour, and fair play? Or would it allow certain sections to “turn in 
on themselves”, and enable them to breed the extremism that causes such 
violence. This is a question asked of Muslims with the intention of showing 
the incompatibility with the perceived two understandings of Islam: the 
good and the bad. However, Muslims can find a sense of significance 
(Bedeutsamkeit) by playing a “full, unequivocal part” in British society and 
gain a sense of ontological security by taking part in this conflict, siding 
with the good against the evil. Yet, as another editorial suggests, many 
Muslims are refusing to do this and are, in fact, in denial: 
Item after item on radio and television has dwelt upon the 
need to avoid blaming Muslims for what happened, rather 
than addressing the hard questions to the community that 
cry out to be asked.  In doing so, it has been taking its cue 
from the Muslim community itself, which seems to be in 
the deepest denial.  Yes, it has certainly condemned the 
atrocity in the strongest terms. But in the very next 
breath, its leaders have effectively washed their hands of 
it by repeating like a mantra that anyone claiming to be a 
Muslim who commits such an act is not a proper Muslim, 
because Islam is a religion of peace.
401
 
 
The remainder of the article then suggests that (erroneously) that 
Jihad translates to “holy war”, and that this understanding of Jihad is central 
to Islam. This, the editorial claims, shows claims by the Muslim community 
that the terror attacks committed by the individuals from Leeds were 
disconnected from Islam, “turns both logic and morality on their heads.” It 
is also a “moral inversion” which results from “the cultural brainwashing 
that has been in Britain for years in pursuit of the disastrous doctrine of 
Multiculturalism.” This doctrine has: 
“refused to teach young Muslims – along with other 
minorities – the core of British culture and values.” 
Instead, it has promoted a lethally divisive culture of 
separateness, in which minority cultures are held to be 
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equal if not superior to the values and traditions of the 
indigenous majority.”402 
 
This article explicitly evokes the idea of “British values” and the fact 
that they have not been sufficiently promoted to Muslims, thereby fostering 
a condition of separateness. The consequence is that all cultures are seen as 
equal, and there is no overarching consistent self-narrative. This represents a 
statement of ontological insecurity about a collective sense of Britishness. 
Without the overarching consistency, and with contradictory interpretations 
of the collective self operating within close proximity, there is no way of 
concretising who “we are”. The article therefore advocates an end to the 
politically correct culture that hampers any attempt at victory within the 
work on myth. This is further emphasised in a subsequent article which 
criticises the weakness of the response by Muslim communities to the 
attacks. While the article declares that the Daily Mail is proud of its “ever-
growing Muslim Asian readership”, it questions whether Muslim leaders 
were providing the needed leadership.
403
 While nobody could the 
“revulsion” felt by the majority of Muslims, there has been a “deeply 
worrying equivocation when it comes to challenging the evil forces behind 
the London atrocities”. This is disastrous as it is ultimately “only the 
Muslim community itself that can stamp our Islamic extremism”. It makes a 
call to action for Muslims: 
 
 The great majority of decent Muslims must confront 
the factors which breed in a minority of zealots a 
loathing of the West so great they are prepared to die 
- provided they also kill the hated 'infidel'. This will 
mean silencing the imams who preach their bigotry, 
closing the mosques that give them a platform, 
cleansing the websites that pump out hatred.  To do 
this will require great maturity by the Muslim leadership 
which needs to worry less about a Muslim-as-victim 
mindset and concentrate more on providing strong 
direction for their communities [bold: mine].
404
 
 
This is the mobilising aspect of the work on myth directed squarely 
at Muslim communities or, more specifically, those who fall within the 
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“good Muslim” category (see section 4.2). It calls for Muslims to take 
action in multiple fields that they are familiar with, such as in mosques on 
the internet. Their present weakness is only fuelling the terror that Muslims 
would ultimately wish to see defeated, just as the majority of law-abiding 
people would also wish. Good Muslims, whether they like it or not, are 
embroiled within this conflict, and their own ontological security has been 
challenged. Others with inimical values to “good” Muslims have disrupted 
their “being-with” (Mitsein) others, and the established relations that 
constitute places they are familiar with are currently being commandeered 
by those with inimical values to Britons and good Muslims alike. These 
arguments are designed to efface the impotence that occurs in times of 
Angst, and instead draw the attention of Muslims to the enemy within who 
must ultimately be defeated. It effectively asks Muslims to mobilise 
themselves within the framework of the work on myth in order to reclaim 
their own sense of collective self away from those who have betrayed them.  
The Telegraph repeats many of the themes that the Daily Mail discusses, 
albeit in a different tone, and with far more emphasis on the “British 
resilience” narrative. Stephen Robinson urges Londoners to “remain at their 
posts” and praises those who are “doing their duty in their own way by 
going to work, meeting friends for lunch, or going shopping.” He warns that 
fear of terrorism can be more dangerous than terrorism itself, citing the 
example of Americans substituting planes for cars following 9/11, and 
increasing the amount of road accidents in the process. Robinson concludes 
that it is similarly the responsibility of the British Government to ensure that 
fear does not allow “the terrorists to change our way of life.”405 Niall 
Ferguson ties this temporal connection with the “British resilience” theme 
(section 4.2): 
London took it from the Luftwaffe. London took it 
from the IRA. And London can take it from al-Qaeda, 
or whichever wretched gang of fanatics was responsible. 
I happened to be in Berlin when the bombs went off in 
London, and that prompted a further angry thought. 
London can take it. And London can bloody well dish 
it out, too. Our capital has been bombed before. But 
those responsible lived - though generally not for very 
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long - to regret it. The Germans were made to pay - 
tenfold - for the Blitz [bold: mine].
406
 
 
Like others, Ferguson provides significance to events by 
contextualising them as part of a long time-line of conflicts in which Britain 
has triumphed. He uses time and place deixis to position the attacks on 
London as if they were occurred in succession to a series of previous attacks 
from London’s enemies that it has ultimately overcome.   His take conjures 
up images of a similar fate befalling the perpetrators of 7/7 bombings as 
experienced by the Nazis. Since the conflict is equivocated by implication, 
one can be in no doubt that the enemy will ultimately be defeated. He 
reminds Londoners that they are also able to “dish it out” re-asserts a sense 
of self-esteem and solidified the integrative aspect of myth by reminding the 
audience of the fundamental strength of London and Londoners. By directly 
connecting the events to the Blitz, the Ferguson is able to present the present 
attacks on London through a framework that is already important to British 
self-identity, as explained more in section 4.2. This gives the conflict, and 
Britons themselves, a renewed sense of significance (Bedeutsamkeit) that 
allows them to contextualise the events. This is particularly important for 
feelings of ontological security. Although the audience may be in a state of 
fear or anger, the construction of such events with reference to previous 
conflicts (i.e., Britain defeated the Germans so will defeat the terrorists) 
serves as a useful cognitive schemata that enables people to present events 
in a manner that would be familiar to them.  
Similarly, Patrick Bishop opts to remind people that resilience is best 
expressed in the form of normality. In an article entitled “Remember that 
normality is the only civilised response to terror,” he makes clear that while 
there is an existential threat facing the public that must be dealt with, people 
must continue with the steadfast determination to continue with their lives 
as they usually would. Nonetheless, “Realism,” Bishop argues, demands an 
acceptance that the attack was not a “one-off” but was “an action in an 
open-ended war in which innocent city-dwellers all over the world are very 
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much in the front line.”407 A similar approach is taken by Stephen Robinson. 
Robinson urges Londoners to “remain at their posts” – a metaphor of war - 
and praises those who are “doing their duty in their own way by going to 
work, meeting friends for lunch, or going shopping.” He warns that fear of 
terrorism can be more dangerous than terrorism itself, citing the example of 
Americans substituting planes for cars following 9/11, and increasing the 
amount of road accidents in the process. Robinson concludes that it is 
similarly the responsibility of the British Government to ensure that fear 
does not allow “the terrorists to change our way of life.”408 All of these 
articles evoke the “British resilience” aspect of the political myth, in which 
Britain has an exceptional characteristic of resilience, as demonstrated in 
historical epochs such as the Blitz. The authors attempt to imbue the events 
with significance (Bedeutsamkeit) recalling these narratives in order to 
provide inspiration for the public to maintain their sense of ontological 
security; to carry on as normal but with the awareness that there are concrete 
threats to be aware of. However, in Robinson’s article, there is also the 
mention that terrorists would seek to “change our way of life”. Using the 
terminology outlined in chapter 1, Robinson effectively warns that the 
terrorists hope for Britons to change how they relate to one another, or alter 
their “being-in-the-world” and especially their “being-with” (Mitsein). A 
plea to sustain normality is fundamentally a plea to sustain the same 
grounding (in the sense of begründen) which enabled them to find a sense of 
significance more broadly and ontological security in particular.   
With this theme in mind, one writer for The Telegraph expresses 
frustration at Tony Blair’s reaction to 7/7 at the G8 summit for being 
inappropriate. Blair was, according to Utley, “fighting back tears”  and 
“feeling the nation’s pain.” Utley finds this frustrating: 
Yes, of course he was right to express his deep sympathy 
with the victims and their families, which all of us feel. 
But this was also a time for defiance and cold, measured 
anger. Imagine if Winston Churchill had delivered his 
famous speech "We shall fight on the beaches…. We 
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shall never surrender" with a lump in his throat. How 
much more effective and stirring that speech was for 
being delivered in a steady, unemotional, matter-of-fact 
way. And Churchill was speaking at a time when rather 
more than half a dozen bombs were exploding in the 
capital [bold: mine].409 
 
This refers directly to Churchill’s “We shall fight on the beaches” 
speech, discussed in section 4.2. Utley utilises time and person deixis to 
draw unambiguous comparisons between 7/7 and the Blitz. In particular, he 
attempts to draw links between Tony Blair and Winston Churchill, claiming 
that the former’s response was fundamentally deficient in comparison to the 
latter. This typifies the importance of the role of the leader in the work on 
myth (see section 4.2) but, in this particular case, Utley is clear that Blair’s 
emotion was not a desirable mode of response. Indeed, Blair’s behaviour 
appears to contradict the calls for normality but resoluteness that other 
articles in The Telegraph have expressed. Nonetheless, emotion was not 
completely absent even from The Telegraph. Nigel Farndale describes the 
“five stages of grief” which he and other Londoners experienced following 
the bombings. These were denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and 
acceptance. The denial phase occurred when people opted to attribute the 
incident to a “power surge” rather than terrorist activity, or that a suicide 
bomber had been shot by security forces while attempting to blow up 
Canary Wharf.  The anger phase constituted resentment towards the fact this 
was “our town those bastards were bombing.” He even claims that the heat 
of the anger phase would have made people receptive to the idea of 
internment for all terror suspects, bulldozing Mosques which preach “hatred 
of the West,” and even bringing back “hanging, drawing and quartering” for 
terrorists. In the “bargaining” phase, people began to question whether there 
was any point in “threatening fanatics,” and whether they had “brought this 
on themselves” due to UK Foreign Policy. In the depression phase, people 
realised that it could have been “any of us” on that Tube, and that close 
family and friends had almost been caught up in it. Finally,  in the 
acceptance phase, Farndale claims it was inevitable as after 9/11, “we all 
became Americans, and that is what everyone in the West still is.”410 
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Farndale’s article is powerful because of its personalised nature. He 
makes a series of assertions about how people would feel, and vividly 
describes the shattering of the ontological security that many people would 
have felt in the immediate aftermath of the attack. Yet, ultimately, the only 
conclusion was to accept the core premise of the work on myth: that Britain 
was embroiled in an existential conflict with a violent, radical form of Islam 
and Muslims. Furthermore, we must also accept that we are all a part of this 
conflict, and that this has been the case since we all “became Americans” 
following the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. This article may 
describe the shattering of ontological security, as stated above, but it also 
describes the way in which it re-emerges. It is this call to resilience that 
remains important, and The Telegraph continues to emphasise this call 
elsewhere by reminding the audience of the importance of British resilience 
with other values associated with Britishness.  Liberal values such as 
tolerance as viewed as central to Britishness (as  discussed section 4.2), and 
these values are made clear in an editorial entitled “A Dark Day from Which 
We Will Emerge Stronger,” the  Telegraph comments:  
 
 Yet it is in the nature of a great city that it can ride such 
ups and downs, if not with equanimity, then with a 
determination that violence shall not prevail…  Through 
a combination of vigilance, tolerance of religious 
diversity and sheer grit, the rest of us must.  
  
While the city is able to withstand various “ups and down”, but not 
necessarily always with equanimity, the city utilises its values of tolerance 
to sustain its collective-self narrative at a time of substantial difficulty. The 
Telegraph often describes the process of this happening via individual 
narrative accounts. These accounts tend to invoke the themes of resilience 
along with the public mobilising effect of myth.  Andrew Martin’s article, 
entitled “Travelling by Tube is what Defines Londoners – it makes them 
Different”, describes his own personal experiences of the Tube, capturing 
many of the familiar sights and sounds of those who frequent it. Martin 
expresses his fondness for the system, describing it as the “most 
complicated and beautiful system of urban transport in the world, full of 
lacunae, which seems to be encapsulated in the famous warning “Mind the 
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gap.” Martin subsequently relates these affections for the Tube to the recent 
bombings in London: 
… Tube travel in general represents such a high level of 
imagination and civilisation that an attack upon it by the 
fundamentally jealous was inevitable. Every Tube user 
knew this, and yet continued to ride the trains. Was it 
because they had no choice? I'd rather say that the 
mysterious arteries of the system have become analogous 
to those within their own bodies. The underground runs 
through the bloodstream of Londoners, and the terrorists 
will need to do more than they did on Thursday to change 
this.
411
 
 
Martin’s article appears to be an attempt to project a sense of  
significance for Londoners by emphasising their own unique position within 
the world. He does this firstly by describing the high standards of 
“imagination and civilisation” which they are part of. This self-esteem is 
reinforced by reducing the bombers to people who “jealous” of these things. 
Finally, Martin invokes the British resilience theme by describing the 
futility of the efforts of the bombers to dissuade Londoners from normality. 
By metaphorically comparing the railway lines of the tube the arteries 
within their own bodies, Londoners are intimately connected to the Tube 
itself. Martin reminds Londoners of the symbolic value of the Tube and the 
fortitude it ultimately gives them. It strengthens the position of Londoners 
who, despite being victims of a tragedy perpetrated by barbarism, could not 
be deterred by the weakness of bomber’s efforts. 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have analysed the rhetoric of senior politicians and 
newspaper columnists following the 7
th
 July 2005 bombings in London. I 
noted that the work on myth was highly prevalent in the immediate 
aftermath of the attack, with most of the emphasis being given to the British 
resilience narratives, and particularly those of the Blitz. I began by looking 
at key political speeches and debates in the House of Commons. Most 
notably, the rhetoric meant frequent inferences of time, place, and person 
deixis, and continuous attempts to remind the audience that they, and 
generations before them, have overcome previous challenges and will 
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ultimately be successful. This would have the effect of ontologically 
securitising in a moment of crisis. Without the event being interpreted in 
such a manner and related directly to the audience, it risked the attacks 
either becoming an indifferent event within the absolutism of reality, 
inciting potential  Angst. This would be the antithesis to the ontological 
security that scholars have argued is imperative to our “being-in the-world” 
(see section 1.4). 
I subsequently analysed responses in Newspaper articles from both 
right-leaning and left-leaning publication. I noted that both publications 
worked on the fundamentals of the political myth in that there was broad 
agreement that Britain was facing an existential conflict with radical and 
violent Muslims. Both left-leaning and right-leaning publications also drew 
from identity-narratives, and especially those of the “Blitz spirit” (section 
4.2). Just as with the rhetoric of politicians (section 5.2), the analysis 
showed that left-leaning and right-leaning Newspaper commentators sought 
to inspire a sense of significance and ontologically securitsing at a time of 
crisis. That said, the main difference appears to be who the left and right 
attribute blame to. Right-wing publications tended towards blaming Muslim 
communities themselves and the weakness of the government who were 
accused of being in thrall to political correctness. Left-wing publications 
were shown to be more likely to blame UK foreign policy and the 2003 
invasion of Iraq in particular.  
The purpose of this section was not to provide a comprehensive 
empirical analysis of the work on myth across the entirety of society. 
Rather, it was concerned with how the work on myth in political and media 
rhetoric addresses the existential needs many experience during these times 
of perceived crisis. It follows the theoretical framework grounded in 
Chapter 1, which is grounded in the philosophical points made by numerous 
existential philosophers that Angst and estrangement are crucial to our 
experiences of being-in-the-world. We constantly need to ground 
(begründen) a sense of significance (Bedeutsamkeit), and we may do this in 
many ways.
412
 However, in such moments of crisis, political myth is one 
crucial way in which politicians and media elites seek to fill the void. 
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Significance grants us a sense of security in our mode of being, how we 
relate to the world, our trust networks, and our routines (as pointed out by 
ontological security scholars).
 413
  I note that 7/7 is one example of these 
trust networks being breached. 
The chapter has been the first demonstration of how a deixis and 
tropes can be utilised to analyse political and media rhetoric following a 
terror attack. This in itself is a unique contribution to the literature, although 
it should be made clear that there may also be other ways the texts could be 
read. By this I mean that my reading is not the only legitimate one and, 
indeed, alterations to my theory of political myth would also produce a 
different reading of the text. However, what this chapter has provided is a 
clear and highly methodical interrogation of the work on myth in this 
particular context, and I would that it can also apply elsewhere. 
  
                                                          
413
 Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration; 
Modernity and Self-Identity; Kinnvall, "Globalization and Religious Nationalism: 
Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security." 
160 
 
Chapter 6: The Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby on May 23
rd
 
2013  
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I analyse the subsequent rhetoric by political and 
media elites following the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby on 22
nd
 May 2013. 
I adopt the same methodological approach in outlined in chapter 3 and 
deployed in chapter 5.   Rigby’s murder at the hands of Michael Adebolajo 
and Michael Adebowale shocked many people across the country. Rigby 
was a soldier who had been deployed to Afghanistan and returned 
unscathed, only to be killed on a London street near his barracks. 
Furthermore, the attackers themselves were recorded on a mobile phone 
camera blaming UK Foreign policy for the murder while holding meat 
cleavers with blood-stained hands. Much of the subsequent rhetoric from 
politicians and media elites was more personalised than it was following the 
7/7. Rigby was portrayed as a hero killed in a brutal, savage and cowardly 
attack, his killers were brutal villains, and some members of the public such 
as Ingrid Loyau-Kennett were kind, selfless, and brave people who were 
subsequently venerated. Many newspaper articles praised the so-called 
“Angels of Woolwich” who tried to protect Rigby,414 and particularly Ingrid 
Loyau-Kennett who confronted one of the attackers directly.
415
 The fact that 
Rigby was a soldier was also extremely important, with many politicians 
and media commentators remarking on the special tragedy that this brought. 
Many remarked on the savagery and even the idiocy of Adebolajo and 
Adebowale.
416
 Altogether, this was an episode of extreme and graphic 
drama which was highly personal and unexpected. 
The attack incited many other important social phenomena in the 
country, most notably a largescale increase of intolerance towards Muslims. 
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This was most vividly manifest in the upsurge in popularity of the extreme 
right-wing group known as the English Defence  League (EDL). On the 
evening after the attack, EDL supporters were encouraged to “take to the 
streets”, leading to approximately 250 EDL members clashing with police, 
throwing bottles and engaging in various skirmishes across the public 
square. A 43 year-old man was arrested on suspicion of arson after entering 
a mosque in Braintree wielding a knife and an “incendiary device.”417 Over 
1,200 police officers were deployed in the vicinity the following night.
418
 
The overall popularity of the EDL on Social Media significantly increased 
in the first 24 hours following the attack on Lee Rigby. Prior to the event, 
the EDL was posted about on Twitter approximately 500 times per day. 
However, on the day of the attack it was mentioned 15,700 times and its 
messages were seen by an estimated 1.5 million people.
419
 Another 1,500 
EDL supporters opted to attend a pre-arranged demonstration in Newcastle 
upon Tyne on the Saturday following the attack.
420
 While there were 
incidents of violence and harassment following the July 7
th
 attacks, the scale 
of the response of the far-right following the murder of Lee Rigby was 
much larger. 
The chapter begins with an analysis of the rhetoric of politicians 
following the attacks (section 6.2). It subsequently moves on to discuss the 
reaction of The Guardian, Daily Mirror, The Telegraph, and Daily Mail 
columnists. It demonstrates that the same process of the work on myth that 
was seen following 7/7 also occurred in this case, but with contextual 
differences. 
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6.2 Politicians after the Murder of Lee Rigby 
 
The evening after the attack, the Prime Minister David Cameron 
gave a speech outside Downing Street which, according to Telegraph 
columnist Matthew d’Ancona, went through several drafts.421 Cameron 
began by outlining his feelings about what had happened the preceding day:  
 
What happened yesterday in Woolwich has sickened us 
all.  On our televisions last night – and in our newspapers 
this morning – we have all seen images that are deeply 
shocking.  The people who did this were trying to 
divide us.  They should know: something like this will 
only bring us together and make us stronger.  Today 
our thoughts are with the victim – and with his family.  
They are grieving for a loved one…  And we have lost a 
brave soldier [bold: mine].
422
 
 
Cameron seeks to make significance (Bedeutsamkeit) in a situation 
of crisis in order to ontologically securitise the perceived collective British-
self. In particular, Cameron uses person deixis to reinforce the distinctions 
between the collective self and other. He reminds the audience that the 
barbaric displays of the enemy that occurred in Woolwich affected 
everybody.  Much of the discussion about the event had centred on the 
personal qualities of the victim, and the fact that he was a young man with a 
wife and child. Many people across the country have spouses and children, 
the thought of this loss is understandably grief-inducing.  Cameron appeals 
to these feelings by merging person deixis with place deixis, thereby 
connecting the events in Woolwich directly to the audience. However, this 
does not necessarily need to be Angst-inducing because it ultimately serves 
to concretise the self and other; it strengthens and unites all Britons against a 
clearly definable other.  The need for ontological security was particularly 
important for those who lived in London and/or are members of the Armed 
Forces and their families. Armed Forces personnel are often held in high 
regard in many countries, and Britain is no exception. Yet the brazen 
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disregard and butchery demonstrated by Rigby’s attackers shattered these 
assumptions. Hence, a void was created that extended beyond the immediate 
physical threat posed by the attackers. This void was, however, aptly filled 
by David Cameron by referring to other familiar, unifying tropes.  He refers 
to the attack as being an attack “on Britain” and “on our British way of life”. 
This was not an attack by the Britons the Armed Forces personnel seek to 
defend (i.e. non-Muslims and “good” Muslims), but those who adopt a 
warped interpretation of Islam and who, by implication, are enemies of 
Britain: 
It was also a betrayal of Islam – and of the Muslim 
communities who are give [sic] so much to our country.  
There is nothing in Islam that justifies this truly dreadful 
act [bold: mine].
423
    
 
Cameron here evokes the clear distinctions between good and bad 
Muslims in order to erase any doubt about the nature of the killers as a 
detached “other”. Not only does this reassure Armed Forces people that this 
was simply an attack by an enemy they are already familiar with, but it 
reassures good Muslims that they retain their place within Britain, but that 
they are starkly distinguished from “bad” Muslims. This evokes the nexus 
of relations that constitute the work on myth: the distinction between 
legitimate Britons on the one hand and the irredeemable enemy on the other 
(section 4.2).  This provides also provides a template for the mobilising 
aspect of myth, as Cameron reminds the audience that we all have the 
responsibility to confront extremism. One of the most unique features of this 
speech is the emphasis he places on one particular heroic figure, Ingrid 
Loyau-Kennett, a cub pack leader who confronted the attackers while they 
were still wielding their blood-soaked weapons. While the theme of heroism 
is often a feature of political myth, the direct, personal reference to an extant 
person is unusual, especially when this person is a civilian. As Cameron 
states:  
Confronting extremism is a job for us all. And the fact 
that our communities will unite in doing this was vividly 
demonstrated by the brave cub pack leader – Ingrid 
Loyau-Kennett – who confronted one of the attackers on 
the streets of Woolwich yesterday afternoon. When told 
by the attacker that he wanted to start a war in 
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London she replied “You’re going to lose. It’s only 
you versus many.” She spoke for us all [bold: mine].424 
 
By using person deixis, he begins by evoking the mobilising aspect 
of myth by declaring that confronting extremism is a job for “us all”. He 
turns the words of Loyau-Kennett into a metaphor that represents the 
position of himself and the audience as being against the extremist enemy.  
As already established, this audience also includes Muslims who are not 
associated with such extremism. Cameron turns Loyau-Kennett into a 
metaphor that represents the deictic centre as being embroiled within an epic 
conflict with the extremist enemy. Being a cub pack leader as well, she 
symbolises a figure of everyday “goodness” and decency in society which 
stood in the face of an insidious evil. Moreover, her bravery is even more 
profound given the physical danger she placed herself in. Many images exist 
of Loyau-Kennett standing face-to-face with the attacker, whose hands are 
covered in blood and is still holding the weapon he used to murder Lee 
Rigby. Loyau-Kennett’s role in this confrontation is also unique insofar as 
she directly evoked the mobilising aspect of myth herself, prior to this being 
interpreted by others. She accepted the attacker’s statement that there will 
be a war, and declares that the “many” (meaning those opposed to 
extremism) will ultimately be victorious (a fundamentally Sorelian 
promise).   
The killers’ intent to “start a war in London” was countered with the 
reassurance that the collective “we” would win. Not only does this provide 
the promise of victory in the Sorelian sense, but it also reassures that they 
can assume their inevitable victory, thus filling any potential void of 
anxiety. Moreover, it may not assuage people of fear (which, unlike anxiety, 
has a concrete and direct focus), but it at least makes more direct, concrete, 
and certain, a situation that may otherwise make us regress to Angst.  What 
we have is a variant of the fundamental theme in the political myth: a 
struggle between good and evil. The myth makes these boundaries more 
simple and concrete, thereby allowing the audience to provide significance 
to the attack and their relation to it. It therefore cannot be an event that is 
indifferent to them within the vast “absolutism of reality”, despite the 
likelihood that the audience would not have known Rigby or his family 
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directly. The concreteness of the relation between audience and event also 
eliminates the potential for Angst as it no longer appears to be a random and 
meaningless occurrence of violence, but part of a larger conflict between 
Britain its enemies. While it may cause more definite emotions such as fear 
and anger which have a direct object this is (as Kierkegaard would have 
surmised) preferable to the directionless condition of Angst. In sum, the 
work on myth was evoked in order to enable the audience to ground a sense 
of significance to the events which allowed them to maintain collective self-
narrative consistency that typifies a state of ontological security.  
The day after the murder of Lee Rigby, Deputy Prime Minister Nick 
Clegg gave a speech to a multi-faith audience at the Hugh Cubitt Peabody 
Centre in Islington. As the Deputy Prime Minister and leader of a party in a 
coalition government, it is important that Clegg’s speeches are also 
analysed.  The event was organised hastily in an attempt to display unity 
following the attack. Clegg praised all the people for attending, not least 
because it brought people together at a time of severe anxiety in which 
people were asking themselves “searching questions in London and across 
the country today.”425 Due to the nature of this event, Clegg was keen to 
separate what he perceived as a “perverted” version of Islam that was used 
to justify these murders: 
Because let’s be clear. People who inflict such random, 
savage violence in the name of some entirely warped 
ideology or some entirely perverted concept of religion in 
the way that we have seen on our television screens… As 
the Prime Minister quite rightly said, what we heard from 
these two individuals was a total unqualified betrayal of 
Islam, a religion of peace was being distorted, turned 
upside down and inside out, perverted in the cause of an 
abhorrent and violent set of intentions from those 
individuals.
426
 
Clegg subsequently quotes from the verse 32 chapter 5 of the 
Qur’an, which says “If anyone kills a human being it shall be as though he 
killed all mankind whereas if anyone saves a life it shall be as though he 
saved the whole of mankind”.427 This interpretation, read literally, renders 
the actions of Rigby’s attackers to be contrary to the teachings of Islam. 
Indeed, in Clegg’s words, it is a “betrayal” of Islam, so much so that it 
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turned the religion “upside down and inside out”, in such a fashion as to 
make it unrecognisable to its adherents. In doing this, Clegg separates this 
perverted form of Islam away from the legitimate and good form of Islam 
followed by people in the room he gave the speech to. This aspect of the 
speech was to shift the perverted form of Islam as far away from the deictic 
centre – which encompasses good Muslims and others – as possible. 
Clegg’s speech also discusses the affront to the ontological security of 
Londoners that the attack has caused. While Cameron also touches on this 
(see above), Clegg is far more direct when he points out that the attack had 
been “all the more unsettling… because the individuals concerned dressed, 
spoke, appeared to all intents and purposes like so many other young 
Londoners that we might come across every day of the week.”428 As section 
1.4 elaborates further, a crucial part of ontological security is having clear 
established routines, and that one can make certain assumptions about 
ourselves, others, and our places in the world. The fact that the attackers 
were dressed in hoodies, jeans, and spoke with south London accents was 
constructed as an affront to these basic assumptions. As all research into 
ontological security would surmise, when these basic assumptions are 
shattered it can be deeply distressing and anxiety-inducing for individuals. 
Finally, Clegg addresses the fear that people were feeling at the time, and 
makes a plea for carrying on: 
We have a choice to either allow that powerful corrosive 
feeling of fear [this may be understood as anxiety in the 
existential literature] to seep into every second and 
minute and hour of our lives or we can make a choice 
that we’re not going to change our behaviour. We’re not 
going to disrupt normal life. We’re going to continue our 
life as before. We’re going to continue to reach out to 
each other. We’re going to continue to look people in the 
eye. We’re going to continue to be the diverse 
community that we are, and you have made that choice 
by coming to this event [bold: mine].
429
 
 
Clegg begins four consecutive sentences with either “we’re not 
going” or “we’re going” in a commanding tone. This use of repetition and 
parallelism was strategically similar to Churchill’s “we will fight them on 
the beaches” in its repetition and intention to charter a clear and 
unambiguous course of action. Clegg uses drama in his speech in order to 
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ironically mobilise people towards normality. This also has undertones of 
the “stiff-upper lip” narrative (for more on this, see section 4.3).  This 
means Clegg does much of what is discussed in the  theoretical framework 
outlined in chapter 1. In his appeal for calmness, normality, and resilience, 
Clegg seeks to reduce the acuteness of perceived threats, whether in terms 
of worry about somatic harm resulting from similar attacks or in the loss of 
a sense of collective self and established routines. This is a classic example 
of invoking the work on myth as a way of ontologically securitising. Indeed, 
in this case, the act of ontologically securitising is a way of finding 
significance (Bedeutsamkeit). Clegg’s speech is also far more directly 
concerned with the phenomenological experiences of the audience 
themselves. In other words, he is concerned directly with their “being-in-
the-world” and how “being” (in the sense of Dasein) functions as “being-
with” (Mitsein). Via the work on myth, Clegg hopes to use the conflict with 
the violent radical Islamic other to strengthen Dasein’s relation with others. 
This may translate into concrete actions such as openness, tolerance, 
friendship, all of which were displayed in the room in which Clegg 
delivered his speech. 
In the first full Commons Debate on the attack on 3
rd
 June 2013, 
David Cameron gave a statement on the murder of Lee Rigby and the 
security measures that would take place following it. He began first by 
condemning the attacks unreservedly: 
What happened on the streets of Woolwich shocked and 
sickened us all. It was a despicable attack on a British 
soldier who stood for our country and our way of life, 
and it was a betrayal of Islam and of the Muslim 
communities who give so much to our country. There 
is nothing in Islam that justifies acts of terror, and I 
welcome the spontaneous condemnation of the attack 
from mosques and Muslim community organisations 
across our country. We will not be cowed by terror, and 
terrorists who seek to divide us will only make us 
stronger and more united in our resolve to defeat 
them [bold: mine].
430
 
 
Cameron uses person deixis and metonymy to argue that the attack 
on Rigby was an attack on our values and way of life, which Rigby himself 
represented. Rigby came to symbolise more than just a person or even a 
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soldier, but a representation of “our way of life”. The statement “our way of 
life” invokes the integrative aspect of myth by person deixis first (our), and 
also implies all images of familiarity, from our politics, society, friends, 
family and activities we may enjoy doing. In other words, those conditions 
that orientate us towards finding significance for our being-in-the-world 
were challenged by this attack on Rigby, no matter if we were directly 
connected to him or not. A similar situation is the case for Islam and 
Muslims (who seem to also be separated from other Britons by implication), 
who have seen their faith, and the things that make their “being-in-the-
world” (and beyond it) betrayed. Yet despite these grave transgressions 
against us which are intended to cause divisions, Cameron reminds the 
audience that we will remain united and steadfast against the enemy, 
thereby invoking the integrative aspect of myth by appealing to its 
mobilising aspect. The events in Woolwich are therefore not an event that 
occurred somewhere “out there” in the “absolutism of reality”, but were part 
of the core aspect of the work on myth: the irreconcilable conflict between 
good and evil in which we are all involved. 
Cameron moves on to condemn the “callous and abhorrent” crime 
which the attackers had tried to justify by an “extremist ideology that 
perverts and warps Islam to create a culture of victimhood and justify 
violence [bold: mine].”431 “Pervert” and “Warp” tend to be the verbs chosen 
by Cameron to decry and condemn those who interpret Islam in this way 
and use it to justify violence. Cameron also argues that “we”(person deixis) 
must tackle extremism in all its forms, and not just violent extremism As 
Cameron puts it with usage of metaphor, “it is as if there is a conveyor belt 
to radicalisation that has poisoned their minds with sick and perverted 
ideas [bold: mine].”432 The response is to work together to defeat it: “we 
need to dismantle this process at every stage – in schools, colleges and 
universities, on the internet, in our prisons and wherever it takes place.”433 
Cameron subsequently reinforced this point by announcing a newly created 
taskforce on tackling extremism and radicalisation would investigate 
whether rules on charities were too lax, allowing extremists to “prosper”, 
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whether enough was being done to disrupt groups inciting hatred and 
violence, whether enough was being done to tackle radicalisation on 
university campuses, the internet, and in prisons. He also questioned 
whether enough was being done in informal education centres to prevent 
radicalisation, and whether they are doing enough to help mosques expel 
extremists and recruit imams “who understand Britain”.434 Cameron makes 
it clear that, while the responsibility of the murder lies with those who 
committed it, all of us have a responsibility to “do all we can to tackle the 
poisonous ideology that is perverting young minds.”435 With these 
statements, Cameron directly evokes the mobilising and integrative aspects 
of the work on myth:  everybody all over society is embroiled within this 
conflict and all have a responsibility to take action to ensure victory. 
Cameron extends the deictic centre (i.e., from the legitimate position in 
which he is speaking) to the entirety of society. He makes the threat appear 
more real, concrete, and one which should guide our relation to one another. 
This iteration of place deixis expands the deictic centre to encompass the 
entire country, thereby reducing any sense of geographical or spatial 
distance that they may perceive exists between them and the issues 
described by Cameron. Put more simply, Cameron ensures that this conflict 
affects everyone wherever they are and that it is their duty to act. 
Cameron’s statement was well received by the House of Commons. 
The leader of the Labour party opposition, Ed Miliband, praised the 
response of the Government and indicated his support for the measures. 
Miliband in particular reserved praise for members of the public, and 
especially Ingrid Loyau-Kennett, who had intervened to try and protect Lee 
Rigby. Loyau-Kennett, and other local residents in Woolwich, were the 
“true face of our country [bold: mine]”436 – face being a metaphor to 
represent the fundamental values of the country. He also resolutely 
condemned those who had tried to stoke up division in the community and 
justify their “own-hate filled agenda and attempt to ignite violence by 
pitting community against community”. He finishes with a rallying call for 
unity: 
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Whatever the origin and motive of terrorists, our response 
will be the same—the British people will never be 
intimidated. Across every faith and every community, 
every part of the country is united, not divided, in its 
abhorrence of the murder of Lee Rigby. We have seen 
people try to divide us with such acts before. They 
have failed, and they will always fail [bold: mine].
437
 
 
Ed Miliband is consistent with other left-leaning commentators in 
emphasising the need to similarly condemn extremist movements seeking to 
exploit these divisions, most notably the English Defence League (EDL). 
Miliband also seeks to evoke the cognitive aspect of the work on myth by 
comparing the recent attacks to those who have also attempted to divide by 
“such acts” before. This means that this attack is the latest episode in a 
struggle that Britons have endured for generations.  Miliband here expresses 
the cognitive aspect of the work on myth via time deixis. He tries to 
persuade the audience that the attack can be interpreted within an 
established cognitive framework that associates terrorist attacks as part of a 
long-line of occurrences continually resisted by Britons. Via person deixis, 
Miliband simultaneously evokes the integrative aspect of myth by referring 
to the invariable distinction between “they” and the British people, who will 
not be intimidated (perhaps also evoking British resilience, see section 4.2). 
Adebolajo and Adebowale were by implication disassociated from Britain 
and Britishness and were instead equivocated with the perpetrators of 
previous attacks. Miliband attempts to portray an inspiring image of all 
united together in resilience to and condemnation of the grotesque act of 
violence perpetrated against Rigby. He does this via the mobilising aspect of 
myth which, while not necessarily explicitly promising victory, does 
promise that the enemy will “fail” to divide Britons. This aspect of myth 
thereby simultaneously ontologically (re)secures people and their relations 
to other groups, where there may otherwise have been the threat of division. 
Put in more existential terminology, “being-with” is not estranged from 
others, but can remain content in the knowledge/assumption that their 
established trust-relations are intact, rather than subject to the randomness 
that occurs in the feeling of Angst. 
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After the initial exchange, Cameron responded to a series of 
questions about the attack. He stressed the importance of cross-party unity 
and attracting the best experts to deal with these issues, and he even 
responded to Labour’s Hazel Blears MP by offering to invite her onto the 
newly established taskforce.
438
 Labour MP Simon Danczuk spoke of the 
solidarity felt by his constituents with the Armed Forces and Rigby’s family 
and friends, and Cameron responded with agreement, warning that the 
“terrorists who think that they will be able to divide us or scare us actually 
just bring us together.”439 Liberal Democrat MP Simon Hughes asked the 
Prime Minister to be careful to avoid “kneejerk” responses to the crisis, and 
to ensure that the Muslim community is supported in denouncing the 
behaviour of the extremists and also to support those who attack in the 
Muslim community.
440
 While Cameron acknowledges the need to avoid 
“kneejerk responses” he makes some caveats  
 
We do not want immediate legislative responses, but on 
the other hand, I think that we must ask ourselves some 
pretty searching questions. All of us in the House 
condemn this poisonous narrative, condemn this 
perversion of Islam and condemn this extremist 
narrative, but are we doing enough to ensure that we 
snuff it out in our prisons, colleges or university 
campuses? Are we doing enough to confront it and 
defeat it, online and elsewhere? I think that the 
answer to that is no. I think that there is more work to 
be done, and that we should do it in good order [bold: 
mine].
441
   
  
What Cameron does here - with some rather casual yet dramatic 
language – is mobilise place deixis. He places the battlefield in which this 
conflict is being engaged in multiple locations, including prisons, colleges, 
universities, and even online. He acknowledges that “we”442 (person deixis) 
are not doing enough, and must thereby mobilise ourselves together in order 
to defeat this perceived enemy. Bob Stewart MP asked whether the task 
force for tackling extremism will tackle terrorists who “come from and are 
sustained by people around them”, to which Cameron starkly responded:  
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It is not enough to target and go after violent extremists 
after they have become violent. We have to drain the 
swamp which they inhabit. That means looking at the 
process of radicalisation on our campuses. It means 
looking at Islamic centres that have been taken over by 
extremists and gone wrong. It means looking at those 
mosques that are struggling to throw out the extremists 
and helping them in the work that they are doing. It 
means going through all the elements of the conveyor 
belt to radicalisation and ensuring that we deal with 
them. That is what is important. That is the work that 
needs to be done [bold: mine].
443
 
 
Cameron’s usage of metaphors is often creative, and metaphor is 
certainly an important indicator of the figurative language of myth (see 
section 3.2).  Cameron’s use of the metaphor “draining the swamp” is 
powerful because it signifies via place deixis an undesirable and ultimately 
disgusting place in which terrorists and their sympathisers dwell. 
Furthermore, the place deixis indicates that these swamps exist in places that 
are often familiar to most Britons, including university campuses and 
mosques. Draining these swamps would reveal the identities of these 
terrorists and their sympathisers, and allow for alternative arrangements to 
be developed where the “swamp” once was. Finally, Cameron repeats his 
“conveyor belt” metaphor to imply that there is a systemic, almost 
dehumanising and one-track process in which people exit “true” Islam 
towards “false” Islam, and normally violence. 
These exchanges between Cameron and his MPs reveal Cameron’s 
determination to interpret events as part of the established political myth of 
Britain’s existential conflict with a violent form of radical Islam and 
Muslims. This is because it allows him to explicitly, concretely and simply 
dispel any ambiguity about the causes of these attacks and how the 
perpetrators and their like should be judged.  He seeks to construct a sense 
of significance (Bedeutsamkeit) for the public by making it clear that these 
events are not indifferent or unconnected to them, but are occurring around 
them in familiar and seemingly harmless places. Campuses, schools, 
collages, religious institutions, are all places where this threat may thrive, 
and since many people are closely associated to these places, it is their 
responsibility to contribute to tackling the menace. 
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Finally, in response to a question by Conservative MP Andrew 
Bridgen, who quotes the line “Kill one, intimidate a nation” from  Chairman 
Mao’s Little Red Book – which he refers to as a “terrorist handbook”. 
Bridgen asks whether he agreed that “our nation” will “never be intimidated 
by acts of extremists, be they from the Muslim Community, the English 
Defence League, or anybody else?”444 Cameron responds in the affirmative, 
by invoking the past struggles against terrorist invoked by Britain: 
 
Regrettably, this country has suffered from terrorists 
over many years. We suffered dreadfully at the hands of 
the IRA, but I think that taught us a lesson that if we 
stand true to our principles, we stand up for freedom and 
democracy and the terrorists can never win [bold: 
mine].
445
 
 
Cameron here evokes the “British resilience” narrative discussed in 
section 4.3. He does this via time deixis, person deixis and the integrative 
aspect of myth. “We”, meaning everyone who is British, suffered 
historically from terrorists, most dreadfully at the hands of the IRA. 
Cameron here draws a direct comparison between the incidents of terrorism 
from past and present. Whether intentionally or not, David Cameron here 
evokes time deixis and provides high levels of entitativity to “terrorists”. He 
categorises the IRA and the terrorists who murdered Lee Rigby as if they 
are one and the same, thereby necessitating the previous successful 
responses. This simplification can satisfy the existential questions that 
uncertainty raises. Where there is uncertainty, Cameron not only provides 
the sense of significance that myth necessitates, but a clear cognitive 
schema which provides the audience the formula to defeat the enemy. That 
is, standing up for “our principles” of “freedom and democracy” which, are 
absolutely core to the integrative aspect of this political myth, and are 
outlined in section 4.3. 
6.3 Newspaper Reaction 
 
In this section I analyse how newspapers responded to the attacks. I 
begin first with the right-leaning papers of the Daily Mail and The 
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Telegraph. Beginning with the former, we find many references to the 
murder as an assault on British values. Referring to the incident as a 
“grotesque attack on Britain’s values,” one article refers to the “terrible 
irony” that he Lee Rigby had survived Afghanistan where 444 of his “heroic 
colleagues” had perished, only to be murdered while wearing a Help for 
Heroes t-shirt in a London suburban street. He was targeted for the one 
reason alone: “his devotion to the Army and protecting the British public.” 
The article goes on to lament the fact that “we give succor to those who hate 
us and our values.” In a repeat of the kinds of questions asked following 7/7, 
the article reads: “Why, when police, so in thrall to political correctness, are 
so quick to pounce on ‘hate crimes’ by indigenous Britons, are they so loath 
to prosecute the zealots who wish to see our freedoms destroyed?”446 This 
repeats the narrative that was prevalent in the Daily Mail in response to the 
7/7 attacks (as section 5.3 reveals): that we are not being tough enough to 
defeat the enemy in this existential conflict.  We allow these enemies to 
attack “our values” and, in this case, it has resulted in the death of an 
individual who is the embodiment of British values, who had served his 
country with distinction against the enemy. Instead of standing up for his 
rights and those like him, the police are in “thrall to political correctness” 
and are more concerned with “hate crimes”.  Some of these themes were 
repeated in an article on the subsequent day, but in a more positive tone as it 
praises David Cameron’s initiative to set up an “extremism taskforce” as an 
“important first step” to “rid the country of the scourge of radicalisation.”447 
These comments from the Daily Mail are representative of the general 
tendency (also seen in chapter 5) to exemplify the stark binary nature of the 
conflict. For the Daily Mail, and Melanie Phillips in particular, Britons must 
be resolute in defence of their values. The attack was a gross assault on 
British values, which (as the previous article also indicated) are embodied 
by Rigby and what he and his peers in the Armed Forces stood for. Yet, as it 
stands, Britain is currently displaying severe weaknesses brought about by 
being in thrall to political correctness. “Indigenous” Britons are condemned 
and punished for “hate crimes” yet the enemy, who ultimately wish to 
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destroy Britain and its good values, is not given the same treatment. This is 
an example of the mobilising aspect of political myth being invoked by 
person deixis. Person deixis is present when the articles reinforce 
caricatures of the terrorist who hates “our values” and weak police force 
(externally influenced in most cases) being unable to act, allowing the 
terrorists free reign.   
These articles make heavy usage of metaphor and synecdoche to 
draw connections between the Rigby and the broader work on myth. Rigby 
is the personification of British values, and his name and constitutive 
features (i.e., being a soldier, being a hero) can be used to recall the entirety 
of narratives surrounding Britain’s existential conflict with radical Islam. 
These positive connotations which are associated with Rigby are invoked in 
order to draw ire against a currently weak political order that has still failed 
- even 8 years after 7/7 – to overcome its obsession with political 
correctness, ultimately preventing Britain from defeating its insidious 
enemy.  Yet, according to many in the Daily Mail, we must acknowledge 
what is not politically correct in order to achieve victory. Melanie Phillips 
argues that this extremism is “religious in nature” and arises from a literal 
interpretation of the Qur’an. While most British Muslims “want to live 
peacefully and enjoy the benefits of Western culture” [bold: mine], there 
is a “fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran” which is “being spouted by 
hate preachers in Britain and on the internet, and is steadily radicalizing 
thousands of young British Muslims.” She castigates those who claim that 
the violence had little or nothing to do with Islam, pointing out that the 
killers cited parts of the Qur’an to justify their actions. According to her, 
saying that they are not linked is like saying that the “medieval Inquisition, 
for example. Had nothing to do with the Catholic Church, but was just the 
product of a few warped and deluded individuals.” Indeed, government 
officials always refused to admit that this was a “religious” war, which 
indicates that they do not understand the power of religious fanaticism. 
While she acknowledges that all religions can have fanatics, she believes 
Islam is particularly vulnerable to it as it did not have a “reformation” like 
Christianity did, although many “enlightened” Muslims in Britain would 
like to see their religion “reformed.” 
176 
 
 As is common Phillips’ articles, she blames the “failure to 
understand all this” on the “widespread terror of being thought 
‘Islamophobic’ or ‘racist.” Finally, “the paralysis caused by the excesses of 
the human rights culture” may prevent legislative changes as people are 
afraid of “doing the terrorists job for them” by “undermining our own hard-
won liberties,” claims which Phillips decries as “vacuous and lethal 
nonsense” and that “those who refuse to acknowledge the true nature of this 
threat are doing the terrorists’ jobs for them.” Unless Britain awakes from 
its “self-destructive torpor” then “all those who love civilised values,- 
Muslim and non-Muslim alike – will be the losers.”448 Phillips evokes the 
drama of the work on myth by reminding the reader of the existential nature 
of the conflict, but also how we are inadvertently hurting ourselves as much 
(if not more) than our enemies. This is the case to the extent that opposition 
to proposed legislative changes was “vacuous and lethal nonsense” and, 
more strikingly, those who are opposed them are in fact helping the 
terrorists. She expresses a cognitive schema which simplifies the situation 
via person deixis into “good and bad Muslims”, with the former enjoying 
“western civilization” while the latter irrevocably seeks to destroy it, 
alongside strong and legitimate or weak and illegitimate responses. Phillips’ 
dramatic language attempts to evoke a sense of anger in the audience at this 
sense of injustice, and warn the audience that failure to act threatens not just 
the physical safety of Britons, but the values that they, and most Muslims, 
share. This is about the collective self-narrative that exists and which, for 
many, grants a sense of ontological security. This example of the work on 
myth seeks to inspire a sense of significance (Bedeutsamkeit) in order to 
mobilise people in defence of these conditions which otherwise enable 
people to be ontologically secure. It does this by constructing significance in 
the form of a conflict which, while threatening, also gives the audience the 
opportunity to uphold and defend their values. These are values that 
commonly unite Britons and, in principle, nobody is exempt from the 
responsibility of defending them. 
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Peter McKay also follows the Daily Mail theme of lamenting the 
passive tolerance that the country has towards Islamic extremists. He 
condemns the BBC for allowing giving Abu Nusaybah a platform on its 
show Newsnight, who he claims was an associate of Rigby’s killers. McKay 
reports that Nusaybah was arrested following the interview, which civil 
rights expert Professor Anthony Glees had referred to as “disturbing”. 
However, for McKay, asks whether “our tendency to blame ourselves for 
crimes committed against us – and paralysis in the face of our enemies – 
even more disturbing?”449 McKay calls for more serious action, such as the 
detention of preacher Anjem Choudary, who he refers to as “another BBC 
performer”. He lambasts Cameron for setting up a “catchy-sounding new 
Government body”, but questions whether we need  “another silly 
acronym”. Indeed setting up a new body “looks like a way of avoiding 
decisions – or spreading responsibility if the decisions you do take prove to 
be counter-productive”.450  McKay goes on to lambast how Britain 
“pathetically” supports the prosecution of “hate crimes” if it is rude about 
the Welsh or Goths, but not “if it’s lethal hatred expressed against being 
British”., McKay warns that the present  failure to “confront and punish 
evildoers tears at the fabric of society, diminishing us all” and that “telling 
ourselves we are civilised is a poor response”. The only hope for the future 
is that “new generations of Muslims will come to treasure the freedoms they 
enjoy here, if not elsewhere, and rise against those who defile with them 
with violence and hate propaganda”.451  
McKay and Phillips both strongly advocate a resolute defence of 
British values (section 4.3) against the threat of the other. Both accept the 
fundamental narrative core of the work on myth: that there is an existential 
threat posed to Britain by violent radical Muslims and that this threat must 
ultimately be defeated. Both attempt to concretise the sense of Britishness 
and the threat posed to it and the various injustices that the former is 
experiences owing to the weakness of the government and a culture of 
political correctness. Both articles also aim to re-affirm the distinction 
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between the “good” and “bad” Muslim (section 4.2) in an attempt to 
convince the audience that the former must actively embody British values 
and, more importantly, contribute to defeating the threats that oppose it. 
McKay in particular emphasises this by invoking the mobilising aspect of 
myth through time deixis when he expresses hope that future generations of 
Muslims will rise up in defence of British values against “those who defile 
them with hate propaganda”.452 The overarching point of agreement among 
many journalists of the Daily Mail is that not enough is being done, and that 
action must be taken swiftly and decisively.   
Surprisingly, this narrative is also repeated in an article by Liberal 
Democrat Lord Alex Carlile. On 24
th
 May 2013, Carlile wrote in the Daily 
Mail with a staunch criticism of the hostility of Nick Clegg and other Lib 
Dems to much of the Government’s counter-terrorism legislation. Carlile 
begins with a metaphor-laden description of the horror of the murder and its 
significance in British history: 
 
 I am certain the name of Drummer Rigby and the 
method of his cruel assassination will become ingrained 
in British history. That brave young man was the 
essence of the Army and other soldiery that protects 
us all and our country – strong, lion-hearted, disciplined 
yet full of life. The cruelty he endured in death will not 
quell the drums of his famous regimental band. Soldiers 
rightly will remain proud of their craft and calling. Nor 
will the sound of his own drum be silenced, as the 
background and consequences of the case are examined 
[bold: mine].
453
 
 
The “sound of his own drum” metaphorically represents the 
background of policy responses to these issues, and it is from this metaphor 
that Carlile launches his attack on the Clegg and other Liberal Democrats. 
Carlile cites the reluctance of the Liberal Democrats to adopt the 
Government’s Communications Data Bill, which some critics have 
“casually and incautiously labelled as a “’Snoopers’ Charter’”.454 The bill 
would have given extensive powers to the government to monitor the online 
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communications of suspected terrorists. Clegg, however, vetoed it following 
its announcement in the 2013 Queen’s Speech. Carlile argues that the police 
and prosecuting authorities should be given the right to take “close looks at 
websites that encourage violent Islamism”, which his “a heresy that disgusts 
every honourable British Muslim.”455 Carlile asks Government’s to “not 
duck” the challenge of implementing this legislation for the memory of 
Rigby who, as the beginning of the article surmises, represents the bravery 
and heroism of the armed forces. Doing otherwise would also betray good 
Muslims (he uses the word “honourable”) who, by implication, cannot be 
reconciled with bad Muslims and would thereby support this legislation.  
Another editorial in the Daily Mail calls for more measures to be 
taken to tackle radicalisation in the UK, and praises David Cameron’s 
announcement that he would create a task force to tackle extremism. It 
highlights that this is necessary to defeat the “scourge of radicalisation”, and 
that not enough had been done up to that point. In particular, it criticises 
universities as being places where radicalisation is not challenged. The 
problem is that Britain treasures freedom of speech, and so “our only 
powers against them are if they break any laws, such as committing public 
order offences or inciting racial hatreds”. As such, this means that more 
must be done across society to challenge radicalisation in the first place. It 
praises the Muslim Council of Britain in particular for its unqualified 
condemnation of these attacks, and “continuing its commendable record of 
distancing the Muslim population from extremists.”456 What we see here is 
the Daily Mail, perhaps uncharacteristically calmly, providing a sense of 
reassurance by praising Cameron’s leadership, but also clear call for action 
to tackling radicalisation in what is an otherwise highly uncertain and 
anxiety-inducing time. However, it still does this by invoking the core 
aspects of the work on myth (the existential conflict) and merging it more 
specifically with place deixis, by representing universities as places in 
which radicalisation is allowed to proliferate.   This article also takes the 
first steps towards assessing the role of the Prime Minister and his 
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leadership following the attacks. This theme is developed further by James 
Forsyth, who offered praise to the Prime Minister for his leadership: 
 
What happened in Woolwich has, for now, changed the tone of our 
politics and, the intra-Tory arguments about the EU and gay marriage 
seem rather small in the light of what has happened there. In these 
moments of national crisis, Cameron rises above his rivals, both 
internal and external. Partly this is a consequence of the office: he is 
Prime Minister, they are not. But it is also the man. One of his 
weaknesses as a Conservative leader – the fact he is surprisingly un-
political – is a strength in moments like this. It means he finds it easier 
to strike the right, national note. One of those who sees him at close 
quarters observes that ‘it is in these kind of situations that he really kicks 
in’ [bold: mine].457 
 
At the time of the attack, David Cameron was under pressure to 
clarify whether there would be a referendum on Britain’s membership of the 
European Union and a bill to introduce same-sex marriage in the UK was in 
the process of being passed. Just as in the case of Tony Blair’s response to 
7/7 (section 5.2), Forsyth’s article demonstrates the perceived importance of 
a leader showing leadership in these moments of crisis. Although Forsyth 
points out that Cameron “rising above his rivals” is partly because he is 
Prime Minister – which we may understand as an example of Cameron 
having symbolic capital – but mainly his own personal characteristics. The 
fact that he is supposedly non-political in these situations means he knows 
how to “strike the right, national note”. This is crucial as, in a time of crisis 
and uncertainty, where the collective sense of ontological security has been 
damaged, Cameron is able to provide this re-assurance in a calm and 
effective manner.   
Nonetheless, the praise for Cameron’s leadership is not universally 
accepted in the Daily Mail.  On 27
th
 May, In an article entitled “When they 
said Fight them on the Beaches, Dave….” - a clear reference to Winston 
Churchill’s speeches in the British resilience narrative discussed in section 
4.3 - Richard Littlejohn slammed Cameron’s decision to go on holiday.458 
He begins by reminding readers of the “Crisis, what crisis?” headline in The 
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Sun when Labour Prime Minister Jim Callaghan returned from Guadeloupe 
during the 1979 “Winter of Discontent”. Although he had not actually said 
those words, Callaghan “might as well have done” as “they encapsulated the 
public perception and were to prove his epitaph”. The perception at the time 
was that Callaghan had left his country during a time of crisis, and this had 
now been repeated by David Cameron. Littlejohn asks what to make of 
pictures of “Call Me  Dave ‘chillaxing’” in Ibiza in the wake of the murder 
of Lee Rigby?” Indeed, while “Dave and Sam Cam [referring to his wife 
Samantha Cameron] are photographed sipping coffee on a Mediterranean 
terrace, the family of Lee Rigby are laying flowers at the spot where he was 
slain”.459 Despite the crisis at home, which had involved the Bomber 
Command Memorial being desecrated and Mosques being attacked, the 
Prime Minister was “swanning round a Mediterranean island famous for 
hedonism and drug-fuelled races”. For Littlejohn, it’s as if “Churchill had 
issued his ‘We will fight them on the beaches’ speech from a sun-lounger in 
Barbados… Everybody back on the landing craft”.   
With this, Littlejohn directly and unflatteringly compares the 
performances of Cameron to those of Churchill during the Blitz, just as the 
same comparison was made for Tony Blair in the aftermath of the 7/7 
attacks (section 5.2). The comparison evokes the British resilience narrative 
images of the Blitz in particular, and emphasises the importance that they 
still have in British identity today (section 4.2). Despite the contingencies of 
both events, the article mobilises time and person deixis to imply that they 
are equivalent or, at least, the roles of the people involved are equivalent. 
Churchill’s example became a framework through which to read the present 
situation; a source of pride for many Britons at a time where significance 
(Bedeutsamkeit) was needed in order for people to (re-)establish a sense of 
ontological security, preventing a lapse into Angst.  The Daily Mail thereby 
at some stages touches upon all the main themes of the work on myth. The 
underpinning myth of all the articles is that Britain is facing an existential 
conflict with the violent radical Islam. The variant of the myth espoused in 
the Daily Mail in both the case of the Murder of Lee Rigby and 7/7 is a 
belief that we are being too soft on our enemies and in thrall to political 
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correctness. This is broadly consistent among other right-wing papers, but 
the Daily Mail is particularly vociferous on it.   
Similar themes also appear in The Telegraph. The day after the 
murder of Lee Rigby, “hearts were back in mouths” when a Plane travelling 
from Pakistan was diverted to London Stansted Airport following a 
disturbance on board.
460
 Despite the fears the incident was resolved without 
harm, and The Telegraph view was for us to be “thankful” and even 
“optimistic”. This was “not just because of what the tragedy in Woolwich 
said about Britain’s strengths”, but because “we appear to have come to 
terms with the latest terrorist threat to this country, and to have devised 
broadly the right response.”461 This was after the failures of the previous 
Labour government and the “philosophical tug-of-war” that followed which 
resulted in many on the Left coming “to accept that their multiculturalist 
orthodoxy was actually setting community against community”. Under the 
coalition, there was a “Prime Minister determined to end the conciliation – 
via Prevent – of those most hostile to our values.”462 It also meant that the 
government restored civil liberties, and trusted the “free press” that was so 
important to this country. Indeed it is our open and tolerant nature that leads 
our society to be “attractive enough that others want to be part of it.” All 
this said, there is no cause for complacency: 
Islamist networks remain in place, and their 
propagandists have infiltrated charities, prisons and most 
especially universities. Eradicating their influence will 
take years, if not decades, as will opening up the closed 
communities whose links to their homelands (fostered via 
satellite television) are far stronger than to the society 
around them. But again, it is better – and more British – 
to do this via persuasion than coercion [bold: mine].
463
 
 
This article attempts to find significance (Bedeutsamkeit) at a time of 
insecurity by re-articulating narratives of British values (section 4.2). By 
reminding the audience of British values that are in fact so attractive to 
others that they also “want to be a part of it”, the article hopes to lift people 
into they are unambiguously on the side of good. Nonetheless, the article 
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still evokes the mobilising aspect of myth through place and time deixis 
when it describes how close the enemy to the audience. Familiar places such 
as universities and charities are places where the enemy is located, (place 
deixis) and it will take a substantial period of time to ultimately overcome 
them (time deixis). While this may induce fear and concern, it also provides 
a direct means through which one can be “in-relation-to” the enemy and our 
allies. Put more specifically, the integrative aspect of myth is augmented in 
this article through concretising the “being” of self/other and, particularly, 
the places in which the other can be located and defeated. Despite the 
gravity of this conflict, the article reassures the reader that Britain has 
pragmatically learned how to confront the threat and has re-established its 
values, for which we can feel “a certain amount of quiet pride.”464  
In another article, Frazer Nelson paraphrased the political 
philosopher Hannah Arendt by referring to the Woolwich attacks as “case 
study in the banality – and idiocy – of evil”.465 Nelson discredits the 
Woolwich attackers, who had entered an extensive rant recorded on camera 
by passers-by, as having “no discernible agenda” and being “deranged”.  
Indeed who hoped to find “some demonic logic would have been 
disappointed: none of it made sense”. Nelson believes it is so bad that the 
authorities should have no concern if people wish to view it. All it has done 
is “hardened the outrage of thousands of British Muslims”. Nelson claims 
that the theme of Hannah Arendt’s Banality of Evil, which he understands as 
the “strange relationship between idiocy and evil”, is reflected in the current 
actions of violent jihadist attacks. Nelson cites Arendt’s view that Adolf 
Eichmann was just a near-robotic creation of Nazi bureaucracy who 
communicated in jargon. She was, according to him “a clown” but because 
the world wanted to see him as a monster, “his worst clowneries were 
hardly noticed and almost never reported.”466 Nelson argues that modern 
violent jihadist have also reveal this relationship between idiocy and evil. 
Richard Reid, a Muslim convert from London, who was arrested after 
failing to light fuse in a shoes bomb, is one example. He also mentions 
Umar Abdulmutallab, who set his underwear alight on a flight while trying 
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to detonate a bomb. Finally, he mentions Abdullah al-Asiri, who hid a bomb 
in his anus in an attempt to assassinate a Saudi minister, but only succeeded 
in blowing himself up while the minister “looked on, amazed and 
unhurt.”467 Nelson’s contribution evokes both the cognitive and integrative 
aspects of myth. He seeks to represent Adebolajo and Adebowale as 
representatives a generally stupid or mentally deficient grouping that have 
little to no connection with the audience. It is a way to further de-legitimise 
their cause, and this is often a feature of left-leaning responses (as discussed 
above).  
The mobilising aspect of myth was developed further in an editorial 
in the Telegraph the following day. The general argument in the article is 
that we must all (but politicians and civil servants in particular) show 
courage in confronting extremism,  We have often failed to do so due to 
“cultural anxieties” that have led to mosques, prisons and universities 
becoming “recruiting grounds for extremism”.468 The authorities need to be 
“bold enough to call religious extremism by its proper name” and this 
involves practical steps to stop preachers of hate being given platforms. This 
is similar to other articles, but the way its arguments are made is different 
since it bases them on the need to imitate the heroism of the Ingrid Loyau-
Kennett and the “Angels of Woolwich”: 
But have also witnessed inspirational scenes of courage. 
We should remember Cub Scout leader Ingrid Loyau-
Kennett, who jumped off a bus passing the carnage to see 
if she could use her first-aid skills to help. When she 
realised that the death was not an accident but 
deliberate, she confronted the perpetrators and talked 
to them in the hope of preventing them from 
attacking anyone else. Equally admirable were the 
“Angels of Woolwich”, Amanda Donnelly and her 
daughter Gemini Donnelly-Martin, who stayed with 
Drummer Rigby while he lay dying. Mrs Donnelly’s son 
later said: “She only wanted to help the poor guy – she’s 
a mum. That’s what mums do [bold: mine].”469   
 
And:  
A lesson that we can all take from the Woolwich attack is 
to imitate the bravery of the women who faced down 
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savagery in order to defend the innocent. If one good 
thing comes out of this horrific incident, let it be that we 
all finally have the courage to confront the preachers 
of hate in our midst [bold: mine].
470
 
 
These women are effectively heralded as heroes, defending what is 
fundamentally good (innocence) against the fundamentally evil (savagery) 
and we should use their example to inspire us to defeat the enemy. This 
dramatic statement is of particular importance to the mobilising aspect of 
the work on myth, which often requires figures of heroism and villainy. 
Their heroism is actually enhanced by quotes which display their humility 
and normality particularly from Gemini Donnelly-Martin’s son. The 
courage it took for these people to attend to Rigby and confront the terrorists 
is, however, inspiring for the rest of us. The article taps into the human need 
for significance (Bedeutsamkeit)  by firstly providing a “proper name” for 
the extremism and then positing ourselves as needing the courage to defeat 
it. It gives us a sense of purpose in what would otherwise be chaos of the 
unknown and a clear, solid guide for action. That is we follow the examples 
of the “Angels of Woolwich” and confront the “preachers of hate”.471 These 
ladies represent  
The Telegraph continues its focus Matthew d’Ancona praised David 
Cameron’s speech in the immediate aftermath of the attack, which was 
analysed in section 6.2. As d’Ancona states: 
… we have grown used to Cameron stepping up to the 
plate on such occasions, and expressing national 
solidarity at moments of high emotion. Hillsborough, 
Bloody Sunday, the Algerian siege, the death of Margaret 
Thatcher… time and again, the PM has displayed a 
sureness of touch, neither hamming it up nor ignoring the 
passions and pains of the moment. “The people who did 
this were trying to divide us,” he declared. “They should 
know something like this will only bring us closer 
together and make us stronger.” It is easy to take 
Cameron’s abilities in this respect for granted. But it is 
hard work getting the tone, content and delivery right. 
The speech, I am told, went through many drafts until the 
PM was satisfied.
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This praise is evidence that the role and tone of the leader in these 
moments of crisis is important. Unlike the criticisms offered of Cameron in 
the Daily Mail (above), this article expresses satisfaction at Cameron’s 
leadership in this situation, and the specific, contingent response he offered 
to a highly delicate situation. The fact that he is so capable of “stepping up 
to the plate” in situations of high emotion and capture the overall mood of 
the country demonstrates that he embodies the strong leadership required in 
such situations. 
Michael Burleigh criticised what he perceived as being a weak 
response from the government, who are too worried about the “mealy-
mouthed talk of community sensitivities” and argues that we must “try to do 
a few things more robustly than has been the case so far”.473  This involves 
clamping down on university free speech and prisons where gang cultures 
are allowed to thrive. He outlined three ways to tackle the threat. First, the 
problem needs a “laser-like focus on the overriding safety and security of 
the general public” and this means taking action regardless of the “vested 
interests” and “huff and puff” of universities, as “we have the whip hand in 
the form of the money we pay them.” Secondly, and perhaps most 
strikingly, Burleigh argues that we need to “revisit the Cold War notion of 
subversion, so that there are legal penalties for those who destroy our way 
of life, but who know how to stop short of incitement to murder”.474 Finally, 
he calls for a multi-agency enforcement of zero tolerance for “swaggering 
thugs” who “one can see on many London streets”. Their jail time “should 
be somewhere as far removed from their usual habitat as possible, so that 
they experience the alienation that many law-abiding people feel in their 
own environments.”475  This commentary from Burleigh evokes a core 
variant of the work on myth that tends to be predominately the concern of 
right-wing publications: a perceived culture of fear of offending people. He 
evokes the mobilising aspect of the work on myth with person deixis by 
arguing that “we” must take action against those who destroy “our way of 
life”, and this includes concrete enemies found within universities and 
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others who have “vested interest.” Indeed, Burleigh takes this so far as to 
suggest that we need to return to the notion of subversion. At the time of 
writing, the website of MI5 claims that the threat of subversion has 
“diminished sharply following the end of the Cold War” and so they “no 
longer undertake counter-subversion work” but would “resume doing so if 
our monitoring of emerging threats suggested an increase in the subversive 
threat”.476 What Burleigh is calling for these practices to be brought back in 
order to find those who are undermining “our way of life”. This would 
merely reflect the nature of the core fundamental point of the work on myth: 
that Britain is an existential conflict with a radical, violent, Muslim other.  
 These images of the existential conflict with the radical, violent, 
Muslim other were further developed in another article by Alan Judd in The 
Telegraph, entitled “How to spot a terrorist living in your neighbourhood”. 
The article was accompanied by a picture of a man wearing binoculars 
looking into the distance, and was written with the intention of offering 
people practical help to identify radicalised Muslims. The article responded 
to a call by the former director general of MI5, Dame Stella Rimington, for 
people to inform on neighbours they suspect of extremism. Clues to 
someone being radicalised are: 
A sudden ostentatious insistence on religious ritual, 
especially in a secular context (demands for prayer rooms 
where no other religion has them); a withdrawal from 
social interaction with women and disapproval of 
feminine dress. There may be a sudden obsession with 
physical fitness, more via outdoor adventure activities 
than team games. Someone may adopt traditional Arab 
dress or abruptly abandon it (so as not to attract 
attention). They might forbid or avoid music, collect 
jihadi material, withdraw from contact with non-Muslims 
or Muslims who are not extremist; there may be single-
issue conversation, vociferous hatred of the West and 
Israel, and perhaps attempted travel to troubled regions or 
misleading vagueness as to where they’ve been.477  
 
 Judd also outlines the profile of those likely to be radicalised. He 
states that it is mostly Muslim males aged 16-24, a third of whom were 
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unemployed, many were unmarried, and sometimes supported by women. 
British “home-grown terrorists” are less educated, of lower socio-economic 
status, with only a 31% attending higher education. Other statistics he 
mentions are that a quarter have criminal records, and a fifth were 
immigrants. These people had only a “superficial knowledge of Islam, using 
it as a veneer of justification for cultural and racial self-assertion.” It is there 
for an ideological rather than a religious process, and “you have to be just 
clever enough to do it and just stupid enough to believe in it.”478 Judd’s 
article evokes several core themes of the work on myth. First of all, it is 
intentionally designed to incite the mobilising aspect of myth; all of the 
public have a responsibility to get involved in the conflict and all are given 
direct guidelines for action. This satisfies the cognitive aspect of myth, but 
also develops the integrative aspect by attaching core, universal features to 
the perceived enemy “other”. By concretising the enemy in this manner, 
Judd hopes to (consciously or not) ensure that they become a high-entitative 
group with clear distinguishing features that allow people to readily identify 
them. Via place deixis, Judd ensures that the threat is not perceived as being 
concentrated to a distant location which bears little relevance to the reader, 
but that these individuals can be spotted by anyone (especially Muslim 
communities). This places the events away from the realms of indifference 
and towards significance (Bedeutsamkeit), and Judd ensures that this is 
augmented by a direct call for action in the work on myth.  
There are fewer articles about the murder of Lee Rigby in left-
leaning publications than there are on the right. For this reason, I draw from 
fewer sources than I did in my analysis of right-leaning articles. Beginning 
with the Daily Mirror, a commentator who is referred to as “Fleet Street 
Fox” returns to the theme of mental deficiency that features prominently in 
left-wing analyses of 7/7 (Section 5.3). Rather than deriding the actions as 
“evil” or glorifying it as “terrorism”, we should instead look at it as the 
actions of a small mentally challenged minority. 
The issue here is that the naturally troubled gravitate 
towards extreme causes.  They already dislike 
authority, they feel misunderstood, and they already 
want to kill people. The cause doesn’t matter to them; 
it’s just their excuse. When the cause is based on a 
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twisted interpretation of religion the crazies have a 
headstart, because they’re harder to spot among a body of 
people who all have the same invisible friend [bold: 
mine].
479
 
 
For Fleet Street Fox, these things cannot be solved by a political 
process as they would “just be rambling about” another problem next week. 
While they want to be “seen as terrorists”, this label flatters them, and they 
could just as easily be people “shouting at cars.” Mental health is a theme 
explored by numerous articles in left-leaning publications, and these include 
those that responded to the 7/7 attacks (section 5.3). By attributing mental 
deficiencies to the attackers, the author is able to remove any potential 
underlying semblance of legitimacy to their arguments and their cause. Via 
person deixis, the speaker situates him/herself within the deictic centre that 
incorporates the audience, and uses the poor mental health to distinguish 
everybody from “the crazies”. The article overall expresses and contributes 
to the integrative aspect of the work on myth by concretising the enemy 
attackers into a collective whole defined by mental deficiencies. This 
simultaneously ensures that they remain a high-entitative group that is a 
clearly and easily identifiable enemy to be overcome. Richard Kemp 
continues this strategy of delegitimisation with a strategy that is less-
concerned with the left-wing variants of the work on  myth, but more 
towards the fundamental claims: that British values (section 4.2) are under 
threat by these radical fanatics:  
Extremists in Britain will continue to attempt killings 
like this, and mass attacks like the one on the Boston 
marathon. Islamist extremists are at war with us for 
the long term. Whatever they say in their phoney 
propaganda this is not about Iraq or Afghanistan. 
They hate our liberal, democratic society and wish to 
destroy it from within. British soldiers should not have 
to face a 360 degree threat in Afghanistan only to come 
home and be slaughtered on their own streets.  The 
Government must pump cash into the police and 
intelligence services and insist on an increasingly hard 
line on sentencing terrorists [bold: mine].
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Kemp wishes to simplify the conflict by effacing any doubt about 
the potential legitimacy of the killers’ claims – which FleetStreetFox also 
does by referring to them as having mental deficiencies. Iraq and 
Afghanistan are irrelevant, for Kemp, as it is a hatred of the British values 
(4.2) of liberal democracy that motivates them. Kemp clearly evokes the 
fundamental narrative core of the work on myth: that Britain faces an 
existential conflict with a radical, violent form of Muslim, and that this must 
be overcome with collective action, much of which should be led by the 
government. Kemp evokes time deixis and person deixis to make clear that 
the attackers will strike again against “us”, and that this is because, 
fundamentally, they detest our values such as liberal democracy.    
Elsewhere, the Daily Mirror evokes the mobilising aspect of the 
work on myth to make it clear that “good” Muslims (see 4.2) can also play a 
crucial role in securing victory against the enemy. In an article entitled“ 
Real Muslims can Draw out Poison”,481 Paul Routledge argues that this was 
“not a Muslim atrocity”, but a “terrorist atrocity committed by men with 
twisted ideas” that are “not representative of the faith”.482 That said, 
Routledge does argue that the Muslims community has to do “much more” 
to “identify and inform the authorities of those in their midst who are 
showing clear signs of falling under the jihadist spell”.  While he is also 
critical of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, they “are not and can never be 
an excuse – much less a justification – for killing unarmed unsuspecting 
British servicemen on the streets of our capital city”. Routledge draws the 
distinction between good and bad Islam in the context of the threat posed by 
the English Defence League who, at the time, were growing in popularity 
alongside an increase in anti-Muslim hate crimes. He stresses that “it is not 
about hating Muslims” but about “the hatred of a fanatical minority for our 
way of life.” Routledge’s strategy to present these differences occurs 
through a strategy of person deixis, whereby good Muslims and the wider 
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British public are separated from these fanatics who are, in any case, not 
representative of Islam. Nonetheless, he asks Muslims to mobilise in order 
to weed out those who have fallen under the “jihadist spell”, as they “must 
know better than any MI5 officer sitting behind a desk in Millbank”.483 At a 
time of substantial fear and anxiety, where uncertainty of belonging may be 
felt by many Muslims and non-Muslims, Routledge’s words (intentionally 
or not) re-construct the consistency that ontologically secure individuals 
require, and also gives them a new sense of significance in the quest to 
defeat violent radical Islam (which is not representative of Muslims in any 
case). 
Nick Cohen in The Guardian attempts to equate the killers of Lee 
Rigby with the English Defence League. As he puts it: “So entwined have 
the English Defence League and radical Islam become, they might as well 
be married”. He argues that the attacks by  “radical Islamists” are not very 
different from the attacks on mosques that followed the murder of Rigby. 
However, the similarities do not stop there, as Cohen points out: 
The founders of the English Defence League were 
inspired by Islamists who disparaged British troops. 
The EDL has in turn produced the Muslim Defence 
League. David Anderson, Britain's independent reviewer 
of terrorist legislation, is so concerned by the reciprocal 
relationship between certain religious groups and the 
white far right, he is thinking of investigating whether the 
police are treating both partners in this ugly waltz 
equally [bold: mine].
484
  
 
Cohen deploys a metaphor referring to the two groups as part of an 
“ugly waltz” in order to concretise the integrative aspect of myth. For those 
who adhere to the more left-leaning variant of this work on myth, this allow 
the audience to equate the moral deficiencies of both the EDL and radical 
Islamists to the point where they are viewed as the equivalent of one 
another. This provides a framework that the authors can model to evoke an 
important sense of significance for those who may hold feelings of revulsion 
for both extremes of the ideological spectrum. Cohen’s discussion of the 
EDL also finds support in David Lammy MP’s article in The Guardian, 
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which sought to blame wider societal problems and pressures facing young 
men, who are overwhelmingly the perpetrators of such attacks. They are 
“isolated from society, fixated by a binary world view where there is only 
faith and infidelity.” However, Lammy is one of the few politicians to 
explicitly state that this is not a problem exclusive to Muslims. Rather, 
“vulnerable males looking to fill a vacuum in a life absent of camaraderie 
and purpose are common to all ethnicities” and “it is not uncommon for 
fringe groups of all ideological persuasions to systemically target these men 
by manipulating their sense of hopelessness and lack of belonging.”485 He 
points specifically to the English Defence League, who had increased in 
popularity following the attacks, as a specific example. They had 
“radicalised the anger of disillusioned young white men and channelled it 
towards immigrant communities they believe are destroying their way of 
lives.” Similarly, another culture that “idolises guns, knives and nihilism has 
drawn predominately young black men into the world of street gangs.” 
However, Lammy also points out that there is something qualitatively worse 
about “radical Islamism” as it is a dangerous distortion that “masquerades as 
an all-consuming faith.” Whereas membership of the EDL or an inner-city 
gang fosters a type of lifestyle or livelihood, radical Islam “imposes a 
warped moral code and a polluted understanding of their purpose on earth.” 
Both 7/7 and Lee Rigby’s murder are the “products of marrying young men 
already drowning in their own grievances with a moral code that provides 
simple justifications for employing the worst excesses of human 
capacity.”486 
Cohen’s criticism of the Islamists in relation to the EDL is also 
picked up by other authors in The Guardian. Brian Reade is highly critical 
of the English Defence League for their bigotry and discrimination. 
However, an unusual event had occurred in the meantime. EDL protestors 
outside a Mosque in Yorkshire were invited in for a cup of tea by the 
Muslims to discuss their concerns. After the cup of tea, they had an 
impromptu game of football. Reade remarks about how “British” these 
things were (drinking tea and playing football being seen as important 
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British pass-times), and how the isolationist, and racist worldviews of most 
EDL members were not reflective of the multiculturalism that had won 
London plaudits in the 2012 Olympics. Indeed, those who see multi-
culturalism as the antithesis of what being English is about lost the 
argument in London last summer”.487 Subsequently, Reade finishes with a  
powerful claim: “the only thing the English need a League to defend them 
from is extremist bigots of every colour”.488 Reade utilises this example in a 
manner that appeals to ontological security. The attacks on Lee Rigby had 
the potential to be represented as a shattering of relations between 
communities, thereby damaging the established trust relations required for 
“being” to be ontologically secure. Reade hopes to re-ground ontological 
security by evoking a sense of significance (Bedeutsamkeit) in the form of a 
concretising a consistent self-other narrative that reinforces the positions of 
all people within the work on myth. This reinforcement has three features: 
first, “good” Muslims are presented definitively as friends of Britons. 
Furthermore, these “good” Muslims also have the agency to draw the enemy 
out and ensure that they are ultimately defeated. Secondly, that the EDL are 
also part of the enemy that threatens Britain and its values. They too must 
therefore be overcome by the appropriate means, such as the example of the 
tea incident in Yorkshire. The fundamental purpose is to assure the audience 
that they are embroiled within the narratives of the work on myth and that 
they can contribute to securing victory. 
As with the core variant on the left-wing variant of the work on myth 
(section 4.5), many turned the blame to UK foreign policy. Seumas Milne of 
The Guardian criticises those such as London Mayor Boris Johnson who 
had claimed there was “no question of blaming British foreign policy” or 
“what British troops do in operations abroad.” Milne points out that the 
perpetrators of almost every terror attack have cited “the vastly larger scale 
[of] US and British killing in the Muslim world.” Furthermore, denying the 
role of US-British “wars, occupations and interventions” in the Muslim 
world as a catalyst for terror attacks at home “helps to get politicians off the 
hook.” It also “plays into the hands of those blaming multiculturalism and 
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migration, feeding racism and Islamophobia in the process.”489  Milne’s 
positions is supported in another article by Joe Glenton who argued that 
British foreign policy was chiefly responsible for the attack. Glenton warns 
that “before the rising tide of prejudice and patriotism fully encloses us”, we 
must be clear that: “while nothing can justify the savage killing in 
Woolwich yesterday of a man since confirmed to have been a serving 
British soldier, it should not be hard to explain why the murder happened.” 
Glenton argues that the attacks showed it was “self-evident” that “attacking 
Muslims overseas will spawn twisted and… even murderous hatred at 
home”. We consequently need to recognise that the role Britain continues to 
play in the “US imperial project in the Middle East” causes this, and that we 
are lucky such attacks are fewer and far between.” Instead, what has 
happened is that Muslims have suffered at home: 
For 12 years British Muslims have been set upon, 
pilloried and alienated by successive governments and by 
the media for things that they did not do. We must say 
clearly that the alleged actions of these two men are 
theirs  alone, regardless of being informed by the wars, 
and we should not descend into yet another round of 
collective responsibility peddling [bold: mine]. 
 
Despite Glenton’s warning that we should not start “collective 
responsibility peddling” he subsequently seeks attribute collective 
responsibility elsewhere:  
Indeed, if there is collective responsibility for the 
killings, it belongs to the hawks whose policies have 
caused bloodbaths – directly, as in Afghanistan and 
indirectly as far apart and Woolwich and Boston, which 
in turn have created political space for the far-right to 
peddle their hatred, as we saw in the immediate aftermath 
of the Woolwich attack [bold: mine].
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While both Milne and Glenton acknowledges the threat posed, they 
are  keen not ensure that Muslims are not blamed unjustifiably for the 
attacks and that, instead, we look to British foreign policy. Both opt to 
propagate a strongly left-leaning variant of the work on myth that challenges 
Islamophobia, the far-right, and squares blame most commonly on the 
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government. The fundamental of the work on myth remains that the enemy 
must be defeated but, for both of these contributors, what enables this 
enemy to proliferate is Britain’s own flawed foreign policy and. Glenton’s 
position represents the cognitive aspect of the work on myth; he provides a 
schema that squares the blame on UK policy rather than, as the right tends 
to, on Muslim communities themselves or perceived issues within Islam.    
6.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed the work on myth by politicians and media 
elites following the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby on 23rd May 2013. The 
attack differed rather substantially from the events of 7/7 (chapter 5) insofar 
as the scale of the attack was smaller and because figures of heroism and 
villainy were far more personalised.  The image of Adebelajo speaking into 
a camera, covered with blood-stained hands, delivering a rant in 
“justification” sparked shock. On the other hand, the bravery  that Ingrid 
Loyau-Kennett confronted the attacker and the “Angels of Woolwich” 
helped attend to Rigby as he died was also inspiring. The incident may have 
raised questions about the physical/somatic safety of individuals (and 
especially Armed-Forces personnel), but it also raised more fundamental 
questions about the “being” of Britons. In particular, many politicians and 
media outlets began to raise questions about “British values” and what could 
inspire people to commit such grotesque acts of violence against them. 
Just as with chapter 5, I began by reviewing the rhetoric from 
political leaders before moving on to discussing the content of newspaper 
columns. Both left and right-leaning commentators repeated the general 
varying themes in the work on myth that distinguishes the left and right, but 
the differences between left and right were much more noticeable than they 
were following 7/7.. Left-leaning publications often attempt to distinguish 
the attackers from other “good” Muslims or the religion of Islam itself. 
Many articles did this by emphasising the mental deficiencies of the 
attackers. This makes them appear as a distinctive minority of people who 
cannot be negotiated with and who must, ultimately, be defeated. Right-
leaning articles tended to view the attack as an example of the diluting of 
British values, something which our government is complicit in due to its 
insistence in upholding political correctness. Unlike left-leaning 
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publications, it is more likely to consider insufficient response to extremism 
within the Muslim community as a key determiner in tragic events such as 
these.  
Overall, the chapter indicated that the core themes in the work on 
myth remained consistent despite contingencies of the two events. They 
were different attacks, yet the political myth proved to be adaptable to each 
circumstance. The findings here should serve as a catalyst for analysing 
rhetoric following other terror attacks. One would likely find a similar 
outcome with other attacks that have occurred in other Western countries 
since 2013. While work on myth is invoked in a particular context in 
Britain, similar contexts are, I would contend, likely to have been 
constructed elsewhere. Whatever the content, the work on myth answers a 
human need for significance (Bedeutsamkeit) so powerfully in moments 
where Angst and ontological insecurity threaten to dominate. This has both 
positive and negative consequences, as I reflect upon further in the thesis 
conclusion. 
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Thesis Conclusion  
 
The thesis has enhanced the existentialist approaches to political 
myth outlined by Hans Blumenberg and Chiara Bottici. It did this by 
revealing how the work on myth is also an act of (re)establishing 
ontological security at a time of political crisis, thereby bridging the 
literatures on political myth and ontological security. It also filled two 
further important gaps in the political myth literature specifically. Firstly, it 
has conducted an in-depth linguistic analysis of the work on myth following 
terror attacks, something that is almost completely absent in the literature.
491
  
Such crises can often cause political instability and create a generalised 
emotional shock across a nation. It is a time in which the work on myth is 
most active, making it somewhat surprising that more research has not been 
done on political myth following terror attacks. Secondly, rhetoric in these 
periods tends to oscillate between constructing unity and division and, in 
almost all cases, seems to lead us towards rather simplistic assertions (see 
more on this later in the conclusion). In the examples of terror attacks 
discussed in my thesis, we saw rhetoric about the compatibility of 
Muslims/Non-Muslims in the UK, selective constructions of “Britishness”, 
and attempts to harden and redouble political positions in response to such 
attacks. What responses to terror tend to do is attempt to make certain and 
simple that which is otherwise ambiguous and complex. If policy-making 
occurs with such rhetoric as a backdrop, then this could potentially inform 
rather simplistic policy responses. While I cannot claim based on the 
research of this thesis that simplistic policy responses are caused by this 
rhetoric, I can claim that the rhetoric is a reflection of a human need for 
significance (Bedeutsamkeit) that is particularly acute in times of crisis. As 
shown in the examples above, the process of significance-finding is also a 
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process of ontologically (re)securitising at a time when ontological security 
is under threat. I explained this in chapter 1, where I drew from existentialist 
philosophy to explain how myths ground themselves within the “the 
absolutism of reality”, a condition in which, as Blumenberg puts it, “man 
comes close to not having control of the conditions of his existence and, 
what is more important, believes that he simply lacks control of them.”492 
This is reflective of wider discussions in existentialist philosophy about the 
unique human experience of ambiguity and estrangement within the world, 
and our similarly unique freedom and responsibility for attributing meaning 
to our lives.  
 I argued that these issues of Angst are an important reason why we 
require the work on myth. Myth is of course only one way through which 
we find significance, but it is a narrative-based phenomenon that reduces the 
uncertainty and absolutism of Angst into the something more definite and 
concrete (even fearful) which, while unpleasant, can be understood as 
preferable to the meaninglessness of Angst.  Following Blumenberg, it is 
because of these existential frailties that human beings need “significance” 
(Bedeutsamkeit). Significance provides “closure” by reducing the 
innumerable possibilities of being and existence within the labyrinth of the 
“absolutism of reality.” There are many in which we find significance, and 
political myth is highly likely to hold less of an appeal to some than to 
others.  However, it appears to occur frequently in the aftermath of terror 
attacks. In addition to the evidence provided in my thesis, it seems to be an 
increasingly important aspect for how many understand politics today. Since 
beginning this thesis, we have seen several terror attacks in France, 
including the Charlie Hebdo shootings (2015),
493
 the attacks on the 
Bataclan theatre, Stade de France, and several cafes (2015),
494
 and an attack 
on the streets of Nice during Bastille Day (2016).
495
 We have also seen the 
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massacre of LGBT+ people at a night-club in Orlando, Florida (2016).
496
 
Britain has not suffered a terror attack on its mainland, but many British 
tourists (and other nationalities) were massacred at a holiday resort in 
Tunisia in 2015.
497
 On each occasion, we have seen local variants of the 
overall political myth that pits individual western countries as in an 
existential conflict with the radical, violent, Muslim other. Each event 
represented a rupture of people’s ontological security, and opened up a gap 
through which significance-making became plausible and, indeed, 
necessary. Each event incorporated themes such as heroism, villainy and 
tragedy, and were invoked in a variety of ways, including verbally by the 
literal discussion of their subject matter and in more extraordinary moments 
such as ceremonies. While Britain has its own unique way of discussing 
these themes, (e.g., the Blitz and British values) as discussed in chapter 4, it 
seems that we are frequently seeing variants of this political myth and it 
should consequently be analysed closely. 
Why do we turn to myth following terror attacks? My argument has 
been that such moments risk us relapsing into a state of Angst by 
undermining the fundamental assumptions we make about our social 
realities. As Martin Heidegger warned, Angst represents the breakdown 
reminds us of the fundamental features of “being-in-the-world” that we may 
have stopped questioning throughout our lives. Terror attacks can 
undermine established trust-relations about perceived knowledge of key 
features of our “being-in-the-world”, including our own identities and those 
of others.
498
 As I noted, the importance of these trust networks has been 
discussed by scholars conducting research into ontological security. 
Although the concept originated with R.D. Laing, it was popularised across 
the humanities and social sciences by Anthony Giddens.
499
 For Giddens, 
ontological security refers to a “person’s fundamental sense of safety in the 
world and includes a basic trust of other people” and obtaining this trust is 
“necessary in order for a person to maintain a sense of psychological well-
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being and avoid existential anxiety”.500 A state of ontological security would 
be one in which people feel whole and can act in comfort, as they are able to 
bracket out questions about themselves, others, and the “object-world”, all 
of which must be taken for granted to undertake daily activities.
501
 By 
making this connection between ontological security, Angst, and the work 
on myth I made what I believe to be an important observation: that the work 
on myth is a process of ontologically (re)-securitising, and that this is a 
crucial aspect of rhetoric following such crises. The construction of 
ontological security in these situations may even be based on fear and 
conflict but, perhaps counter-intuitively, conflict and fear can be generators 
of ontological security. Yet, as Bahar Rumelili argues, conflicts “sustain the 
political and social production of definite objects of fear, systems of 
meaning that clearly differentiate friends from enemies, and unequivocal 
moral standards premised on the necessity for survival”.502  The cognitive, 
integrative, and especially the mobilising aspect of the work on myth have a 
tendency to establish this sense of certainty in a dramatic manner.  The two 
examples discussed in chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate this in a UK-specific 
context, but I believe the theory could also apply in other contexts. 
What do we gain from knowing all this? More specifically, what is 
the original contribution of this thesis and what are we able to do now that 
we were not able to do prior to this research? The main contribution is that 
we now have a new theoretical toolkit through which to analyse the rhetoric 
following political crises (particularly terror attacks) that concentrates 
specifically on how political language is deployed in order to answer 
existential concerns in these crucial moments. This is important for two 
reasons. Firstly, these crises tend to dominate media and political discourses 
in their immediate aftermath and may form the backdrop for legitimising 
radical policy changes, normally in the form of new counter-terrorism 
legislation. Secondly, these crises can often have substantial social impacts 
and, in recent years, this has taken the form of empowering the far-right. 
Finally, in terms of the contribution to the political myth literature more 
specifically, it is (to my knowledge) the first piece of work to link 
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existential theories of political myth to linguistic constructions of political 
crises and terror attacks in particular. This provides a currently absent 
framework for understanding the relation between political rhetoric and 
answering the human problems discussed by existentialist philosophy. 
Given present discourses about terrorism, extremism, and a rise of political 
populism during 2016, such analysis is likely to become more importance. 
However, the thesis continually encountered the problematic issue of 
exactly how we distinguish political myth from other important socio-
political phenomena. I began by distinguishing myth and ideology often 
placed too closely together in studies, even if those studies themselves have 
enriched the discipline as a whole. Myths are dramatic and figurative 
narratives, whereas ideologies are concerned with coherent systems of ideas. 
Ideologies are constituted by ideas which offer purportedly coherent 
systems of thought about a range of political issues, whereas political myths 
are dramatic narrative processes designed to provide a sense of significance 
and ontological security.  Even if ideologies were able to provide 
significance and ontological security, they still do not necessarily take on 
narrative form. While we often find myth and ideology interacting closely in 
practice (which may reflect why they are often studied together), we must 
keep them analytically separate in order to avoid losing the specificity of 
either. I subsequently distinguished between myth and religion. I 
acknowledge that they have many overlaps, especially since both answer 
existential questions about the human condition. However, religions attempt 
to offer larger, more universalising and timeless answers to these questions, 
whereas political myths are more “inner-worldly” and context-bound. 
Political religions are rarer, but were most vividly seen in the totalitarianism 
of the 20
th
 century which, as Hannah Arendt pointed out, was qualitatively 
different to all previous forms of government.
503
 I acknowledged that many 
political religions will be founded upon and sustained by a variety of 
political myths, but the all-encompassing and totalising nature of political 
religions is hard to equivocate with the variation that exists in the work on 
myth. My final distinction was between myth and science science. In 
modern parlance, one assumes that science exists solely to counter myths 
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and establish truth. Instead, I posit that myths can answer different 
fundamental existential needs that reason and science do not necessarily 
fulfil. That is, myth is not concerned so much with “ontic” entities or what 
can be said to exist, but is rather concerned with our experience of being. 
This need for significance is not necessarily answered by the deployment of 
“facts” or “truth”, but by resolving the fundamental existential concerns 
discussed in chapter 1. Nonetheless, I elaborated on how traditional studies 
into myth have sought to consider it a product of primitive civilisations, and 
that it will ultimately be overcome by scientific thought.
504
 Ernst Cassirer 
considered myth a form of social regression that was demonstrably inferior 
to scientific thought.
505
 Yet studies by scholars such as Vincent Mosco and 
Mary Midgley have indicated that myths remain very prevalent in modern-
society, and the Mosco’s study into the myth of cyberspace indicates that it 
may even strengthen motivations towards scientific and technological 
enquiry.
506
  My position was that existential approaches to myth are not 
inherently in tension with science, but that they answer different questions. 
More specifically, the work on myth is concerned with answering existential 
needs for significance (Bedeutsamkeit) and avoiding Angst. 
Despite this, the question of the importance of truthness or falseness 
of myth was an initial obstacle in the research which, I believe, was more or 
less resolved by a deeper engagement with the existentialist literature. This 
is because my concern was the existential needs that the work on myth 
answers and how it addresses the conditions of Angst outlined initially by 
Kierkegaard. What matters therefore is the process of significance-making, 
and this can often be indifferent to the question of truth. This was also 
important to stress because of the fundamentally pejorative connotations 
that may accompany initial understandings of the concept of “myth”. The 
political myth discussed in this thesis is also highly controversial; a cursory 
glance may give the impression that I am arguing that there is either no 
genuine threat from individuals and groups who intend to kill and maim, or 
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that the subsequent comments from media and political figures made claims 
that were necessarily untrue.  As I have explained on multiple occasions, 
this is not my argument.  Indeed, even if I had explicitly stated whether it 
was true or false, it would not have changed the outcomes of the research as 
I was concerned with the existentialist problems, not on whether these 
representations of reality were accurate. 
With my theoretical framework established, the question then 
became how we can observe myth in language. In chapter 3, my 
methodology chapter, I noted that my focus would be on the dramatic and 
figurative language that sought to find significance (Bedeutsamkeit) at a 
time of crisis. I identified two features of language that tend to be present in 
the work on myth. The first was deixis, which refers to the act of “pointing” 
via language, and this tends to be analysed in the form of “person”, “place” 
and “time” deixis. These are important because political myths tend to have 
narratives of people, places, and times when they are invoked. Myths may 
tell stories of heroic individuals, of places with great symbolic value, and 
important times in history (i.e., the founding of a social order) or prophesise 
about future times (a promise of victory). I noted that deixis is often made 
apparent through highly dramatic language often contains metaphor, 
metonymy, and synecdoche.  Metaphor allows the speaker to dramatise 
narratives and represent them beyond their literal subject-matter. Metonymy 
and synecdoche allow the speaker to construct shorthand representations of 
particular important events – one of the most important being the “Blitz.” 
To my knowledge, my thesis is the first piece of work to combine deixis and 
tropes to analyse myth in the existentialist sense, although Jonathan 
Charteris-Black has deployed his linguistic theories to analysing alternative 
approaches to political myth.
507
  
The remainder of chapter 3 was dedicated to discussing the selection 
of my source material and the issues that face qualitative research more 
generally.  There were challenges in deciding what types of material I 
should select, how much of it I should analyse, and how to ensure that my 
research was reflexive. I explained that my interpretation of my empirical 
material was neither nor detached from the context in which I read it. 
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Centuries of hermeneutic philosophy indicates that subjective readings 
(even if they are intersubjectively grounded) of texts are inevitable due to 
the contextual differences in which they are read.
508
 I justified my choice of 
selecting the London bombings of July 7
th
 2005 and the murder of Lee 
Rigby in 2013 as two key moments in the work on myth in a British context. 
Newspaper articles and political speeches were selected from the immediate 
aftermath of such attacks. This was important because such moments 
represent the height of a crisis, and one in which the threat of Angst can re-
occur. It is a time in which the work on myth is at its most stark, and where 
the theoretical observations made in chapters 1 and 2 are most clear. My 
approach was clearly interpretivist and qualitative, and I would be 
unconvinced by attempts to adopt a foundationalist or positivist approach to 
political myth, most notably because it may leave the researcher compelled 
to analyse myth in terms of whether it is true or false. That said, some 
quantitative approaches that assess the frequency of myth based on certain 
utterances (deixis, tropes, etc) would make sense if they are predicated on 
an understanding that these are still subjective interpretations that may be 
read differently depending upon context. Quantitative approaches may be 
useful when the researcher is dealing with a large volume of empirical 
material but, in my view, this will always be less preferable to qualitative 
approaches that can provide more detailed and context-specific analyses of 
the work on myth. This is even more crucial since the work on myth is 
characterised not just by constancy in content, but also variance. This would 
make it difficult to construct all-encompassing, cross-contextual (e.g. 
concerning socio-cultural and historical differences) theories about the 
content of a political myth that would apply in all circumstances. The 
political myth I discussed in this thesis may have a constancy in subject-
matter that makes it adaptable to a multitude of contexts, but the way it is 
invoked in particular places depends on factors that may not be universally 
present, such as a shared history, cultural norms, different political events, 
etc. I would argue that this ultimately justifies my approach to select 
examples within a time period that emphasises the work on myth at key 
moments in a UK-based context. 
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Building from these insights, I explained the core features of the 
work on a political myth in a UK context. I argued that narratives about 
Britain facing an existential conflict with a pernicious violent radical form 
of Islam have taken the form of a political myth. This is a story of good and 
evil, wherein Britain is threatened by an insidious other who must ultimately 
be destroyed. Although there are multitudes of ways in which British 
identity can be conceived, in took two important forms in the empirical 
material. There are two main features to this: the first is the notion that 
Britain is an exceptionally resilient country, which is sourced from its heroic 
displays during the Blitz. The second extols the virtues extols the virtues of 
British values that should be adopted by the other. Indeed a key determiner 
of whether Britain will be victorious or not depends on whether these values 
can be mobilised to convert radical and potentially violent Muslims. This 
chapter set the groundwork for the empirical analysis in chapters 5 and 6. In 
many respects, it served as a prelude to these chapters insofar as the 
majority of the content of the political myth was made most visible in them.  
Chapter 5 discussed the London bombings of 7
th
 July 2005 (which 
came to be known as 7/7) and the subsequent work on myth that took place 
between political elites and newspaper columnists. This is not the first work 
to look at the role of political myth following 7/7. That accolade belongs to 
Darren Kelsey, who analysed what he identified as the “myth of the Blitz” 
around this time period.
509
 It is also not the first to study the concept of 
ontological security, as this has formed one part of Stuart Croft’s work.510 
However, my thesis is (to my knowledge) the first to apply existentialist 
theories of political myth into a linguistic analysis of political rhetoric. It 
enables us to more deeply interrogate the rhetoric that occurs in the 
immediate aftermath of these attacks. I began with an analysis of the 
responses from politicians, and I paid particular attention to Tony Blair’s 
reaction to the events following the attack. I noted that the “British 
resilience” narrative theme discussed in section 4.2 was strongly present in 
this period and, in particular, many comparison were made between the 
                                                          
509
 Kelsey, "The Myth of the "Blitz Spirit" in British Newspaper Responses to the 
July 7th Bombings."; Media, Myth and Terrorism: A Discourse-Mythological 
Analysis of the 'Blitz Spirit' in British Newspaper Responses to the July 7th 
Bombings. 
510
 Croft, Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security. 
206 
 
resilience of Britons and Londoners especially and those who resisted the 
Nazis during the Blitz. I argued that the events represented a shattering of 
ontological security and a potential return to a state of Angst. Blair’s rhetoric 
was deployed (consciously or not) to prevent this, find significance 
(Bedeutsamkeit) and re-establish ontological security.  
I moved on to discuss the reaction of newspaper columnists from 
left-leaning and right-leaning sources. Just as with the political speeches, 
many continued to make references to the Blitz, with claims that Britain 
would endure against the enemy other and would ultimately be victorious. 
While both the left-leaning and right-leaning publications evoked the core 
themes of the work on myth (i.e., that there was a conflict with a radical and 
violent Muslim other), there were some differences the responses they 
advocated. Right-leaning publications were more likely to express outrage 
at the failure to confront the enemy sooner, which they attribute to weak 
governance as because they were in thrall to political correctness. Left-
leaning publications were more likely to discuss the perceived failures of 
British foreign policy and warn against the dangers of Islamophobia and the 
rise of the far-right. While both British resilience and British values were 
important in these cases, the former took on greater prominence following 
the attack. Many comments discussed stories of Londoners overcoming the 
odds in a fashion comparable to the Blitz - theme that featured heavily. This 
situation was broadly reversed with the example of the murder of Lee Rigby 
in Chapter 6. While British resilience” remained important at times in the 
rhetoric, I showed that more attention was paid to the second core theme of 
the collective self-narrative in the work on myth: the importance of “British 
values”.  This was often invoked in a much more personalising manner. 
Themes of heroism and villainy were particular important, owing primarily 
due to Rigby’s work as a soldier. However, much was also made of the 
heroism of Ingrid Loyau-Kennett, a member of the public who confronted 
the attackers while they still wielded blood-stained weapons. Loyau-Kennett 
and the “Angels of Woolwich” were depicted as heroic figures at a time of 
grave tragedy, and an embodiment of values we should aspire to hold.  
Both of these chapters highlighted overarching themes that 
continued to repeat themselves in different forms. A terror attack would 
occur that would be subsequently constructed as a crisis instigated by an 
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insidious enemy. In the immediate aftermath of the event, politicians and 
media figures would seek to offer public interpretations of what had 
happened. More often than not, they would make statements that described 
the importance of the situation, and invoke dramatic and figurative language 
in the process of this. Much of the rhetoric would make reference to the 
heinousness of the enemy, and the promise that in unity the collective self 
would triumph. We often saw references to past historic victories, 
prophecies of future victories, along with other references to identity tropes 
of the self and other. What seems to link these examples is the attempt to 
provide some form of “grounding” where it may otherwise be absent. The 
speeches and newspaper columns give the audience a platform from which 
they can situate themselves in relation to each event. They can (re)learn 
about the core features of the work on myth: who they are, who the enemy 
is, and the nature of the conflict. In such a moment of where there may 
otherwise be Angst, the speeches offer an opportunity for clarity and 
concrete meaning where numerous other contradictory interpretations may 
be available. I would argue that represents precisely what Blumenberg 
referred to when he discussed the idea that myth is a way through which we 
construct significance (Bedeutsamkeit) within the absolutism of reality.  Put 
in less grandiose terms, at a time of disruption to our sense of security, we 
will often seek ways to feel secure once again. This can be distinguished 
from physical safety insofar as it refers to a certain security of our being, in 
which we can understand our place within the world, including our relations 
with others. 
All of this raises normative concerns that should serve as a catalyst 
for future research. The empirical material in chapters 5 and 6 seems to 
indicate that political myth often ends up simplifying our social and political 
experiences, and this simplicity may be a necessary part of constructing 
significance and ontological security. However, this could have important 
social and political consequences; political myth might radically simplify 
highly sensitive and complex situations into dramatic absolutes and, more 
worryingly, could encouraged simplified perceptions about people and 
potentially create the conditions of possibility for prejudice. As Johan 
Galtung points out, the most important part of the word “prejudice” is the 
particle “pre”, meaning “a judgement made in advance, independent of 
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experience”.511 A study by Knowles and Effron concludes that high-
entitativity can grant an element of legitimacy to prejudice and disinhibit its 
expression, especially when it is linked to a group’s pursuit of collective 
interests. Prejudice was seen by third parties as more legitimate when 
expressed by participants of high-entitativity groups who were defending 
their collective interests, and people were more willing to express private 
prejudices about others when they perceived themselves as belonging to a 
high entitative group.
512
  Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that 
imaginations about Muslims continue to be influenced by the perception 
that they are an existential threat. A poll carried about by the charity Islamic 
Relief asked 6,640 people which three words and phrases they most 
associate with the world “Muslim”. Of these, 12% said terror, terrorist, or 
terrorist, which was the most frequently given phrase. This was ahead of 
faith (11%), mosque (9%), Qu’ran (8%), religious (8%), Muhammed (5%), 
Allah (5%) and prayer (5%). A further 5% of people said “extremist or 
misogynist”.513 The media has influence on many of these perceptions.514 In 
2007, a report commissioned by the Greater London Authority which 
examined press material from 2006, found that prevailing view in the press 
was that “there is no common ground between the West and Islam, and that 
conflict between them is accordingly inevitable.”515 Islam is portrayed in the 
media as “profoundly different from, and a serious threat to, the West, and 
that within Britain Muslims are different from and threat to ‘Us’” and a 
group challenges “’our’ culture, values, institutions and way of life.”516 
There were several themes to this narrative including: the failure of Muslims 
to integrate, their obscurantism, the incompatability of their values and 
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interests with the rest of British society, their unreasonable demands and 
their support of extremism and their mixed loyalties.
517
 We have seen many 
examples of this by media commentators on both left and right-leaning 
sources discussed throughout chapters 5 and 6. However, none of this has 
been cited to claim that all people who are influenced by the political myth 
discussed in the thesis are prejudiced against all Muslims. What I am trying 
to point out is that simplification of how we perceive people risks 
encouraging generalisations that could, ultimately, become prejudicial.  
This presents a serious challenge: how do we reconcile our 
existential needs in such times of perceived crisis – which simplification 
helps us to achieve – with a desire to sustain an open, transformative, and 
non-essentialised understanding of ourselves and others? I would suggest 
that this is an important avenue for further philosophical enquiry. If political 
myth encourages simplicity where it may best be viewed through a “shades 
of grey” lens, then we may perhaps risk reckless and inappropriate 
responses. Despite this, it is also crucial that do not discount the positive 
aspects of the work on myth. It seems that there is much to be said in favour 
of the work on myth in times of crisis. Perhaps any rhetoric that can bring 
people together at such difficult times is a positive thing?  
There is some merit to this point in the sense that it acknowledges 
our need for a sense of collective solidarity. Although this would require 
further philosophical investigation, my sense is that we should take a 
consequentionalist approach to political myths as we analyse them. Rather 
than assuming that political myths are always good or bad, we should 
consider what they do.  We should ask several questions, such as: who do 
they exclude? Who do they include? Do they encourage prejudices? Can 
they incite violence? However, this may not satisfy some scholars in the 
existentialist tradition of philosophy, who may see political myth as 
essentially a process of suppressing Angst rather than engaging with its 
productive potential. Karl Jaspers may have argued that political myth 
would represent a failure to present a strong “inner resistance” to the “social 
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configurations” that are consistently imposed upon us.518 Furthermore, 
Kierkegaard actively encouraged us to embrace Angst:  
“I will say that this is an adventure that every human 
being must go through – to learn to be anxious… 
whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has 
learned the ultimate”.519  
By implication, this would mean that political myth is a sign of 
weakness and non-authentic living. If we were to hold it to that standard, 
then we would ultimately argue that it must be suppressed and overcome. 
Not only does this seem highly improbable and impractical, it also strikes 
me as somewhat normatively dubious. Surely much of “being-with” 
requires sympathy and empathy for the position of others, and striving to 
construct a sense of unity only represents to support people in times of 
emotional hardship? To me, it would be bizarre to critique all myths. 
Rather, we should consider whether they are built out of already pre-
conceived essentialist notions of self/other, or in a society in which 
prejudice and discrimination flourish. I believe this question could provide a 
catalyst for exciting philosophically grounded work that takes this question 
seriously. It should opt to critique situations where political myth may be 
contributing to conditions that create profound suffering. This will require 
much reflection and careful investigation into often deeply sensitive issues. 
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